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ABSTRACT 
Tho 0ubjoc~ of t~~ thoai~ !~ tho pROcoag of 
oecul~i~&i!oo in moder~ TUFkGYo Xt bogi~ ~iih e aootion 
l:GW!Ot:Jing ihG coooopt of aoc\!l~ize.'Moxu in oocio1ogica2 L. 
lito~&i"~o so i~t tho subsoquoni o~imni!o~ of ih® ~ki~ 
CQGO csn be aoon ~ ~pp~op~i~to poEDpoctivoo 
'ftlG goco~ ~action EGMiO't!~- "illio iniollocilMll rurgl.lDOllliD 
cUEroni i~ ~rk®y gt tho t~ of tho coni~Yo ~ thEGo 
mejo~ sol~tion£ ~osiod fo~ th~ ills of th~ l~i~ Oii~ 
Emp!E® mro RGho~od 't!iih opoc!fic crnphQaia on tho tho~t 
of Uyo. Go!Wp 0 by f~· tho I:IOG.i !Ellfl~ontie.l of tho ihirut®Z'S 
Thla tJociio~ on<iGJ t:Ji th G. look &t tho i€ilooo 
of Aietlmk 0 GJixwo hio: viotm hOO. iho m©blt p~o~ inflMllWO 
OB tho oo~so of IJGc~exize.iioll'l !~ iha Ropmblioo 
Tbo thi~ aoction ~oooumi9· the p~ooii~&l mo~~oo ieko~ 
t@~ds tho ~el of eoculQF.iz~iio~ Thia bo~ins ~!ih o~ly 
m!lii&ry ~fo~s in tho Otto~~Emp!~o and !a follc't!od by 
Tho final eociion of the eiudy discmeaoa tho ovonto 
fro8 th~ baginning of tho. multi=pmrty poricd until tho pro~ont 
tiiDGo 
Tho conclusion sho~s that secularization romaine vory 
much a livo issuo in Turkey todayo 
~ 
When. mentioning Islamic la~ in ihe following oiudy 
the TurkiSh t0rrn SeriBi has b~0n preferred to th® 
transliteFatsd Ar~bic Shariao 
3 
For the sako of clarity M~stafa Kamal is referred io 
afJ Ataturk even when discuasirug the period prior to his 
receiving this title from th~ Grand National Aaaemblyo 
For similar reasons the city on the Bosphorus is called 
Is~ even. during the period when it would be more 
accurate to refer to it as Conatantinopleo 
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SOCIOLOGY 
~fore turnJ.ng- to the events t-Jhich have taken place 
in modern Turk~y ana to the ideological al~ments which 
have bro~ht them into being0 we shoula luok briefly at 
some ia~as concerning s~culariza1.ion that axe nou curec:mt 
in th~ sociology of rel~giono ~a is a conten~.ioua 
area wluoh has J:.lroduuea a gTGUI.t deal of l.i teJ:a.tureo 
A comprehensive ~eview of ~11 this mater1a! is beyond 
the !IDCope of our euquiry ana tiO we shall confine 
ourse.1.ves to a critical aiscust110n o.f tne term in the 
hope of l:l.l'L'iving ali a satisfactory working defini tiono 
This will t~naole us to l:iee t.h~ ma1n body of .;he wo:t•k 
aga1ns" a fair.ly we.d uefinea oackgroundo 
No a~tempt will be mao.~ heL·e to prov.iae a :.t:evulw of 
the l:itatisLict!.l work which hat~ o(tj~::~n car.ned uuL 1nto 
sr=cu.Lar~zauun in tJestttL'n souiet.yo This is because w® 
aim in ttu.a seu~ion to establish a conceJ:.ItUal rra.msworkv 
no-._ an emp~rict~.l ontto In aaui tionv diffel.'ences be_twettn 
Islamic anu Chris han socie "ies maKe stat.istical 
uomparison of doubtt'lll valuav t.~Vtm wneu adequate 
statistics are ava11a01eo Bgs1ues 9 1.he s1ze of the 
statistical li teJ:ature prevents it f:.t:om being ueal t. with 
aaequa1.ely in the space ~vailablea 
'lhe term "secularization" as founa in sociological 
'!'hie is beuau~;~e 1 ta JuSBJJ.Htg coha.a boooms au a.inua~~P e.~:~ to 
1 ooscurt~ ratn~::~r tntm clW":ifyno Xm. this rGapect the 
term is not unique in sociology~ such terminological 
5 
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o toll!~ c:;nrunpl..o @f th!g, pE~WblGlil mth lie~ -oo 
1300W.~zsti®.Q~.& 10 Y,h@- f\llll ch~hlo&J> @l ihD Mild iod ~ie;\~oo0 
Mtd thG OEJpty oraoa of ~lffi'Ytt0 €!EO: p@i\.m.tGd to 1m G\7idoxwo 
cof iw cm:iGJ.t~oro., 2 
@E ~ 1lil paei!nc~aBI: of bcaoom:ng, = ilmcrsaed.~y di~ollll. 
~ ~oc!Gty as. ~dos• to con~t oE ~ doc!®io~~oo .. 3 
.AiO~c::.t.&' o ~S doolino in thG FOOOgni. ii@li'! &litn'd®d :&>GJ.igiO!ii) 
by ~cisty 1~. Dot m0roly confiraod t@ wb~liofo ~d 
m~oby lfGligioU!I8 thiruting~ practi!30 and insiitutiong 
:ll..os~ socitiDJ. sd.ggll!.ficanco" o .61 Thi\.&;~ d®fim tioliil 11!11 to ~ 
pr~f0rred to ~t of ~lfitto Wi1~0 $ dGfinitioffi wirQS~Sl 
ica.tiom.,---
s~culariza.tion is a. social proc~ss ac~v~ a.i th0 
l0vGl of the group ra.ihsr thtm ih.Bt of the indiwid1JJ8lo 
Felo for tho rGligiowg in3titutions rather than & dGnial 
tlh!ch th® r~ligiows institution~ &r® hold io rGprG~ent .. 
S@ w® ~t r~~r that firm religious commitment® on 
tho pQrt of individual Actorg doe~ not nec®~ily 
1 
secularization it is society as a whole which must be 
our concerng not merely a particularly conservative or 
radical individual within society. 
Later in this section we shall turn to criticisms of 
the concept of secularization made by Martin.5 For the 
sake of completeness his definition of secularization 
may be included here. In a fundamental statement of 
his thesis he declares that "secularization is less a 
scientific concept than a tool of counter=religious 
6 ideologies". We shall return to this viewo 
Thus 9 secularization is generally held to be a 
decline in the social significance of religion. This is 
seen by a decrease in the relevance of religion to suoh 
fields of social life as education 9 the law 9 and the 
political process. As such it is often held to be an 
age-long process. '1'hroughout history law 9 science and 
ethics 9 amongst other things 9 have increasingly become 
matters of personal or collective conscience rather than 
being based solely on religious precepts. As Pickering 
puts itg "the process has been at work throughout 
history: man's history is the history of his seculariz= 
ation".7 
One further matter deman~s our attention. lt is 
important to draw one distinction if we are not to be 
misled by too simplistic an understanding of secularization. 
'!'his "conceptual distinction ••• is that between secularization 
proper 9 and structural differentiation".
8 
We have noted that shifting the basis for such things 
as education 9 law 9 and so on is a basic indication of 
secularization. Yet Budd defines "structural 
differ~mtiationQD as being exemplified by a shift from M 
educa.t.ion syst@m controlled by the religious institutions 
to one controlled by the stat~o9 Is thera 11 then 11 a 
fundamental confusion here? 
otructurel diffeE®niiation !t is control of the educatio~ 
s.ysiem which passes out of too religious apheroo But in 
S@CUlarization it is the conceptual base of the ®ducational 
sph@~e which paeaea from religious to sscular institutionso 
Education and educational policies 11 in secularizat!onD 
come to be legitimized by reference to predominantly 
aacular P rather than to religious ideol·::>gieso This 
distinguishes secul&rization~proper from structural 
differentiationo Secularization involves the docline 
in the acceptability of religious beliefs and dogmas as 
so~ces of legitimation for actions in the wider social 
sphell'®;l it is not merely the decline of religious• 
institutions as a means of administration and control 
of other 11 non...religious institutionso 
Aar Budd points out "many sociologists believe that 
a true turaJ. differentia~tTori does· not· entail · seculQ.riza tion" o 10 
T.hey argue that the fact that such spheres as education 
and the law are taken out of the hands of religious 
bodies merely means that these religious institutions 
perform a "limited but purerp and hence more powerful 9 
11 
rolcv." o 
sentlleo 
Yet this argument makes little sociological 
As Budd rightly points outs nmaking values 
pure. and divorcing ~hem from social contexts and 
pressures seems likely to w0a.kam and not atrengthen thm 
likelinood or them becoming Q. basis for a.c tion19 o 12 
The assential feature to notice hers is that it se0ma 
9 
likely that if the religious dogmas and beliefs of a 
society are no longer felt to be binding on the legalp 
economic and other institutions because of structural 
differentiation9 then 9 the very sacredness and 
unassailability of these dogmas is likely to become leso 
a matter of social agreomento Structural differentiation 
leads to a de facto recognition that the religious 
institution is not the sole authority in all matterso 
Structural differentiation itself creates alternative 
authorities in the legal 9 economic and other sphereso 
Thus existing beliefs may be questioned and alternative 
orthodoxies may developo 
In summaryp structural differentiation does not 
mean that the ideology underpinning social institutions 
is no longer religious& it simply means that institutional 
control is no longer operated by religious functionarieso 
however 9 structural differentiation may well be a 
contributary factor in the secularization processo 
But secularization is not merely a shii't in institutional 
coptrol 9 but also a chang~ in the beliefs which are the 
legitimation of the institutionso 
'i'hus 9 secularization is an element of social changeo 
It may occur on its own or as part of a wider process 
of social changeo It is thus reasonable to expect the 
process to oe influenced by the pre~existing societyo 
AS secularization is an element of social change it can 
be illuminated by looking at what kind of society is 
oeing changedo ln a simple form this can be illustrated 
by the historical generalisatiom put forward by Marting 
"where there exists one religion possessed or a monopoly 
!20Ci'll.ty ID:pli to .il.li'ilio tt1o t1e..xT!ng !;;Jid~0'" o l)) Of 'lli.o&lo 
&li@.OI§lg oXM:J t1ill bel 00f!Gdic&ted ~ :!!!Gl!gioEf-1 o dUJ Vo Eiil&Jt 
t1ith the init.il.&l ~uelifi©atiom thnt Qtt~ ~koy ~ 
.., 
& sm&QEfic!al E0ading of the faciao ~G politic~ 
privil~B 8t:~am:iod to the Chzi!J;i.f.l!Jll rnn@ri t.ilogo. IS\lorag 
t!i ih th~ mplit boit1SOO Shi 0 i tmd ~~ ~Oll'i)90 "t:ri ~ 
Tho po~ tioll! of E"digion 111 thin Goci®ty a.fteE" 
10 
tlw: ~rio:m R~olmtion of 1776o IDm thiG iyp® M:rollg!c:m:~ 
as such i~ umprobloow.tic and :n.Cn=p®li tical 0 &1 'tho~ 
~~ ... 
"d.iffraEsnt dsnornimat!o111a tsnd to eru.pport o~ part-y rt'!.ihm.> 
tbam. QJIDOth~66 0 !5 The ~i tiah pe.tt~ dweloptld Q.~ tho 
"r®ligion ~~is politically ~problOOA&ticv. ihough 
csx~ partial a.llgmnents of dOO@~i!ona Md partiQe 
occ~9~ o 1~ 'Ene diffG~nco botM®oon. th~ American Yd. 
pt\tteX'liil :reJ igiol!l ita~ nomP-poll tic& p. but in ih® :B&'i tiQ!n 
"P&ttGrw thGriD a.ro l>&ib.l 19Gligwnonial of d@OO~tio~ 
.foo \b tbn:i!, thoy X'!lrui IWli(E!Olli\. 19~ f!:¥_0011 pDl~ \bicoJ.J\.y 
~bl~'isi©o 
~h~en:\s and ~'WO GJO.Cli!J8Ei8E:l COE3£X'offiio C@OOEOO~ ~ 
~ 'WO EOligi@ci.ty10 fi'Jl"[J 
im~o~ oih<9a. of ~ Eoligio"mO imotJ. il! "Me>oo io E::)'\> 
. ~ . 
emootm.ntioJJ.y C!.id!.rdmrodiiVo . Xt t1.:UJ. bGl o'l!il!iouo ~i 
D. 
@OColeJ;izertioo.& r.;~it~ne!.:U®Do Xi mlll '!!Jo of btGx-oo~ Jl.&'i$GE 11 
'W tJOO ~ho. if ~c. of tlliooo iypog bor;;J.i fi t9 tho 
of ooo~~!~ ti@JO. oo GJlroha cl&oi~ ~ t 1 t ir.J not C!. 
. 
-oo.tGmiU':l.e CQl~op'\$ OO:lt !OO:&:oly e. ''t®ol of O©t!!ID.iol9= 
Eali~i®uo ido©lo~ogwo'Jl~ It ig ~~ ti~ t@ givo ~ liitlo 
12 
ro~omo !Jm&rti "\smiio!mGJ oo!f.l9!«loEOO. o.o o. clODo 10 o ~ ~ 
it 13ll&li @o X'O.OOBDOX'00 0 if thiLo }i}OOi tiOffi ifJ "i;ll') @a 
oB!r:r6aint.Cld 0 ~"t ilffi -m~ocVJ.l.oxizai!G>n tf® ~o Eof~ U> a 
doo!!oo !R o11 vol.i{§!()~ inwii intiomo. ~i 0~27 n 
do©!iBO m @![:') iypo of EOlig!o~ iaoU i11lti€DlJil.v 1fA(§)g yot e!. 
doo!ireo 1~ omo ~oct of all Eol~~ ~iituii~@Do 
~~ ~y ono.@lo BO to diQii~i~ boi't:JO~ QOC11\16Ei30.t!®~ 
~ 0. ghifi fEO~ O~Q iypo of !mGi!iuiio~ EOligi®ID i@ 
Qi~lo p:i:'®coaEl 12.ffGct!rng ell rolJ.a!<mGJ iooii iutio@Ql iro 
~ Q&mO tf&y bocauas roligio~ inGtiiuiiono ~vo no co~©~ 
c~o.otGEiaticG tlhiofi c&n @o effocto~ by o. oi~o pF®CoQQ 
in ~uniform ~Yo AD ~e tfill eo conoeEUGd tfiih ~ 
QpGOific GJiiuati@~ s~h ~ne:l:'el objociione nood ~~ 
ooncora US& 't:JG tfill ~i ~ ~!~ E~t~iGmontg o.bomi 
roliai~a i~titutiomg &a e ~oloo2n 
~tillil 't:farna us that nru,1 iooti tutiooo oxpMd !Yld 
docliso for e tfidG ~mrioty of roaGo~ end EGli~!oug 
iooii tutiooo &r~ no oxccaptiooo oo 22 Wo ~t mitGi!JiY't to 
pcasible th&t thea d0clino in this oF that :&>el!giol!i!IQ 
illWii tutiom.0 or owe!ill in ell oo.ch insti tuiiona 0 ~y nwt 
be thG Fooul t of ascula.r!zation byt ma.y oooocaiva.bly bo 
dUG to liUllOthSX' CBUG\Go 
~iin tollg: us that ho intends to ar~o ~~ 
th~ vio"t:f. toot 90't:fhGro religion ie w~@k omo ruw fl. sl!X'G 
indic&tion of a d0voloped soci~ty fi~y orientated 
towaxds the future'' o 23 Again~ this position~ wh~ch 
Martin argues is a false one 9 can be stated by claiming 
that if society would "once educate people propel'ly 9 
in the neutral scientific atmosphere congenial to 
rational values 9 and religion will steadily lose its 
grip and mankind no longer be troubled by bad drea.ms'' o 24 
One instinctively rejects this position because although 
the 10scientific atmosphere" which facili tat®s rational 
enquiry may be "neutral" human life is anything but 
neutralo Human beings do not experience their lives to 
be neutral. I~ addition this position places too much 
emphasis on religion as a system of explanation of the 
worldo 25 But "believers ar12 not failed rationalists 
but human beings 11 • 26 It is not justified to hold that 
being a nuclear physicist and a believer are mutually 
incompatibleo In addition the views quoted above do 
seem to betray a bias which is anti=religious 9 rather 
than a neutral attitude to religion. 
Finally, in this regard 9 let us note that f1artin 
shares our worry regarding the distinction between the 
sacred and the profane. No sets of criteria 9 he 
suggests, can be used with any confidence to distinguish 
13 
between the religious and the secular. 27 We could easily 
substitute the. word profane for the secular in this 
context. For the secular is that which is not 
sacred or religiousg and this definition could equally 
apply to the profane. But there is some doubt as to 
whether a strict dichotomy between the sacred and the 
profane or tha r®ligi.oua and the aecular may bo maintained 
wlth regi:U'd tn Ielwn, wh.lnh i~1 whu.t muut oonutJrne U(i in 
14 
For Th!rlt1.21Gllio a '~GJooulru;izod oooiGiy icylioo @. lo..elt 
of 1!llEll.t'I7GE!:]E!.lly k!old &>Gligiou~ beliofo 10 o ~ T1rn.ig; ~W.C! bo 
1) t1ocl ohVJroh loGJ061 ! ii:J; toopor&l p®wozo 8 
2) rol!gio~ all~w~!tgolf to boeooo tho cbjoet 
of ~iontifio onquiEJB 
}) roligiouo imotitu1iomo. boc~ !~npoblo 
of Gnforcing law~ r~l~ti~ t0 GnOxilogo8 
4) roligiow;v insti tu tiorw mro l1lElfl.ble- to oomtrru 
tho liVOISI {)f !W:dividW!lg tho~gh thiQ iB 
tho only B)9hG:reo loft to ihG'f!~ 
5) r0ligion f&ilGJ to hold tha f!J06J.t i:atGllig<mi 
mo~bero of sooiotye~ 
ae 1 t M.s a \:!idGx> D- or®&tS=Oul iural applica. tiollll thl!m do 
dGf!ni tionw or sooouros involvi~ GJ.tntigiiog 4:>f 
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Having said uhat secularization is and hou it is 
to be observedp we can now go on to ask why secularization 
~hould taKe place at alla On this point Durkheim 0s 
suggestion is unsatisfactorya For explanation he appeals 
to 01natur@ 01 as the reasono Secularization isp simply 
because that 0s the way things area His views in thie 
respect are aptly stated by .Pickering: "the scientific 
Durkheimp witnout any clearly enunciated reason appeals 
to 0nature 0 = the course of events = a mysterious force 
over which man has no control = to explain secularization"o30 
Durkheim 0 s unsatisfactory conclusion on this point 9 
having been thus stated 0 need not detain us any longero 
Wherep we may askp will this secularization process 
lead us? Durkheim has ~n answer to this questiono 
But his conclusion is itself not without some difficultyo 
His approach WE~s somewhat paradoxical: "religion is 
dying and society is becoming secular; yet 9 on the other 
hand 9 religion. is alive and will always be a component 
This is a great problem in the 
theory of secularization& is it perhaps that we simply 
cannot know where. the process is leading us? It may 
be answered that sociology is not predictive 9 in the sense 
in which the physical sciences are: nevertheless 0 it was 
one of UUrkheim 1s contentions that sociology would become 
as scientific - and thus predictive - as 9 say 9 physics 
or chemistryo 'J.'he twth is that this difficulty arises 
out of Durkheim 0 s attitude to religiono The seeds of 
this paradox are to be found therea Durkheim 9 Pickening 
tells us 0 had an ambivalent attitude towards religiono 
This involved 10a denial of its truth=claims 0 on the on® 
16 
hand 9 and a worship of ita practical effectsp on the 
32 othervvo For Durkheim the claims wGre not truGg 
cer-tainly they were also unprovable. by using the methods 
of socioLogyo But at the same time he held that religion 
fulfilled a valuable role in society. The question of 
whether a totally non=religious society is possible is 
mor® a question for the philosopher than for th~ social 
scientist., All that is necessary for us to remember 
is that Durkheim is u.nclear as to the future of religion 
and whether or not it will remain a force 0 or at least 
an· element 9 in society. He is unclear as to whether 
religion can be or will become wholly non=aocial and 
entirely personalo 
.Finally Durkheim :reminds us of age-long aecularization9 
as against the shorter term 9 moFe rapid phenomenon of 
mode:xm history. It is this age=long process which forms 
the back~urop to more modern events. For that reason we 
state it here 9 thougn it is modern events with which 
we shall deal later in this atudyo As Pickering 
explains itg "for Durkheim the development of social 
institutions in the history of mankind has been accompanied 
by a regression of religion 11 o33 Durkheim's use of the 
word "regression" in consideration of this matter is 
somewhat confusing as it seems to imply a re.turn to 
something e But Durkheim 0s point is not that religion is 
r.eturning to a previous state 9 but that it is moving 
constantly further from its original state as an all= 
encompassing inatitutlou. .Durkheim woulll holu that 
religion hue nev0r bean in aucn a woo.k position in eociety 
as it occupies at present. lt would thus have been 
17 
th~o !0 B dec~o&Qing nmobOE of ©cllGcti~G 
boliofg mnd ~®ntimontg ~ch DrG b@ih colloc~vo 
eno~ end gtro~ ono~h tG t~0 @~ ~ ~oligio~ 
cha.rooto~o~ 
~IJ ~oligion lcmo~ ooth }i)€lt70:i:' GEld :!Js!flmon©o tri ~Im 
tho ~ideE eooiot~ ~ ova~ l~ooo !to. imtl~om@o o~o~ iho 
- - - - - - - -- - -
idG©Jl.0~0010 0 JrkJlfG pf.l!X'tiOulUly tTO ~VG GilGO!Il hotr 
18 
ioo ~:1tom poEiod !Eil Tl!x'koyo 1:Jo G:lla.ell boQ;illil 0 !liD i.OO 
~E'\s cactiolillv. loy looJ.d.lmg o.t ih~ Moologic&! 51iM! 
tho@~o~!cel dovol®pmontgo 1:Jo ~l o~BO the iuorno 
effid 1\KJJL!.ofe 1.1Mch lio b@hin~ iho pz>5:>Ct.i@~ BO&£J~oo t:mict2! 
fo~th Qeoiion 1.10 ~ill look o.i ~ giin&t!oiD i~ ~ko~ 
®iJMo Jl950 inn €1m, eitompi io ~CJOQ~ tho ou.t~SOI[lO of imlo 
EO.fOX'll!!9o o..nd to 000 if modGm Turlto;y WI) a t~ip, & 
sse11Dlar: &Jie.iGo PickG:dng 1.1~ng l!G 'l;ho.ts 00:E:Gli~oimO 
f\X'G ~ moEo E®oilJ,ont ~ is ofton ~~ro .. ::S~ 
!Q ih® gocul~ gopwblic qf Tmrkoy p~oof of ~e t&ei? 
SECTION TH'O 
Turua:SH THOUGHT 
i~tolloctU&l elomontg in ~k!sh 0ocul~io8o ~s~ 
cl. o~ Bi th tho oociol ogical roo. te:dBl e.lroooy disctaGJr;;~Qd o. 
At tho turn of tho cenim:'y foB ~toliQJA ·d.J.l~Eo 
IVpoOO~Gl0d F»Jzy J!:G@l QC')MQ Cf JM.t;M)!Mll idonti tyvol rut {tic\\ 
MV® e. tBGMe of idGntifyi~ 1;:;1! th :WlmB Md. @f :&'osontmon-1> 
of tho 'l;!ot;;tt~ infidol o 2 Evon in ~o 1960o foE OC3'\s 
Tulr?:w onl.y e h1bllolfu:l BOO e ~o&l 'flm'ko 31 JA o.ddi ti©Ill t© 
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f~t&liotic~ hi~y tr~itioDQl 0 ~ nGGocia~od ~ith GOQO!~o 
~poEotitie~1 0~ Tbio and of tho intolloo~ spoc~ 
ooculari£'5o !t. ia inclrulod brio.fly hGEG te oho'l1 ~ey~ oo 
it t1or.cra ill! :&;'Oliof o- tho idoo.a to bG m®til9ro.od 9hortly o 
:Fmtuiro iGJ ofton unod roimply as a doE@@il.iory to:rem.., 
As Robiooon oXl}lo.tlws 
1 t my fJP\U' a x-!8.1~ po®pl0 to Ofllel:&'JOOlllD offolrt, 
bge~GG of conviction !~ thoir ~f'ogi ~~~ 
to boe@Oo supa~ioX'a or im tno feeo of rove~Q0~0 
~ oamo ph!los@p~ m&y pr®v!do Eaii®nBlizBti©~ 
for ro~gnatiol1! to dofont end ~ti~i~Yo~ 
BoW1W:&: 0 c~e t!hollh it c~ or~i.JM.tod JlWt. !lll the 'tl:Ul~ 
but iB1l tho m.d~ of urb&n illltoll.ootuelt<~.,. 
nineteenth century it was g~nerally appreciated that 
reform w.as n0cessa.ryo Groups differed greatly howovor 
as to how much reform was n~eded~ and in which direction 
this ought to moveo 
accepted the need for reform but would only approve of 
thos~ Tanzimai reforms which were in confo~ty with the 
~oriato 6 r~ another response to Tanzimat refoEms Namik 
Kemcl argued that Islam was not the cause of the under= 
development of the Ottoman Empir0 0 rathen it was non= 
adherence to the soriat which had caused the relative 
decl!M of the OttomM staio 0 7 By tho beginning of the 
20 
twsntieth c0ntury 0 howevor 9 there h~d omergsd three 0schoolaa 
in the attompt "to find a new foundation for the pol! tical 
8 
existence and cultural reconstruction of the Turks"o 
By this time the problem was not simply seen as that of 
the decline of Ottoman powerg at thia; stage the problom 
was sean as tha. t of the "on tire tradi tiona! existence" of 
the Turka., 9 We ca.n now turn to look at these throe 
groupe in turno 
Tho firat of these groups can be t0rmod the 
Weaternisisg ihough 0 as with the namea for all the groupsp 
the t0rm was originally coined by the group's critioao 
Tho Westernista were the most loose of the three groupep 
not showing the almost aect-likG cohesion which the 
10 Islamista and the Turkists display0do For this group 
the main problem was to cast aside the old system of valu~so11 
If this were donep a new morality could then be developed 
to bo erected on the foundation not of the Qur 8 an 0 but of 
12 Waatern values~ For the Woaterniats 9 then 9 
modernization was far more than a material matto~·11 it 
toot rr.s.y bo co!IWidGrod. in t'l!l1&'m., 
~ ~mdmll~ Covdoto14 
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Thoy ar0 Toilf.il.k Fila:oi 
Tovfik Filwoi (:il~7=1915) c®~~v ~@U@! hJ,g pcotX!y 0 
~o~ bG. roco~zod to tho i~i~!du&l for tho ~i~~X'O~ 
&iio&!l of :!:'Glig:!.o'l!a· bol:!.ofli:l.l0 o 1~ ~nt of tho ~0~0 tm:i iiom 
by F~kroi prier ~ 19~ cont&!~od vGho~®ni ~o~uneimi:!.omg 
of tlfooi i!om, &nd obGJcuraniirno Jl..'O: Aput from rua a.lmGJi 
Lmi!iwr&n !.nod.o.iGlllCO om tho !ndividm},].0(]1 ri~i to intor~ro'IG 
roliaioug; do~v oihGr ido&l€il ~GI?® rus® p~omoiGd by 
belief in ~0 a dignity0 tho brothe~ood of ~v 
mgn°o oap~ity f@r perfoctiomu lovo and peacov 
individual l!bortyD and th~ infinite capec!ty 
of Ro&DC~. t0. transform thQ ~oX'ldoL® 
Ollho c&nnot holp bllt ~orndor ho~ tho o.cccapiiMlCo of GlWlh 
f!.bGLtE&c t idooo ll!D 10lo"lro" or tho di~ ty of ~ om!!ld oo~o 
aolwod the prGseimg problomg of iho Ernpirov no ~tio~ bo~ 
Ycai one of 
ho ~~d to proa0nt thia s~cular morality ~ithoui hig 
yo'llllthful roe.deli!a feGling that tho idoela hG pz>e~Dentod 
116J1M,Okod of G.RWthing foroi~"'o l9 Yot f<!m.'oigiil!J they ~OX'Oe 
~ot ~&J J')F@la)iiil$ nothing lGQ£1 ihan. fA M't:r ViO't'i' Of tho 
Woe;t,o. ~hoao folllZ fotmdatiolMJ t!Gro "!ooivid'I!BlibilmD 
libGm:l.liWp pr~ti~rn 0 a.nd p\M:'iiem!Qa~o:ltl 
Dx'o Alui't.&ll® Covdoi (1~~=1~~2) bolioood i!mo~ ~OGJGJ 
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tho ~o~t m&8~ of tho pop~aiio~ ~ere onli§hiornod0 ihaB 
Gll ettompte ~t r0form uould bo doomod to COillG to nothi~o2l 
~ oongido~~d tnet tho p~oplo of Turkoy uo~o guff~Ri~ 
fro~ tho Q&mG problomo ~8 th©oo of ~tho~ Mm8lio pooplooo 22 
Thooo pm9l'!\l1oen t5;dX'0 °0WOMologicG!J. 0 Q.CiOZAiif!c 0 OOO@.©mi!.@ 
~ ovon b!©:l®g.i@al dogoooEooy'0 o 2' .AEJ~ iho cooooo of 
thoso pr@blome ~oEo indolomco ~ ig.nor~coo24 A100 
to Eol!g!oubl offici&lbl uho Covdot coZAblids&"od to bo 'boiltl 
®~~id and dogono~too25 Doopito otatina tho pro~lom in 
pmhp pull 0 if nocoasru:-y l&eh tho pooplo illi"Gcil 
movi~0 ~orlting 0 e&rn1~0 a0®ing0 arui thi~ 
liko tho infidola of ih0 W0ot 0 26 
it ~t not be imaginod thnt Covdot uBQ hootilo ~o !o1~ 0 
or 11 foE that !!m.tiQr0 to roliaioo in ganoralo21 He Jmew 
ooth tha Iruamic ooionCG61 and !E&bic and Pereian H. te:~mtura 
u@llo 28 ~addition ho blhouod a groat deml of intaFest 
Ha.wing lookad briefly at somo; op!miomt of the 
~oy ca:!lod 
thGffi8olwoo tho Islmmic S0c!o~y of Lo~d ~n (Com!yG~ 
:n.m!~ X&:lla!i!!?lQ.) and thoiJ: most prominent f!gw:o 1;1EM~;r 
23 
~@tGfs s~br!o 2~ SmbEi boc~G f@IDO~Q 09 ihG collabor~iioftigi 
~=!01@3 ~~~ ihe Alliod @CC~pBiion of Xotma~ 
foll<ll'l:!ing tho !l'iro.t 1;-Jorld t-Jtlill' (DocGmbor 19118 w .LI.U@I!EJi 
1~3))o ?W· This g&'Ot!p Dimply pl~dgGd themaOlWG8 to COBIOOi 
thG "'riGW Dl2ifig O:L&pii'G9BOd ilm 9'0iilG qUQZ'iOX:G: thel.i ! i 1;1&8 
IGlmm 1;1hich 1;1aa tho obat&clo to pregrosso}l 
Tho gocond (!Toup of Isl&miG-tlil 'l;!lll.9 lmotm IMl tho 
~~am. Umollilo ' 2 Tho moat promiuont !!!Gmbsr of ih!a: 
chempiom of iha OE!.UISlO of orthadoxy and of '0Eovolutioi!Q.Z'y 
Islamic Intsrnaiional!sm"o33P V~d0ti 'l:!aa found guilty 
1;1iih @tfier lo~erg of tho Un!o~ 0 ~s exocutod follo1;1ing 
a oo'W&'t mutiol o ~ Tho lmll. i!nG®.!l.'s 1;1ors JOO.!li'Uy Al bmW.~ 
troops of tha Firat Army Corpa 1;1hioh 1;1aa at~iionod in 
I8i~l o )95 ThGir domandSJ 1;1ora quite a!mplo s ~~Tho 
,Ser!ai i£J in dMgazo 0 1;1e 1;1ant the .§oria.tg"36 Th(S! Umom 
erguod that aa a d0mooracy should follo'l:! thG 1;1ill of tho 
pGOplo 0 &nd ~~ ~ m&jority of the populatio~ 1;1e~® ~ltma 0 
so the la.1;1 of the land ought to b® ibe $orb.io37 Xi 
l;;la.ta: not 0nough to ba.GJG c®rt&in l~t11J 0 say relating to tho 
ll!J:'@!Gd 0 ihGYO coll!J.d b® no protGmco tha.t thGro 'l;!a&l em 
Ial&mio ai&to end that tha ~oriQi wao bGin~ ~ppl1Gdo3® 
ThG only lon@=iGrlil survivor of thia group 't1&s Said 
Nur611 (~7=!9W)e39 illursi~ kno1;1ll to his follol;;lera &G 
lbd~=U.Z=Z~ ~ T1iw I:JOOOOE of the Time~) t:f&fil m.t.il1 le&d~ 
e, pol! tic®=&:ol!giou.s growp 10\i tho t!mo of hi6! d@e.tho 4,0 
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fin~ !Dlamioi ~o~p to bo comgide~ hero& Thia v&a 
tho ~omp gaihorod aRound tho jo~ ~!rai=i ~Do4! 
Tho outatendixag figu~o ®f this group vM tho. poot 
Mehmod Ald.f (187.0=1,36) o 42 Aldf coooideEod tho mcl.m~ 
pF.©bloo io oo tho onimtoooo of a. gruf btatv®om too 
intolloctuals and tho massos 04~ On tho ono hand tho 
intollociu.ala fo~ th~ sol~ion to ih~i~ problomg im 
@f Eu,r.(J]lpo~ idOM. I.Mld mothod~>~: l:TB.B co!IWiderod~ by thG ~s11 
to bo tho ea.u.oo of theilt' prcblQJilGo 44 
tiol.!J.d bo pOb!lilliblo and pormioGJiblo to borrot:f froB tho 
~oeto4~ Obwiowol~ ~oai c~tion vo~d be n~odod t~ 
Tho difficulty~ 
Muaa Kazim 11 a. t!Fi t.Gr ta.aoocia.tod vi th ih!g, ~ol!p 0 
decltArGd thats 19\;fe mve to adopt oml.y tho eci~nco~a (llim) 
a.rad thG ~u&trioo (foaa) of Ewropoo 10~~ O~G:ll' ~ this 
\1e!ii%e~zatiolffi l:TSB impossiblo 011 evon in. tholil® mathrs ef 
cueiom which vero believed to bG outsid0 thG ~eri&to41 
oav ~i the ~o~th of ecion©o iro ~opo ~ cnuged tho 
do@l!no of ~oli~!o~ not tho o~OE tiay ro~o~ ~y 
coe2iderod thai ~iG would ~i bG too gro&t ~ problom i~ 
Chr!Qt!~iy~ ~h!ch ~olo~aisd ~ e®rt&!n dogxoo of 
d!oi!rocti~o boi~oon liDlig!om and tho ~oEldo4~ ~~owoE~ 
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~o Xolem covo~od 811 of l!fo 0 sa ~oll ee tho efi~E=11£o 0 
tho~ it ~o~d b~ iot&lly ~cop~blo for ~ooior~ ocio~co 
to 'bo iho ctMllGG of Q. epreoo af iln'oli~@si iy .ili'! ~o Xolaill.ll.G 
~orltl.,so 
!m ~i th,!g ~~ dUO to tho :&'OlD ii VO dGclioo in tho 
pooitio~ of tho mlome i~ tho nin~tsenth c~ntugy~ 
Px'o~io'WJly 11• "~o~ ihoill.' cor~.:l:.x'ol of odlilce. ti@!iv ®f tho 
jmd!eie.ry B!.lld of tho l!l.dminiei~ativG not~om" tho W.GIDO. 
M.d. o.ctod oo ngoii\iGJ g.f tho s.i&tGo5J.l A.ftoE" ihG middlGl ef 
tho niooteonth contury tho W.ome. ~oro {P.'e.d'W.Uly cquoo8oil 
ou~ of CQ~tre.l poeitio~o in iho ~oe.~X'El.@1oS2 ~Y 
rGm&inod ~ offici&lG e.t tho local lovo1 0 ~i ~oro 
roploood na.tio!Ylly by e. gro~ of pr©.fom:~ioM1 0 e~oer 
of the do be. to over modernize.tio&a and ihlllS lim! ted tho 
o.ffoctivon®ss of thoir contributionso 
m8st infl~ential ~0ro tho ~kigta ~ho omorgod ~ s 
resp~ms® to tho \1estemliatEJ and tho I~lamiliJts.,53 TI.Yrldsm 
d0velop®d fEOm a ~oup of intsllectuals wh@ manifogtodg 
10~ romant!o 0 idoali~>rip md no.'Uont\ligt ionchm.cyg 'fuey 
w®r0o o ~pEo-occup!odo o o ~i th Eull!opElBlil ideelhrt.ic philoaophies 09 o-54 
:Not to bo con~~d 1:1! th Gi too~ ~TilFkiso or p~Tl:!mlmirna 0 
the lfln'ldmts 1::!SrG th<a firS>t '1\lrld!.eh nationallifft~~.to ~5 
the· maj,&r infltwnco upon thQ dsvelnpmefllt of the !dew ma 
"WiAdGrlyigeg '1\u'ld.oh eeculariso., 56 A goed doa.l. of W.o. 
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©ri~~iod in the RmGai&n ~pi~o &nd ~~ do~ol~pod im 
cppog!tio~ ~@ ~~~!si ~Oo~1 P&n=~eni~0 in oe~t~n~i 0 
o:r!~!ll1Bt®il! !In ~&ry es mn ru t®m€\.tive to the gm>~!X!g 
idoo1o~ of p~=Sl~vi~5~ The difforonco bot~eo~ tho 
pM=Turld.GJte it meant I'~(!) 0 ~her®~IEI for tho 'rl!rlctaio i i 
meant culturGo5' Dosp!tc the d!ffor~ces 0 ha~ovoz- 0 
Laicism 0me~ad as a concept froa french oonetitution&l 
developmGnt~ in the ninete~nth centuryo6X It rofGrrad 0 
according to Me.rdin0 to "tho neceasi ty that the eta to 
rof~ain from landing its positive support to &ny o~ 
tS2 religious denom!na. tion no More oJt&c tly 0. in Frmwh 
l&!CWQ. h8EJ tm 01eaaocia.tion ~! th anti=elGricmliiDm Md tho 
®Qp~tion of church and atate"o~~ But any ioi'Iil G~ 
movomont could not simply bo tran9p@rtod from Franco to 
21 
p..laC~8o This is brougni out by Mard~ng 
In France relJ.gion and the state a.lL·eady opt:!rated 
on two distinct institutional J:egisteL·s and 1:1ere 
eveutuaJ..i.y sepru·ated in tne .ta1:1 of tne lando 
In Turkey a limb of tne ~tate 1:1as torn out of 
its body when laicism became the state policyo64 
As Feyzioglu also points out 9 the scope of secularizing 
measures required by an Islamic society are much greate~ 
than those required by a Christian society 0 65 This will 
bs demonstrated later when w~ encounter th0 actual reforms 
carried out by Ataturko 
At this point we may consider the thought of Ziya 
Gok&lp in some d®tailo He was "the most original and 
influential among the 1~rkish writers of the 20th 
centuryaoo 66 !n him was found tne b®st formu@a.tor of the 
major trends of the !tapublican periodo 67 Durkheim was 
68 Gokalp 0s principal teachero This can be seen in hie 
insistence that 00religion divides ~verything into two 
categories ~ the sacred and the profane 00 0 69 This idea. 
comes direct from Durkheim andp a~ noted 0arlier 0 is not 
readily applicable to the Islamic tr&ditiono 
Religion held an important place in Gokalp•a 
understanding of societyo He held thatg 
All institutions of primitive societiesoooSpFing 
from religion and acquire their power and value 
from this source of sacrednesso70 
This habit of religion's investing other institutions 
with supernatural or charismatic power was generally 
Wlproblema.t.ioo Mowever 0 it did become harmtul when it 
ma.tel!'ial 0 ineti tutionfll"'o 
71 This is bGcauaa it would 
prevent the~e worldly J.nst~tutiona from aaapting to tne 
®Jtpod.isncea of everyday lii'o 6 72: 'l?his domoustratOG ho1;1 
Gokalp sa1;1 the conservative aspect of religion 1;1o~king 
as a ~&k~ on development~ but he also aa1;1 the 
posaibi!ity and even the necessir.y or using religion 
to dav@lop na~ional identitiesa t:,.s he sayss 
Religion is the moat important factor in the 
cr~a~ion of national conscio~neea as it 
unit®a men tnrougn common G&ntiments ana 
belief61 0 7} 
Thus we can understand wny Gokalp could not remove tn0 
Islamic strand from his thinkingo To do so ~;JOUld hav® 
been a disastero Religion ~;J&s nec&ssar~ HB a means of 
binding men togetne1.· and providing them 1;1i th a common 
outlooko 
Goka.lp's conce1.·n for relig1.on and social ractors in 
his tn1.uking on re!'orming Turkey is explainea by his 
desii.·e to create a. nation 1.n Turk~y 9 and not merely a 
stateo M~· puts the d1.stinction like this& 
A coJ..J.ectivity united. oy political mores and 
subject to a political authority is calJ..0d. a 
statso Tho collectivity which is the produc~ 
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and tne union of cultural mores under a. cultural 
authority is called a nationo74 
The reforms Gokalp was 1.nterest~d 1.n seeing were. thos~ 
aimed at the entire culture ana not simply at political 
insti tu.tionB·o 
Gokalp recognised that in tne d.ays of tne Union of 
Progr&st!l. theL·e; were two key B!Choola of tnought 9 ono 
belioving !slam to De compatible with model.n oivilizat1.on 
an~ the oth~r tninking it was noto75 Ho oaw ~t ao a 
major paut of his ~ask to attempt to dis~over whioh of 
tnesa arguments was trueo 
Ho boH.mrod ihai tho 00t\mdamonimlo of the fa! ~w 
~oro not ~ubjoct to tho la~g of evolution ~hich 
govornod social inaiitutionso7~ Xmdeods 
A religion c~ase8 to be religion ~hon !is 
ultimate principloo ax® bel!oved no~ to bo 
abeoluio ~ unchaTig®abloo77 
But G©ke!p did not go ~o far aa to state the pos!tio~ 
29 
Islam &s a politic&l and religion~ unity cannotp 
a.t loast in its clMaioal m~ad.:!..eval formp me:~tgo 
~ith w~stern civilization as it is todayo7~ 
The pFoblem ~as a difficult one to state just in 
People can neither ontir~ly drop tho rol.:!..gion 
they held eacred 0 nor can they di~penee with 
tho noc~asitios of contemporary civilizationo79 
The ans~er to Turkoy 0s dilomrna ~Bid not to be found in so 
stark e. choicoo 
and legal rulos ea religious ruloa and thus mak0a them 
~ 
so.crod 10 0 so Gokalp tried to find the choico ae ono 
bot~eo~ d!fferont olomenta within Is108o Ho attramptod. 
and "ihe elem~mte that depend on time and pla.cg" and liQ.y 
m 
change with the development of sociGtyo He citsd thra 
prillllciplos of ~ \:fh!ch ue "subjGct to the irMSfox ... 
~tiona taking placo i~eoosociety 0 and honea aro aubject 
82 to changQ e.long with socioty00 o· Ho also argu.od that 
celi'.t&in aspects of Islam "pe.rticula.rly the conunandli) 
88sociatod with tho proper !slam!c organizatio~ of 
soc!oty"83 w0re actually elements of Arabic culturQ Md 
1ood no pl&co in f0°pr!atino 0 Lalam10 ol84 Goltalp omptw.aisod 
the.t for him !slam was a religion that 10d<arnandGd of it~ 
follo~ers 0faith 0 p and it did not confine its follo~ers 
to any form of social organisation11 P S5 as Mardin puts 
ito His major contribution thenp was to argue that 
there ~as in Islam both the essential and the non= 
essentialo This would allo~ the reformers to re.place 
or abandon the non=essential elements and to adopt some 
aspects o£ ~estern culture ~ithout needing to abandon 
Islam in its entiretyo 
30 
One of the non=essential elements according to Gokalp 
1;;fas the Arabic languageo He had dreamt Wof a country 
~here the Q;ur 0 an would be recited in Turkish" o 86 '!his 
particular dream was to be answered in the reforms of the 
Kemalist erao H~ also spoke out against the making of 
laws by the Sultan=Caliph and called for the secularization 
of la~oS1 This call too was ans~ered in the early days 
of the Republic with both the secularizing of law and 
the abolition of the Sultanate and then the Caliphateo 
Howeverp Gokalp did envisage Islamic education as a basic 
ingredient in the education of Turkish youtho88 This 1;;faB 
both out of a desire to create bonds of common belief 
amongst citizens and because Gokalp never rejected th~ 
essentials of Islamic faith. However 9 he never etated 
what he held the essentials of Islam t® be 11 and had he 
done so any definition he put forward would doubtless 
have lessened the acceptability of his argumentso 
Thus Gokalp proclaimed the "threefold goal of 
Weaternizationp Turkization 9 and Isla.mization"a
89 
Westernization in the form of promoting the methods and 
the material aHpecta or Western oivilizution. Turkhation 
in the form of the promotion of the vnrnficulo.r languags 
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even in uorship 9 along with a general promotion of na.tivo 
'1\u'kiah cultureo The essential and absolute elements 
of Islam were also to be upheld as the. religious ide@logy 
to liv® alongside the material aspects of ~estern 
civilizationo As this excluded Islam from state 
a.dminis~ration and from the organization of society 
religious bel1ef was inevitably to become a more personal 
affair. 
followeg 
Mardin aptly summarises Gokalp 0s blueprint as 
To draw out the latent Turkish culture of the 
Turkish nation 9 to establish a Turkish state 
based on i tP to accept Wester·n civilization 
and to make Islam a matter of consciencap a 
private belief.90 
Gokalp was a member of the dratting committee for 
the constitution of the Turkish Republic of 1924.9l 
But apart from this he did not take a particularly active 
role in the reform movementso Indeed 9 his 11Fela tiona 
with Ataturk were never very closep partly because. of his 
academic reticence'' o 92 Gokalp l:las; more of a thinker 
than a man of action. Ataturk9 on the other hand was a 
man of action. It is now time to turn our at~ention to 
the thoughts of Ataturk and his fellow reformerso 
Ono of the most interesting studies which would be 
of great help in our understanding of the reforms would 
be a study into the early thougnt of Ataturko Unfortun-
ately the basic materials for such a study are not availabl~o 
SUch a studyp on the other hand 9 would probably show but 
little development in his thought. MBFdin believes that 
he had 10ma.de up his mind very early concerning the Turkey 
hG visualis®d in the future•o.93 
:ruring the reform period ll.tb!turk n¢1var ong·agod in 
&nti=Eoligio~. p~opagand& e0 ofto~ fo~ in the S©wio~ 
UK!!Olmo~Lli Mo ~oo~ in f&©i~ 00by M moeJW @pp©rJOd to iho 
reli~ion of h!Q pooplowo95 H&ihGK ho ~!shod tg, ~om@~O 
tho omirtW?iOG=@ld trooi iiolJMl. uhich hemperod frootlloo M!!1 
~ pn:@~ooo., Mo oowght ro Tt!~ldfy IGJ-lM ~ ~o it 
QCCOp~blo &0 both a ~t~al mnd B ~~iio~@l EOli~ODo91 
Tmd~ Turkif!c~tio~ of IrJlam ~as n~i gimply fo~ ih® ~&ko 
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of ~sh natio~iGmG9~ Hie purpogo 'Uas rather to 
10~fy IslMA for tho oa.ko of roligimao c:JruighltGlliJLlontwo~~ 
WliniGlli~blo to tho ve.c.Jt lilEl.jo~i ~y of Tlll"ltGo -
s~ippi~ IQltilli1 of tho li turgice.l ooo ©f A.Ea.bie Aiaiuzo!.t 
coH.~imznod of the rcrJ&aoxw.bl<lnGss of IlalQ!i'l& tho idoo OOOE'l!J!O 
11& dGifOl>ti§ conviction" in his mindo ].OO Al:il ~rkG&1l Gxpla.il1'!t&J 11 
for A'&!.turks 
thcrJ aboli tiol!l of tho Calip]l'B&ie mo!lmi libGr&U~ 
Islam from its unroeaoneblo iF&dit!QQBl 
asaooi&te~and preparing the greo~ fo~ ito 
em0rg0nco as a rational r0ligio~101 
i~ which r0ligion could survive in apito of boi~ 
102 sopQrat~d from ita custommry a0ttingo ~taf& KGID&l 
wa.a psrsonruly convinced "that a drivo for en snlightGnod 
and h~zed Islam was absolutely nscsasary11 0 l03 ~ 
noe0msity ~as ba&JGd on what Ktamal. rGge.rdoo a.e "the doop 
igntlJR&nOG of tho interprGttarGJ of J:Zol!gion" .1°4 YGt it trill 
bo not!cod that 'fuis ne1:1 atti tudo f&volllX'od tk!Gil continued lifo 
ot omly certain &apecta of !GlalBo 
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p®Eoiai ~fter tho reformso 
a opi~!i of indGpG~OUCOp a R&iio~ 0QC!OUtifi@U 
app:ii'OE!.Ch '00 lifo0 &rul ~ poo! Uvo fool.!~ iliw,"t 
tho in.di v!dtwl !o cepablo of blhe.pi&$ hio. otn:m 
doaii~o :!.()5 
'!'E'I!o 0 roliffioim- was grM'G0d emd !nd.ood guarMisoltil. 
f:K'sodom &iild protocti@EAo 1~ Bwt ihi6l waa of!Uy a,g loiilg B&:J 
10
.1 t trliB not utiliood to promote ~my Qoo!al gr po:u. tico! 
ido®logy ha,'(Y!ng inatitutiomU 1mpl!cationra00 0 ].01 Xm 
Komaliat sscu1~ism it was the ido~1ogy of Islamic polity 
which waa boing rojectodo108 ~ 1~~0 fo~ oxamplo 0 
Laiciom w~ dofinod as a doctrino wheroby Foligion sho~d 
be a ~tte~ of ps~sonal discretion concerned with 
individ~ oonscionco not tri~ atato or public m&itorool09 
As Scm!mmel commontag 
This botr&ys & fundamental misconooptio~ ef 
tho idoGl of IslaM which saGs in re1igi@m &nd 
state t>mJ.y two a.spocto of th0 ssmo rotali ty0 110 
Al tliwugh Atatuiiit cs:rr.ta.inly did not 't!lmi to destroy !~lam 
111 ~t ~imply to diso6liabl!ah !t9 yGt tho Republ!~ is 
firmly bassd ~on th® bolief that pol!t!c&l powor comes 
from tho trill of tho pQoplo wr~thGr than from soma 
rGl!gious or cUvi~ /Olow:co 10 0 112 Again tho inGhrtonco of 
i~t! tution&J but of 90b!i'w:'oeii~ e1 O~li.J b!YI3iemn is 
8\U:!Oly apte ll~ 
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clearo tfuat is more open ~o question howsve~ is ho~ 
realistic it is o To what extent Islam may be deprived of 
its political element is open to questiono Xs. it 
possible in tnis way to destroy one element without 
irreparably damaging the ~:mole edific<a? This questio&'il 
The Kemalists ~ould 
cla~m tnat tney were re=moulding Isl~ to present it as 
a rational .~.eligion devoia. of botn trad.itJ.onal factors 
leaa.~ng to under=development and devoid of political 
imrolvsmento But is th~s merely a ch&lge in the 
presenliation or is ~ 1. actually a pa.L·tial O.b'lstruction of 
Islam? 
While it is not the purpose or 1.nis s.tua.y to 
attempt to answer these questions it is impor·~<ant that 
they be inclua.ed at 1.n~s pol.nt s~nce they concern the 
fundamental ~ssumpt~ons and ~a.eas of tne Kemal~st reformso 
Any assessment of those reforms w~ll not be ~omp~ete 
until tne Islamic worla. haH reacned a consensus answer to 
tnese questionso 
As we ana!! aee 9 desp~te statements by Feyzioglu 
that "faith is a private matter beyona. th~ reach of state 
powt~r 11;Ll4 it has proved tne case tnatg "Islam in Turkey 
is t'i:IX too v~rile for secUlarism to ignore ana too 
unpredictable tu hold fre~ rein~oll~ From theory we will 
now turn o~r attention to the ~ctiona of the reformerso 
Following which 0 we wHl look to 1.ne .L·esul bS as found in 
Modern Turkisn Lifeo 
SECTIOH Tm1EE 
SECULARISM IN TURJ:{EY 
TO !S'jQ 
ThG 'fiu'ko M@p'&Gd Icllam won 'llioy ~amo into C@ID.~i 
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1:1i th ~:U.rnEJ ao th"y migx;'&i<:~d \;l'oeitrffiX.'dGJ.,! !l!o;w!Jffi8 Q\cmo oo 
tho coll'llcopi ef ;U.h8d 0 or Ht91y \18&' 0 gavo tho ~iiru ~ 
a Eoligioua reeeon fo~ goimg inig b&itlo iiD mddit!oa te 
tho!E ioEritorial incontivoo2 Non=rnilitary &epociEJ; @f 
socioty mlao bonofitod &a the ~am~ C3Ved to or~go tho 
adm!Bietraiio~ of the ne1:1 ior~it@r!os conquorod in tho 
oQXiy days of the Ottoman Empiro 0 3 In th® foll@~:J!ng 
p~GJ wo shell look at ovantQ. at tho ®nd of the Oti~ 
period 1:1hich 'I:JG~o aimoo at ohMgi~ Turlt0y to e aocml~ 
Tho secularizing proooaGJ ia a loFey o!J!G in Turkey 
atroiching back before the time of Ataturko It ooy 
practical authoriiyo After Sel!m I tho j~ioiml end 
theologic&l hie~archy cf religious echolmre 1:1ero ~ubjoet 
to the author! ty of the nru.f't! of !GJ.t&nblli! as Sh&!Wm 
al=l9J.QJ30 4 :&llt the author! iy a.f this official \:!8.,.;3 
simply theoretical aa he had the po1:1er to issue foiv~0 
but he could l'!Ot insia:t on their bGing obeyGd., 5 Tho 
pr@cesa of aeculmr!zing the la1:1 has beon undeF way in 
a rGal aense in TUrkey since the beginning of the last 
centuryo~- In the Tanzimat period the virtuos of behavi~ 
in mccordanco with Islamic cuatoma \:!8.S' strGssed at tho 
same time as laws were bGimg 8doptod fFom ths BGeto1. 
The details of thGse aventa ~ill b0 GxaminGd late~., 
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Although secularizing- re.rorms quick~ned pace in tne 
Ata~urk period such measuL·es were no"t to ~a.J.ly 
unpL·eceuented o ~ven in tne Ataturk period it was maae 
easier for lwka to acc!dpt tne retorms by A ta tuL·k 0 DJ 
policy of spreading the reforms over a period and 
i t d . th t t• 8 n ro uc~ng em one a a ~meo 
In the Ta.nzimat period two mentalitie~ b€lcame 
increasingly estranged and mutually hostileo9 These 
two positions were those of the traditionalists and those 
of the secularists or modernistso In this period the 
secularizing of the state took the form of creating 
dualities and dichotomies within institutions 0 not the 
form of a split between church and stateo10 This 
emphasis on sepa~ation and the creation of a series of 
dichotomies was replaced in the Kemalist period by an 
emphasis on unification and the resolution of the 
11 dichotomies in favour of the secular structureso 
This shift was partly the result of a change of attitude 
towards Islam after 1908 when the hope of reforming Islam 
into a typically Turkish institution was replaced by a 
12 firm policy of laicismo 
As Berkes points outP if we accept that there were 
two institutions 0 church and state 0 which needed to be 
separated we will misjudge. the events in Turkayol3 
The new Rapublican regime attempted to act on its 
constitutional mandate of freedom of conscience by 
establishing government agencies to help and encourage 
the people to approach Islam through reason rather than 
traditiono14 Kemalists would claim that Ataturk 
performed a service for religion from saving it !'rom 
political exploitation 0 15 .But Millar see0 things 
differently a He argues that although an atheistic 
ideology never bec·ame established in '.l.'urkey 0 religious 
leaders came to have very limited influence on civil 
affairs and social questions 9 except in the mora 
16 
r.emote rural areaso t-Iebster also notes this 9 
remark1ng that the sole aim of the reforms was 11 the 
secula.dzation of political li1'e 10 0 l7 Certainly it is 
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true that relig1on was steadily removed from any position 
of political importanceo ~fuether this move was aimed 
at be1ng in the service of true religion 9 as Feyzioglu 
18 
suggests 0 by releasing religion from political 
exploitation is more debatableo 
But 9 as we shall se~s~ 9 the elevation of the people· 
and their will to a position of supremacy was an ea.t·ly 
measure taken by tne Grand National Assembly0 l9 This 
botn legi timizea 1:.ne .t·evolution and made the .cevolution 
a new source of legitimacyo It is by reference to the 
1 t . th . ~·-k . tif 'h . l' f 20 revo u 1on at A~ s JUS y t e1r Fe 1g1ous re ormso 
This ap1:.ly reflects the pragmatic nature of 1:.n~ Kamalist 
reforms in that 'X'u.I:ks now support them by reference to 
an event rather than to an iaeologyo 
.Be.fore looking at other areas in some detail 0 tn0 
attitude of the Kemalists to history is worth no·l.ingo 
Kemal1sm tritls to diminish -r.u~ importance of the .Muslim 
. 21. 
and Ottoman periods of Tur~ish n1s~oryo Great 
empha~1s is t!,ivenp ratne.t· 9 to tne nistory of lihe p:xr.e= 
Islamic Turks and 1.0 tne ni~tory of anl:ient gJ:oups in 
Anatolian history sucn at~ tue Hittiteso22 Such a change 
in historical emphasis se~ms to have be~n thought 
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C!osirabl® to facilitate the L'®form of contemporary Turkeyo 
It U> oeyond tne :;:scope or 1.h1s ljtudy t.o luok at 
hOI:! the Atat\ll'm reforms were seen from tne perspective 
or l.hose li.v1ng 1n other Musl1m countrieso One item 
is ~nteresting t.o no~e howeverc As the Ke.malist 
when much of Turk~y was oceu.pieu by European troopsp 
the revolution was wel~.;omed by moat Muslim cou.ntrias 
as a move agains~ imp~ria~ismo 23 
approv~ may not be assumed to nave appl1ed alsu to ~he 
va.riuus r~t·orms propos~d af'ter Turkey had forceu tue 
Eu.roperuJ powers to withdral:!o Even wi t.nin Turkey the.1.·e 
were definite Islamic over=t.onea tu tne liberal.ioH movement 
in the early 1920so As Heper states: 
If a significant Islamic revival ever occurred 
in Turkey it was during the war of Independenceoo• 
Islam was a means to mobilize the masses against 
0 the infidel 1 o It was used to legitimize the 
national atruggleo24 
Having made these preliminary remarks we can no1:1 
move to look at the reforms in indivldual areaso 
Ottoman Military Reforms: 
Much of the early attempts at reform in the Ottoman 
Empire were prompted by military necessityo '.Phis is 
equally true of the first deliberate and conscious attempt 
at a partial Westernization policyo 25 This, occurred 
early in the e1ghteenth century after the signing of two 
treaties gave official recognition to two humiliating 
defeats for the Empireo26 These wer@ the treaty of 
t:arlowitz ~1699) 0 recognising defeat by the Austrian 
~pire 0 and tne treaty of Passarowitz ~1718) 0 recognising 
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defeat at the hands of the Jaussian lmlpireo'l1 The 
example set oy Peter the Groat of Russia persuaded certain 
circles within the Ottoman Empire that a policy of vigorous 
Westernization and modernization 11 particu~arly in the 
army~ ~;mula enable tne Ottomans to oeconw.P once againp 
tho· terror of its neighoourso 28 As early as 1716 a 
French officer named de Rocnefoli't submitted a plan to tho 
authorities for a corps of European engineering officers 
in the Ottoman armyo 2~ we shall see throughout the 
military reforms the important part played by indiv~dual 
~~ropean sola~erso 'rhe majority of these were to De 
French unt~l tn~:.w were replaced as the primary source of 
as~istance oy tne Pruasians in tne n1nete~nth c®nturyo 
De l'aochefort.'s proposalsp noweverP carne to noth~ng at this 
early stage.:%) 
The next attemp·t at reform centres upon yet another 
F.rencnman. ~is was tne nobleman Count de Bonneval who 
became a convert to Islam Dearing tne name Ahmed lE'asna 
31 Jronnevalo In ~eptemoer 1751 0 ~opal Osman Pash&g the 
Grand Vezirp gave h~m the tas!< of :ceform~ug the ~orps of 
Bomlla.raiers along .bJ'uropean lines.32 The significant 
difftu:ence oetween this and the previous episoa® m~mtioned 
is thai. on tnis occas~ou the ~~u l.iat~ve came from the 
Ottoman governmoot 11 iu tue SI18.pe of' t.he Grand Vo.ziro 
'!'he o'tllel!' ai1.ference is tna t 'tnis· ~u~ T.~a ·u ve oore frui to 
1m, 11.~ a school or gunnery \:!as opeufi!d. to tra.iu oomoareliers-o '} 
'.!.'he follo\:!ulg yew.· 0 ~n 1'1.)5 0 ue DonnevaJ. was ~p.v~m t.us 
rank of Ps.e.l'lllll. o1' two tul.ls 0 a.nu 1.t1~ m1.li '-W:Y rank. of 
Cniot J:tomba.ruieroj4 A:1lowev01&' 0 tne ne\:1 scnool wa1:1 suort 
liV000 tthen T.lle Janissarillls founa out about the school 
In l'lfB a fresn anempt was maaeo !n tna t year.· v 
we.s openea tor &.ne rwvya ~ 
co.~.pt; of ~;ugJ.nee.~.s a.nu a.xti11.CEYv and r~organized ths 
gQmPfoundryo37 In 177j de Tott retired to Francco38 
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At this point de Toit 0s assistant took over the ~ng of 
the schoolo39 Me was a Scotsman by the name of Campbell 
who became known as Ingiliz Mustafa after he· adopted 
Islamo40 
'Rh0se measures we1:.e given a.d.aed impetus in 118·5 
when the Russians conquered the Crimsao 41 At thifil 
point the Turks were being officially encouli'aged in their 
efforts by tne lt"'rench who feared e. Russian threat to 
their interests in the Levante42 A year later a new 
engineering course waa opened at the urging of the Grand 
Vezir Halil Hamid Pe.shao 43 The course had two Franch 
iuatr.uctors andv because of the language problem!) a 
local Armenian to act as interpretero 44 However 11 all 
the military schools became inactive in 1787 when the 
Ottomans became involved in a war against Austria and 
Ruseia.o 45 They remained inactive until peace was 
resumed in 1792 11 at whicn point a new Sultan 11 Selim III 0 
made a fresh starto46 
In 1'791 11 Se:lim III (reigna!d 1789=1807) conunanded 
twenty two individuals to write down their views on the 
causes of weakness wi~hin the Empire 0 47 The·se inaiv= 
iduals comprising civil 9 military and religious 
dignitaries were all agreed on the need for military 
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One group of those consultod by the Sultan thought th&i 
the ~y should be reformed~ Feverting to old Otto~ 
·military methode in an offort to ~esapturo the goldon &ga 
of Ott~rn~ po~or@49 A BOco~ faction coneidelied ih&i 
th® army could not bo roformod and that th~ bs~t thing 
the Sult&n could do ~ould bo to di~bamd the axmy and 
start agGln to creato a totally no~ army t~ainod 0 &rmod 
and equipped along European linoao50 It ~as to~&rds 
the latter via~ th&i Sclio.0 himself incliMdoS,l 'Em.i;J· 
_it ~s that in 17.92=} Sol~ issued & aeries of commands 
~ich aimod ~t oatablishing e. ne~ 0 RG~&r 0 corps· of 
52' ill!Jf'Mtley organiood like thoso of Europoo !Kb order t@ 
this: new foroo ~ sorios of f~sh t~os ~0~o int~uced 
o!ID commodities such as tobecco 11 spirits a.nd goffooo5 ~ 
ContF&l featuros of Sol!m 0g plmna ~oro no~ mil!taF.y and 
mwu oooool&J o 54. Those offorod courses i&'!t gurmery D 
fortifioatio~11 navigation and ancillary sciences ~ 
reliod heavily on the uae of ~emch teS~Che~ and 
insiruct~~o55 Fronch cooperation was in~orFUptod 0 
bmt ~as lat®r roaumed ~hen tho climato had improved 
botwe~ the t~o p@~er~o56 Prior to the ~Br 11 &ftore 
1192 instructm~~ !~tho military mnd naval achoclg 
~ero appointed diroctly by tho gove~ent of the French 
RGpmblico57 
It is important to get these events in perspoctivoo 
Tho new changes ~ero confinGd to the milit~0 certeinlyo 
Jmt 11 ths social implications of those moves \'1\'!rs fe:c 
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greater than may be imaginedo These reforms created 
a new element within Ottoman societyo5B That element 
waaQ as Lewis points outQ a group of young naval and army 
officersg 
familiar with some aspects of WGstern 
civilization through studyQ reading~ and 
personal contac~ 9 acquainted with at least 
one western language ~ usually French = and 
accustomed to look up to western experts as 
their mentors and guides to new ana better 
wayso59 
This was in marked contrast to the traditional and popular 
vie\-! that the West could and did have nothing of any value 
to teacn Ottoman Muslimso 
The next period of 1ntere3t beg1ns with the mutiny 
of the Janissaries on the 15tn of June 9 1~26 9 in response 
to a proposal for mili tru.·y reform from the tnen Sultan 
Mahmud II (reigned l80tl=l8)9)o60 This was certainly 
by far from the Iirst tlme the Janissaries had. revolted 
to impose their (conservative) will on ~e Sultanao 
:But.on tnis occasion Mahmua was ready for their challenge 
ana. met iT. head Ollllo ~una loaa.ea with grape=shot had 
previously be~ placed in Mahmud 0s palaceQ ana when tne 
Janissaries as~embled in the Hippodrome 9 as they habitually, 
did wheu in revolt 11 the guns opened f1re on them 0 fbl 
The f1r1ng con1.inued for about tuirty minutes by which 
time virtually all the Janissaries had been killedo 62 
The same day a proclamation was issued abolishing the 
C f J • · 63 Mahm • fr orps o . an1ssaB1eso n ud could now enJoy a eer 
hand than any reforming Sultan befo~e himo The Janissaries 
had consti1;uted the most powertul 0 certa1nly tht! most 
mil:Lta.rily potl!lntQ obstacle to refolmlo Witn tne Corp~:~ 
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aboliohod ~ could now p~oceed wi~ hiG refoEru!ng 
sehomoa without nseding to go in foar ~f losing oitho~ 
hig. throno or hi~ lifoo 
T1nin£J ! t wM 'Ghat Bi thG Gnd of 182~ a eodo of ro@.l= 
~tio~ ~ae proparod foR the formaiio~ of a now=siylo ~Yo~4 
Th2 forco was to conaisi of iwelvo thou~and mon atatio~od 
in the capital with additional troops in thG pr©vincoa 0 65 
~6 E£ah ~was to serve fo~ a poriod of twelvo ye&rao 
in the di~~ctio~ of Westernizing and modernizing tho 
ermGd fono~s by tha striking suocoss achieved by ~od 
!B-Ali of Egypt ilW similar roformao 1 It wu 0 tliruav to 
~t that Mahmud turned with a roquosi fo~ twolvo oxport 
ins~ctors to help in the modernization ~ivoo6S ~ 
roquost ~as twrnod downo~9 ~ ~d ~~ forced to 
t~ to ~opo for aasistancoo10 ~t the SUl~ ~ould 
no .. t turn to Franco for holp Cl.lm. eooo\!lnt of thdr eu.pport 
for ~ammod Ali ~ Egypt and tho!~ earlier sympathy 
with Grealt insurgents.o 1l An offer of holp. came from 
Pal.mers.ton in ER!gland but ~aa tumod down on acoomht 
of English philhellenismo 72 Im 1835 D hC!Ui®var P som~ 
Turkish oadots wor~ aocopted for training at Woolwich 
and three british officers went to Istanbul to assiat 
with the military roformso7} This was followedp in 
1&30o. by a British nava.l mission to IstanbuJlo '14 :B@tb 
miso!oms met with little aucc®ss 0 how0verp at l0~t partly 
duo to thG growth of lb!aaim !il!fl1&0noo in XaianbW!.o 15 
Beginning in 1821 Ma.mmw. :!regularly SJQD~ groups of 
students to Europao76 At first ihQBG gro~a WQ~ made 
'\Qlp QXclu6ively of army and naval oadets 0 lm.t in later 
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yGsrs civilian students were also inclmded in the pariiGsoll 
Mahmud persisted with this policy~, despite the fact that 
it created a certain. amount of opposi tiorn among ruling 
circles in the c&pital 0 7S 
I~ 1835 the Sultan engaged the services of von 
Moltke 0 a Prussi~ 0 who was to holp in training the new 
armyo19 ~llowing this appointment Prussian and Aus~i~ 
help was sought in training the army 0 80 The SUltan 
discoverod that assistance from iheaG quarters was 
readily availableoBQ From this time on there was a 
growing tradition of Prussian advisers and inat~ctore 
in the Ottoman army which culminated in the Empire 0s 
involvement in the Fi~st World Waro .Bu i G'l.m:m though 
the soldie~~ of the new army were now being train0d 0 with 
European helpp the army still sulfered from one chronic 
shortagGo Apart from the presence of a number of Western 
renegadea 0 the army was pitifUlly short of compGtent 
officerso82 Indeedp in part the Ottoman army was to 
remain dependent upo~ Prussian officers for the remainde~ 
of the Empiro 0s hdstory0 
Mahmudos other major military reforms consisted in 
establishing a numbeli' of school~ao In 1827 a Medical 
School was founded exclusively to tFain Doctors for the 
army .. S} Civilian Doctora 9 meanwhil0 0 continu0d to b® 
trained in the Medical Departments of tratitional 
Medreseso84 In the new Medical School instruction ~as 
in Turkiah and French with several of the inetEUctors 
bo!~ brought from Europ0o&) 
!n 1631~ ~wo other schools wero open0d for tho 
The firl8lt 
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of those tlas an liruperial Music School to t~aiu trumpot~rs 
and drummers for the netl army0
87 and the socond was a 
00 School of Military So!oncos 0 Europeans played a largo 
part in the teaching of both thes0 schools and th~ 
knowlodgo of on0 European languago 0 meat oft~n Fx'oucho. 
was compulsory for all atudenta0 89 
Im 18430 cam® the last majo~ militaFy rofo~ of the 
Ottoman poricdo90 At this iimsp during the reign o£ 
Abdulrnracid I (l83fd,=l8.61) 11- th® army was reorganized into 
five army corpso9l Each man was to senve for fivo years. 
with the regular troopsD followed by a further seven years 
in the reserve forceoo~ By this time all aspects of training0 
equipment 0 weapons and organization we~ firmly baaod on 
~uropa~n rnodola 0 93 All that is oxcept head=wear 0 
Ottomo~ troops wero now wearing the foz 0 which had been 
introduced from North Africa in 1828 on the orders of SUltan 
Ma.hmud IIo94 Wo shall look at the fez in mor~ detail in 
a later section when we consider the so~called Hat Reform 
introduced by Ataturko 
Th~ fez apart 0 it is also important to remember that 
simply dressing the ordinary soldiers in EurQpaan atylo 
uniforms was a considerable step !~ a sscularizing 
d br.ec 1!J. on o In order to explain this statement 0 which 
may appear an exaggeration to a non=Mualim Feader it will 
be necessary to explain briefly 0 the doctrin0 of Bid 0ao 
.Bid 0a is basically innovationo More fully P it 
meal'l!S g 11some vi0w 0 thing or mode of action the likG 
of which has not formerly existed or been practised 0 
In the religious vocabulary 
of 6JODIO people l.lld 0 a acquired 00pojorativo connotatio:ruJ 
equivalent almost to hsreey•o)~<b For this group all 
innovatiofiB 0. all departures from th® customs of the 
OiheEs 0 
on tho other harui 0 ~eli'e prep~ed io accept that cer'&ll.!n 
!nnovationo 0 so long as they did not actually cont~ad!ci 
the customs of the Prophet 0 and the teachings of the 
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Qwe 0 an and Hadi ih ( tra.di ions) 0 could ac tua.lly be 
boneficialo9® The juxist al=Shafi 0i contends that Bidoa 
may be either good or bado99' The bQnch=mark foE 
dim~inguishing between the t~o is to consider whoth0r o~ 
-~> th -~>-ad! 6 th D . • • t ad • t • ].QQ not. oy coaw:.- C~> e Qur en and tile li' ~ ~Ob'!£lo 
It ia against the background of this doctrine that the 
often smmll changes occurring in Turkish life 0 in the 
present caae army life 0 must be moasurodo 
By the tim0 the Ottoman miliiaFy rofomma ~ been 
completed there had been many such innovat!o~ and the 
MUslim soldiers were dressed in European uniforme 0 
carrying European equipment and fighting with Western 
1deaponso Even though these may not have been seen by 
som0 a.s innovations contradicting tradi tion 0. there was onG;~ 
further consideration mitigating against their oager 
acceptance by the troopso These new clothes and 1dGapon~ 
woro thogo of the hatod Western inf!dols poople whoa@ 
weys 0 particularly in battlo 0 had eo often been seen aa 
antagomd.etio towards Islamg Gvan if thrair uniforms did n©i 
contradict ito 
infid~l ~aye in order to fight for territory and thG 
StatGg whell'.eas previously it had rejected infidel tiaYfQl 0 
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and fo12ght for Iala.mo 
So we sse that th~ military ~ofoFmB both paved th~ 
way for secularizing meesures by destroying the traditional 
conservative powor=base of tho J&n!ssary corps and also 
bGgan the procoss by Wosternizing ihe armed forceao 
!9th Cantury Roformgs 
We may now turn our attention to various reforms 
which took place in the nineteenth century outside the 
purely ~litary aphereo We shall come in ;a, 11 ttle-
·1" 
while t~the group of reforms kno~ as the;Tanzimatp 
.t' but fir~,t we must look at the reign of Ma.hnll!d II which 
I :i· 
~mmedia~ly preceded the Tanzimat periodo 
r 
Sml~en Mahmud !I 0 sometimes referrGd to as the Pet0r 
t 
the G:&>e~t of the Ottoman Empirop wee born, !,:n July 1784 0101 
,•: 
the son {or Abdulhamid Io 102 Ho a.ppealf9. to have beon 
greatly ~nfluencod by Salim III 0 his cousi~ 0 and liko 
other 0~.toman rulers before him 0 knew no Western 
:· 1031 languag~Bo · 
'· Ma,Qmud 0-s g,reat aim was to centr.aliso t;he administration 
of the· J!?lpiro by lbringing ~,yincea ~~;.: the direct 
and off~~tivo control-;f_t-~government in:Istanbulo l04 
. ~~ In this he was lall'gely successful o He· celi'ta.inly 
succood~d in establishing his personal and diwct control 
i 10~ 
over both Rumelia and Anatoliao T~ achieve this 
;_ 
required:0 Gssemtia.lly 0 the elimination of 8.11 intemnodiato 
solllt'ces_of authority arid powero107 All power which· de:Irived · 
from i~eri tance v tradi tiol'll0 custom or eve~· poprua.r assent 
.•. ·~ ·. 
•• < 
'i-
was to 1k suppreaned leaving the Sultan a.e~the only source 
~ 108 I 
of lsgi~imate authority in the Empireo ··} Clearly 0 the 
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slipp~ession, of the Janissary corpe was an oloment i~ 
thie policy o On the ~hole it is thi8 ceniFalizing 
His ~oforms rspresent an essential clearing of the groumrl 
prior to the ati0mpis at erecting no~ otructmros ~hich 
~as mado follo~ing hie deatho 
In 1838~ Mahmud took limited stops in the direction 
of FOforming educaiionol09 Two new grammar schools ~o~G 
established in mosques in IstanbulQ thG purpose of ~hich 
wae to prepare boys 0 up to the age of about oighteon 0 for 
i . t th . il . 110 en ry 2n o e c2v aeDV2CSo Although the est~blishment 
of the schools was an innovation there was nothing very 
novel about their syllabuaeso In fact the syllabuses ~ere 
remarkably tFaditional with the main emphasis baing gFamntical 
The schools 9 thus 9 could do nothing to 
help ~ith the chronic shertage of MUelim Turks ~ith an 
adequate knowledge of some Western languago 0 112 M©st of 
the translation work which was neoded in the Empire had 
to be done by members of local Je~ieh and Christian 
minoritiesoll} Yei this situatio~ came to be sean as 
unsatisfactory 0 particularly as the ruling elite in the 
Empire came to believe that the loyalty of their non=Muslim 
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subjects was not always to be trustedo MUslim Turks 
with a knowledge of European languages were needed to learn 9 
and subsequently to teach Western sciencea 0 ll5 Al~ ~ith 
this a new Turkish vocabulary would need to be created 
to refer to the things and concepts which wero being 
imported from the Westall~ Despih the urgancy OJf the 
need 9 howeve:e 0 no significant improvement \1as to be made 
in iho situation for some timGo 
A centralized authority and administration for thG 
Empire would clearly increase tho burden to bo carriod 
by ~d0 s civil servants 0 both in the capital and in 
tho locali tioBo In orde~ to enauro that tho n~w ~yBtom 
of c~niralized government worked satiafactorily 0 ~ 
attempted to raise both the status of his civil serv~ts 
and their standards of proficiency and hon~aiyoll1. 
Cloarly0 the ~wo schools mentioned above were aimed at 
improving the profici~ncy of civil servants in the long 
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termo Howeverv iruJuno 1926p more immediate atop~ were 
takeno118 Mahmud extended the right to boquoath property 
to civil serva.ntsg previoueely they had no_. Fight to 
dispose of their ostatoa to a next of kin upon thGir 
d .6.'1.. 119 6Qb!4o At the same time this measure e~ded a 
traditional privilego of the ulema 0 who up until this 
time had been the only members of the ruling &skari 
class who had the ri~ht to boquoath their propertyol20 
measure of security for their lives and their property 
which they had not enjoyed hithertoo12l 
18~ saw the first Ottoman census of modern timaae122 
Tho c0nsua was limited in scope 0 surveying only the mele 
l2} populations of Rumelia and Anatoliao The reason 
for thoso limits is to be found in the purpose foF which 
tho information collected was to be used 0 for aeaGssing 
124 oon~cription &nd tammtio~o 
gnd suspicions of this movo 0 oert&in m0mbsrs of the ulema 
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woro included amomg the census takerso 125 Also at this 
time 9 a land survey was carri~d out to facilitate a more 
126 offici0nt system of assGeament and collection for i~GSo 
I~ the earns year a step was takGn towards the 
abolitiow of feudalism when the Tim8r system was abolishGd 9 121 
A Timar was a piece of land which waa held by a Sipahi~ 
a cavalrymanv in return for military servicG 0 12® This 
Firstly 9 it did away with & 
fo~ of military service which hBd becomG inGffioient and 
WU'eliablGo Secondly~ it aasieted in the centralizatiom. 
of authority by eliminating Timar tGnanta who had oftsn 
becomG p@werful figures in the prlilvinceso l29· 
In 1~2~ Mahmud incorporated the administration of 
all pious foundatioma and their revenues in a new 
13{» Directorate 9 later to become a Min!siry 9 of Evkafo Ewkafv 
in Arabic ~ (or Waqf), is a pious foundation 9 usually 
i~ the form of land 9 the revenues of which are assigned 
to apecific 9 religious purpoaeaol3l B,y this movG the 
collection and expend! ture of a.ll such ful!Uls was conoon= 
trated in the hands of the SUltano132 This move was far 
mora dangerous and controversial than the o;thera which 
have been mentionedo 13~ Perhaps one of the most 
significant effects of this measure 9 however 9 was to 
deprive the ulema of a measure of independencao We 
shall return to this aspect of the reform in a little 
In 1831 the Turkish offici~ g~zette (~akvimPi 
Vek§Yi) began publication.134 Thie Gvent aided thG 
process of oentralization by oxplaining thG policies of 
the SUltan to his civil servants for whom tho gazette 
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came to be required readingo An adait1onal contribUtion 
to th~ centralization ot all power in the hru•ds of the 
SW. tan came in 1834 with ·t.he inaugura tlon of an official 
postal systemol35 The appearance of ~he first telegraph 
in 18J5p and. the first railway in the Iollowing year 
al~:~o increal:ied the ~ff~ctiveness of centralizationo136 
The importance of such centralizing measures as have 
been discussed can best be appreciated by realising that 
the power=bases of various groups which might oppose 
reforms was being graaually eliminatedo The conservative 
and traditionalist Janis~:~ary corps was gonep the ulema 
had lost their financial independence to a large degree~ 
and local officials and nobles in the provinc~s had be@n 
brought more firmly under the control of the central 
administrationo 
minded Sultan was in a faF better position now to imposo 
his desires on the Empire than had previousely been the 
oaseo The other major trend, connected with centralization, 
Rbich contributed to giving fUture Sultans more of a 
free hand was the bureaucratization of the ulemae 
This may be simply illustrated by looking at the position 
of the Chief Mufti of Istanbulp the leading member of the 
ulema class in the entire empireo Prior to the 
destruction of the Janissary corps this official had 
appointed his own secretaries and. assistants and transacted 
all his business from his own homeol37 Following the 
abolition of the Janissaries 0 howeverv the Sultan gave 
the Chief Mufti the building previously occupied by the 
Aga. of the Janissaries as his official residenceo l38 
To assist the Mufti in his new official residence a 
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department of the Uhiaf Mufti was created ~hose secretaries 
were appointea on the approval of the bVQtano 1~9 The 
consequence of such a bureaucrati~ation of the ulema 
is ~Gl1 stated by L~uiso He tells us that itg 
undermined their popular and effective power 
and greatly weakenea the~r abili~y = and at 
times even theLr aesira = to resist cnangeol40 
Changes were also being made in the social li1'e of 
the upper echelon in the capitalo 
example~ the ~ltan began hosting Weatern=e~yle 
receptionso l41 ~~e arrangements for these events 
inc!uaeo tne u.ae of muropean furniture auu the ~w. tan 
wenli so tar as tQ snow deference to any ladies preaen'to142 
One must not be tempted to under=eetimate the aifierenc~ 
which ][luropean !'urni ture ma.dso New forma of furnitur® 
can change not only the appearance of a room 0 but also 
tne way in whicu people ait 0 eat and act in i'&o As 
La.roui puts it: 
It is true that it. was not the Dacemoriste 
or tne Savants accompanying Bonaparte 8s 
expeai tiona who ove1:turncad societies~ whethex-
Rusaian or Egyptian 0 but ~liah furn1tureo14~ 
lt ia 0 however 0 equally important that the reform 
me~sures ~n~t1ated by Mahmud should not b0 over= 
ee tima. ted o ~ile these measures were an es~ential at~ 
in clearing tne ground !'ur what was to follow they did 
not go very deepo The law of Islam was atill 0 subaliantially,v 
unchallengedo l44 Certainly in questions of marriage 
ana divorce~ tne family and inheri 'tance Islamic la1.-1s ano. 
customs w~re. still dominanto145 Jqually the status of' 
. h . 146 1.-1omen aua ot· slaves rema1nea unc a.ngeao 
The obstacles faced by Mahmud 0 howover~ were 
consiaerableo Hs had to overcome the profound and 
well established contempt of Muslims for the infidels 
and for anything which had~ infidel orig~0 l47 This 
view prevented Ma.hmud from enlisting the aia of any but 
a f~w Westerners in his efforts and meant tnat only 
limited use could be made of those whose assistance·was 
engagedol4S Neverthele~a a start haa be~n madeo 
Mahmud ~as unable to build on the ground whicn he had 
cleared of its most dangerous traditionalist obsta.clea 11 
owing to his death ~ 1839o 
On the aeath of Mahmud II his son became Sultan 
Abdulmecid Io149 Abdulmecid was determined to continue 
the reforming work of his fat~er ana was greatly 
encouraged in this by his motherp the Valide Sultan 
150 Bezm=i Alemo 
rno time was wastedo On the third of November 11 
1839 0 Abdulmecid·s ministers produced tne Noble R~ecript 
ol tht:~ Rose Chamber lHa.tt=i .§erif of Gulhane) 11 which is 
genera..Lly regarded as tne first reform of the Tanzimat 
periodol5l Among other things this document proclaimed 
security of life, honour and. property for all subjects 0 
the abolition of the system ol' tax farming, regularly 
ana orderly recrui~ment into the armed forces, fair and 
public trials for criminal offences 0 and equality of all 
152 citizens before the law regardless of their religiono 
It was this last element which represented the 
greatest departure from standard Islamic custom and was 0 
thus 0 the most shocking and disconcerting to Mualimsol53 
It is true that both the traditions of Islam and the 
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policy of thiS Ottoman Empire grant®d a largG amot.wd; of 
autonomy to non=Muslims in thG organization of their o~ 
thOiil 0 lS4 Yet it is ~Squally tRUe that this toleranc® 
rcasted on the assumption thai tho 00 tolaES.ied communitiG61 
wore separate and inferior and were moreover cle~ly 
mtU"kod &B such" .. l~5 During Islamic conquesis 0 @n thG 
wholo 9 Christians and Jews were not encouraged to conve~t 
to !alam in any large degreoo156 T@ an 0xtent this may 
well have been because the economic statue of the Arab 
Muslims depended upon the subjoct peoples r®iaining their 
former religion and paying the poll iarro151 In &ddition 
to p~ying the poll tex the non=Mu~lim eubjocie of a Mu§lim 
government had to distinguish thems~lves from Muslims by 
not riding on hors0back or carrying wGapons 9 and by having 
a generally FespQctful attitudo towards MusliM~ol56 
The non=Muslim was also at c~mtain legal disadvantage£~ 
with rogerd to protection under criminal la~ 0 iostimo~ 
in law=courts and ma.Flci.age 0 15·9 Yet morQ explicit expres= 
eion was given to the inferior status of non=Muelima 
in A~H. 100 (717./718 A.Do) when the weregild for a 
160 Christian was fixed at half that for a Muolimo Thu~ 
it ia not surprising to find that at the time of the 
Rescript many Muslims simply accepted that although Jews 
and Christians mumt be tolerated~ they must also be 
regarded as aeco~=elaas citizenso Thi~ view is well 
®nca.psula ted by Lewis g tha eviliDfidel and the true 
beliaver wena different and separate~ to equalize them 
and to mix them was an offence against both religion and 
commolill aanae" o 1~ !t would require a grQa.t effoFt for 
Muslims to give up tnis principle of inequality and 
t . lib2 0 sepa.ra ~on., At the very least the Hobl0 Rescript 0 
thus 9 declared ~he intention to parti~lly secularize the 
legal system by removing from it any element of aiscrim= 
ina6ion in favour of !slam and of Muslims., 
Another in~eresliing fealiure of the .i.~oble Rescript 
is that it openly refers to the measures proposed as 
11n~w laws 11 anu 11new institutions 11 ol63 From what was 
said above concerning the aoctrine of B!d 0a the signif= 
icance of tnese references will be readily understood., 
If there remains any doubt 9 however 0 as to the 
importance of even minor changes there is a saying 
attributed to the Prophet Muhammad which can surely shed 
some lignt on the signif~cance of ~he claim that the 
Nabla Rescript intended creating new institutions 0 
According to the tradition M\Ulamma.a aa.id: 11 the worst 
things are those that are novQlties 9 all novelty is an 
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innovationp every innovation is an errorp ana every error 
leads to Hell=Fire".,164 Despite traditions such as 
this 9 then 9 the Noble Rescript proclaimed the. intention 
of the SUltan and most of his senior officials to create 
new institutionsp rather than simply to pretendp as had 
happened in the past 9 that what appeared an innovation 
was simply a reversion to a previous custom or institution 
which had fallen into disuseo165 
One of the 11new institutions" which the Noble 
R~acript established was the Council of Judicial 
Ordinances tMeclis=i Ahkam=i AdliX!)P sometimes also 
referred to as the Council of Justice.,166 A body bearing 
tnis name had earlier been established by Mahmud II in 
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This served to placs in ro~!nese the administ~at!vG 
appi!Ui."atua that wou.ld be used shortly whGn V!M'ious ll'!lga.l 
codGa began to bo in~oduoed into th® Ottom@n legal 
!D March 9 1840 0 a completely new form of centralized 
provincial administration was intrcducedo li&-9 Like ma.nw 
other introductions into Turkey in the Nineteenth Century 
this was baaed on a French modelol70 In place of the 
earlisr system of ~ax=farmers and aemi=fsudal dignitaries 
the ~w system placed the districts und0~ the contr@l 
of salaried off!cie.lsol7l Thie system would s0rve to 
centnalize power in the hands of the SUltan and 0 at the 
same time 9 to bring to an end the old feudal ayst~m which 
still held sway in some arease 
another innOJva tion P and 0 further 9 an innovation copying 
an infidel syst~me However 0 this was something of an 
ambitious project and it was a little while before it 
could be fully put into effect over a wide areao112 
According to the strict thGory developed oveF the 
ye~s by Muslim jurists 9 theYe could be no legislative 
authority in a State as all law came from God and was 
promuagated in the form of divine revelatio~11' 
Howeverp strict theories often find it neceaeary9 or merely 
expedi~nt to compromise with events and this theory was 
to be no exceptiono !n earlier Islamic Empires the 
jurists had recognis~d both custom and the will of tho 
ruler as legally valid and offoctiveo114 Thosl'!l olementG 
wero ~pplied in adminiatrativ® tribun&le ~hich ~a~~ 
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outeid~ the system of courts administe~ing the Holy La~ol15 
Certainly the Ottoman Sultans issued Kan~ 0 ~i it ~ould 
bo a. mistake to regard these as la~so Re. iher 0 a Kantw. 
ie 10& codification of existing la1:1 ~ a tabulation cf 
!"fiE> log&]. ru.lcas 11 o In fact the OttomM!!l ~ent f1ll'thor 
than. p~evious ~lim regimes had done in ~siabliahing 
the euthority of Islamic Lawol77 Ho~everp rnaj@r departuros 
from this tnaditiom began in the mid~Nineteenth Centuryo 
178 In 1640 a ma1:1 Pems.l C@lde ~as int:~rodl!cedo · ThG 
provisions of the Code ~ere influenced by French 16~ 
but ~era 11ma.inJ.y, 1:1ithin the framowork of the pen~.l la~ 
of tho §'eEia. t 10 o l79: Hl!ll1:Jever thG oodG did &ff!rm tho 
equ&l!ty of all subjects beforo the la~o 180 H~r0 0 for 
tho first timCilp albeit tentativ€lly 0 110 eee the o.pp0aranco 
of a legislative body and the regulative principla !~ 
181 the Ottoman Statoo The ulorna offered n© resistance 
to the ne11 ~odoe182 
In 1846 a C9uncil of ~blic Instruction w~s creatod 
which 0 in 1847 0 became a Miniatryo 
18
' Although tho 
plana for this nsw body 11eL'e arnbi tiolJls 0 by 1850 only s-ix 
ne1:1 secondary schools had be~n establiahed8 184 Tak0n 
t0gothe:xe· the ne11 schools only had 870 pupillilo 185 In 
establishing the schools the Sultan and hie officimla 
wer0 careful to pay lip..;service to the important placo 
of Islam in. educatio~186 In mpite of this 9 however 9 
I 
it 11as this reform 11hich paved the way fo~ secular 
0ducatiom,9 for the effect of the reform was to creat® 
ne11 schools 11hose teachers and c~rricula ~aFe outsid~ 
of the coatttol of the ulemao187 
So faF the reformers had not felt sufficiently auro 
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of themselves to establish any eyst~m of courts or any 
legal system not almost entiroly bas~d upou the roligiou~ 
188 la~ of Ielamo ~ 1847~ ho~ev0r 0 mixed civil and 
c~!minsl courts uere establiohGd ~ith European and 
Ottoman judgoa sitting in equal numbe~so189 Tho X'UlcHa 
of ®vidence and the procedural ruloo for these collEts 
~ere dra~ from Europ~an ratheE than fFom Islamic 
sources.., 
19,0 
Othe~ developments were taking place ~hich served 
to bring Turkey clmse~ to the major European po~ers !~ 
the field of legislationo Xn 1840 Commercial :&lards 
wer~ given official recognitionol9l The task of theao 
ooards was to adjudicate casea bet~een Turkish and foreign 
traders by applying European customs and p~act!coa.., 192 
In 1850 a CemmeFoial Code was adoptod and onactods 
the first secular code in Turkeyol93 This code had 
been; prepared for int~oduction in 1841 9. but due to ®ppoai tion 
from the uloma its promulgation at that time had been 
abandonedol94 This code was based on the Fr®nch 
Commercial Code of l807 0l95 and ~as administeFed by 
CommeFcial tribumals totally independent of the ulemao196 
This code 9 inde®dp was the "harbinger of a complete legal 
and social revolution11 ol97 It was follo~ed by an 
add! tional Commercial Code 9 ruso adophd from the French 11 
in 1860o l98 This code 9 togetheF. with the Maxi time 
Commercial Code o.f 1864 9 l99 was administered by the 
Commercial Courts ~hich wero responsible to the ~niatry 
of C@mmerceo200 In turn 9 the wo~king of these courts 
was regulated by the Code of Procedure of Commercial 
All of thesa measures 
59 
~er® adopted from the W~st for pragmatic reaso~ 
stemming from the pressures of the world economic sysiomo 202 
~ch developments however were not only to be found 
ifl tho Commercial soctor 0 
~as published ~h!ch was adopted and modified from the 
French Pomal Codoo203 Although based on the French 
model the now Penal Code did ha:vo •vaevera.l 6lignificant 
omi~wions~ additionsv and amendationavo., 204 However 0 
the ne~ Penal Code did abolish the traditional hadd 0 
de.fixwd ptmishments 9 of Islamic ls.~g all that is. but 
the death penalty for apostasyo205 To administer the 
Penal Code Criminal Courts began to be established 
alongside the tnaditional Religious courtso206 Yot 
the shift to Western Legal Codes was not wholesale by 
any meanso For in the same year as the adoption of 
the new Penal Code 9 a land law was adopted which was 
"prepared with due concern for national practices and 
207 
needs"., 
The adoption of Western baaed Legal Codes was 0 of 
course 9 as much a measure of secularization as one of 
Westernizationo The adoption of these Codes 
necessarily required 9 at least in part 9 the abandoning 
of the religious law of Ialamo 
On the 'fth of May 9 1855 0 a Ferman was issued to 
abolish two elements of discrimination against non=Muslime 
which were mentioned above. 208 The Poll tax was 
abolishad 0 and the prohibition against non=Muslims bearing 
arms was lifted thYowing military se~ice open to all 
citizens. 209: However 0 after being disqualified from 
military service many membeFa of the minority communities 
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~erG oith0x unsuitedp or oimply disi~clined io serve in 
210 tho armed forceso Those ~ho o~empted thomsolv~s froill 
mil.itary serv.ict9 wer~ obliged to pay a special ox:emption 
tax (the bedol) ~hich ~as levied in exactly the same ~ay 
as the Poll tax had bcono 211 Th~o for many in tho minority 
communities the offeci of the t~o measures tak®n together 
was to loave the situation exactly as it had been before$ 
On the 18th of Fobrua.:ry 0 185,6 0 a ne~ reform charter 
was promulgated by the Sultans the !mperiml Reocript 
) 212 (R&tt=! Hmma¥¥A o This reaffirmed the principles 
sot out in th~ NoblG Rescript of the Ro~e Chmmber ©f 
1839o 21 ~ Tax farming was abolished yet againp as waa 
discriminatio~ againa% subjects on religious grounda.214 
On! June 20ih 9 186.1 9 Abdulmoc!d died and wa.s succeodod 
by his brother Abdulazizo 215 Abdulaziz ~as not an easy 
individlMl.l with whom to work 9 being 10capricious tmd violent 0 
obstinato and irasciblG 11 .. 216 Unlike his brother~> 
Abdulaziz was not at all in sympathy ~ith the reformerso 217 
Despite thisv howoverp the roform movement had by no~ 
gained auffioiont momentum to be able to co~inue itm 
~ork for some time longero 
In 1808 the Imperial Ottoman Lyooo ~as opened in 
Ga.latasarayo 218 This w<-•B a major evQnt in the progress 
towards secular educatio~o It was 9 in factv the first 
attempt mad@ ~ith any seriousness by a Muslim government 
to provide 9 at the secondary levelp a modern education 
iiill a Western language., 219' As might be expected following 
tho precodent of previous reforms the language in ~hich 
i~truction wao provided at the acho®l was Frencho220 
Anoth~r notablo foaturo of the eohool wua ihnt horo 0 
for the first tim~~ Muslim and Christian pupils wcro 
taught aida by sidco 221 ThG importance of the acho@l 
wont far beyo~d the fact that it provided thia 
mixod ioaching in an attompt to move towards r®ligious 
Aa Turkey 0a ne®d for officials with a 
1:Jaatern education. gr~Sw ~ ao graduates of the Imporiru 
Ottoman Lycee came to play an incr~asingly important 
part in the development and administratiom of the 
Ottoman Empire and~ laterp of the Turkish Republico 222 
The Impell'ial Ottoman Lycee 0 Le~wis tells us 0 11had n® 
playing=fiGldsp but not a few of the victories of modern 
22) Turk()y were won in ita classrooma"o 
The first important innovation in the spher® of 
vivil Law occurred in 1869o In that year the 
~ivio Coda began to appear 0 and would continua to ba 
published in instalments until 187'o224 This Cod~ 
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simply codified the existing religious law "instead of 
trying to solve each legal problem by means of Fetvaso"225 
Despite still being based on the religious law this 
measure was an important innovation as it was modern, 
that is Western, in both form and presentationo 226 This· 
meant, in fact that these law books could be used even by 
those who lacked the training in jurisprudence which was 
the tll.'aditional monopoly of the ulemao This Code, whioh 
followed the Hanafi school of Islamic law remained in 
force until the early years of the Republic when it was 
abrogated in 19.26co 227 
In 1871 events taking place far from the Ottoman 
borders posed a serious threat to the reform movement 
within the Empire$ This threat w: s to prove fa tal 9 and 
lo ush0r in o. poriod whf!n no ni.gnlfine.nt rnovor~ inn 
wosternizing o~ secularizing direction took placoa 
ThG event concerned was the Franco=Prussian War and 
the French defoato This defeat lowered the prestigo of 
France within the rulirrug circles in the Ottoman Empire 
and therefore~ as so many of the reforms had been based 
on FrGnch models.9 the prestige of the reforms also •. :- '" 
received a considenable blow0 228 Had the occupant of 
tho Ottoman throng at this time had sympathy with the 
reform movoment~ the reformers might have managed to 
ride out this storm. But 9 as the Sultan had little or 
no sympathy with the reforming procese 9 the result of the 
Franco=Prussian War with the evidence of French fallibility 
it provided 9 proved to be an insuperable obstacle for the 
reformers to overcomee At this point a determined mood 
of reaction took hold of the Ottoman Stateo 229 Ottoman 
Christians were dismissed from public service and much 
greater stress was laid on the Islamic character of the 
Ottoman State and on Islamic unity, rather than Westernization~ 
became the guiding light in the Empireo 2}0 
Despite the reaction 9 however, the reform movement 
was merely stopped in its tracks. The reforms had, by 
this time, gone too far for it to be easily possible for 
the Empire to revert to the situation which prevailed 
prior to the beginning of the reform movemento A great 
deal had been achievedo As Lewis puts itg 
The men of the Tanzimat 9 with all their 
failingap laid the indiepensible foundation 
for the more thorough modernization that was to 
2:51 followo 
By the mid-Nineteenth Century, on the whole 9 secularization 
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had moved so far in \r/estern Europe that to westernize the 
Ottoman system meant~ almost inevitably 9 that the system 
would be secularized at the same timeo 
Mention has been made 9 abovep of the declining power 
of the ulema to resist change in the Nineteenth Century 9 
Perhaps it would be useful~ before turning to reforms 
in the early years of the presen~ century to gather together 
some comments on this subjecto 
The Decline Of The Power Of The Ulemag 
In the context of the Ottoman Empire 9 the term Ulema 
was applied to those individuals who had 9 as Chambers 
explainsg 
secured appointment as mosque functionaries 9 
teachers 9 jurisconsults 9 or judgeso They 
were members of the learned or religious 
professions holding patents of office 9 ra.uksp 
and titles peculiar to their ca.reer 0 232 
In Ottoman society the ulema constituted a group with 
exceptional power ana. privilegeso 233 The most 
materially significant of their privileges was the fact 
that their property 9 unlike that of civil servants before 
the tiine of Mahmud II 9 was not subject to coufiscatioh 
on their deathso 234 As a group 9 the ulema had reached 
the height of their power by the middle of the Eighteentn 
Centuryo 235 
After this the ulema 9 as a class 9 went into a 
declineo It must be emphasised 9 however 9 that this 
d~line was gradual and the ulerna remained an element 
wnose wishes nad to be taken into account by the high 
officials of the Empireo One of the major causes of the 
decline of the ulema in the early period was the 
increasing competitio~ within the group caused by more 
and more ulema seeking the limited number of top 
religious postso 23~ The corEUption and nepotism which 
this competition brought about X'esulted in a "widespread 
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decay in moral fibre and quality of learning'1 o 237 These 
forces eventually took their tollo The privileges of 
the~ made it an attractive source of prestige and 
power with the result that there was considerable pressure 
from the descendants of nobles 9 soldiers and public 
servants to enter the ulema classo Indeedp some of 
these aspirants actually bought the diplomas which qualified 
them as ulema meaning that there arose a group among the 
ulema who hel~ posts as ulema without having received the 
education which their diplomas claimed they had completed 0 238 
With such forces as these working from wi thir:l the g'll'.oup 
it is little wonder that by the end of the Eighteenth 
eentury the ulema were beginning to show signa of 
weakness a 23·9 In the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud II 
it became clear· that although the u[ema were still a 
force to be reckoned with they were much too divided 
and compromised to be able to offer any kind of sustained 
and telling resistance tootwo such reform minded Sultaneo 240 
Despite these developments 9 in the early Nineteenth 
Century the ~ still maintained a monopolistic control 
over education and the lawo 241 Other measures which 
have already been mentionedp however 9 served to further 
weaken the position of the ulemao 'rhe destruction of 
the Janisaary Corps in 1826 by Mahmud II deprived the 
ulema of a similarly conservative military allyo 242 
Following this Mahmud gave the Chief Mufti an official 
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residenc~v as discussed above 0 which effectively 
iruringed the tr&di tional adminlntralive independence 
of thQl ulema./43 Alrno unclf~r MH.runuc1 !I th~ ulema. lost 
their financial independence when the [>'ultan established 
control over e~ksf revenues (the pious foundations). 244 
Indeedv it is a pointed illustration of the divided nature 
of the ulema that certain of their number actually 
supported some of the Westernizing reforms. 245 On the 
whole this can be put down to a lack of foresight on the 
part of these individualso The leading ulema who 
supported reforms in the reigns of Selim III and Mahmud 
II 0 Heyd concludse 9 were not sufficiently "farsighted to 
realize that the Westerniz.Lng reforms supported by them 
would eventually destroy the Islamic character of the 
Ottoman State and society"o246 
Later in the Nineteenth Century 0 during the Tanzimat 
period 0 the ulema lost ground on all frontso 247 They 
reacted negatively and defensively to the secularizing 
tendencies of the reformersa 248 However by this time 
the major damage to their powerful position had been 
For the remainder of the Nineteenth Century and 
the years immediately following 1900 0 as mentioned 
earlier 11 although they remained influential in locali ties 0 
particularly in the rural areas 9 they had ceased to have 
a great deal of power at the centre of the Empireo 
This marginaLization of the ulerna 9 as mentioned in the 
previous section 0 greatly influenced and lessened the 
effectiveness of the contributions they could make to the 
debate concerning the future direction to be taken by the 
Empire9 
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The Millet S.'[Stem~ 
One form of aeparation of temporal and spiri tu.al 
power may be thought to have existed for a long time in 
the Ottoman Siate 9 in the form of the Mill~ systemo Yet 
it would not be at all accurate to see this syatem as a 
form of separation of religious and political or civil 
authori tyo !n an attempt to clear up what could be a 
misunderstanding herev the following is a brief note on 
the Millet system in order that we may appreciate its 
true nature~:> 
The Millet system was not an innovation of the Ottoman 
rulers 9 but on the Conquest o£ Constantinople in 145) 
Muhammed the Conqueror merely allowed the existing system 
to continue to functiong 249 Shortly after entering 
the city Muhammed the Conqueror~ Mehmed II (1451~1481) = 
recognised the recently elected Greek Orthod~x Patriarch 
Genadiuag 25° His duty was to represent the Greek community 
in ita dealings with the Ottoman Stateo 25l In addition 9 
Genadius was granted judicial authority to settle all cases 
concerning the internal affairs of his community including 
such matters as marriage 0 divorce and inheritance 0
252 
An Armenian Patriarchate with similar functions and rights 
was recognised by the Sultan in 146lo 253 
By the early part of the Nineteenth Century there 
had been a considerable growth in the number os Millets 
recognised by the Ottoman governmento In this period 
the following Millets functioned in the ways outlined 
aboveg the Greek Orthodox 9 Greek Melkite 9 Maronite 0 
Gregorian Armenian9 Catholic Armenian 0 Syrian Jacobitep 
2;4 Jowish. In 1850 this list was lengthenod still 
further with the addition of the Evangelical Church of 
.Armen.i&o 255· 
The system guaranteed the individual commtu1i tieG 
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freedom from interferance in theiF affairsv at the same 
time as prohibiting them from interfering in the affairs 
of the other communities. 256 Thus the system effectively 
precluded the emergence of any marked degree of 
evangelical or proadytisirag effort by any of the groups 0 257 
rl'heoretically speaking 9 "a Christian 9 a Jew 9 and a Muslim 9 
living in the same house were subject to separate laws, 
each according to his Millet"a 258 though it must be said 
that such a house would probably prove difficult to find 
in, actuality,. 
Though our consideration of the system has been 
brief it is hoped that sufficient has been said to make 
it clear that this was not a system for separating 
religious and Aecular sphereso The head of each community 
had control and charge not only of religious matters, 
but also of matters of law relating to the family and 
inheritance, which today would be considered secularo 
1924 Constitution: 
On 26)th April 9 1924, following the War of Independence 11 
a new Constitution was accepted for Turkey 0 259 In their 
work in preparing the new Constitution the Constitutional 
Commission adapted some provisions from the Constitutions 
of France and Poland 9 but did not merely borrow any articles 
from other Conatitutiona. 260 
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This Constitution. declareil Turkey to be a Repl!bUc262 
and oiated that the n1ligion of the ata.te was Islwn 
Thus th~ exiAtlng posit.ion of Islam waa 
reaffirmed at the same time as the changed political 
situation. was formulated in legal termso 
Yet Islam was not to Femain unaffected by the 
changing situation., This was recognised constit= 
utionally in 1928o On lOth April of that year thQ 
19.24 Constitution was amended" 263 Article 2 of the 
Constitution was amended deleting the statement that 
!slam was the state religion of the RGpublico 264 
\~ommenting on this change Cragg dscle.res that at this 
point "la.icisation and secularity became complete".., 265) 
Yet this judgement is a little prematureo For the 
completion of the process of secularism we must look to 
the latter part of the following decadeo 
On 5th February~ 1937 the Constitution of 1924 
d d t . 266 was amen e ye ag~no On this occasion Article 2 
was amended to the effect that Turkey was a "laic" Republic., 267 
It is only at this late stage that the secularization 
process was made constitutionally explicito It seems 
likely that this late declaration does not reflect an 
actual change or development in Ataturk 0s planao It 
rather reflecta 9 I believe 9 a tactical move by Ataturk 
to refrain from making his plana too explicit in the 
early years of the Republic until other reforms had 
succeeded in reducing the influence of religious leaders 
to some extent .. 
Article 12 of the Constitution9 as issued in 1924~ 
atatod that 11 'thoA0 un~tb.lo lo r.0.ad and wrl te Tl!rkif'Jh 11 
wero inolig!b!o to stand for elec Lion to tile Grand 
2GS NationaX Aaaemblyo This emphasised the osaential 
Turkishness of the stateo 
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Article 75 dealt specifically with religio~g condemning 
religious discrimination and allowing for freedom of 
worshipo The final form of this Article read: 
No one may be censured for the philosophical 
creed 9 religion or doctrine to which he may 
adhereo All religious services not in con-
travention of public order and morals and the 
laws are authorized. 269 
Thia 9 however 9 represents the reworded form of this 
Article which was passed on 5th January 9 19}7o27° 
rewording was found necessary because the original Article 9 
due to an oversightp guaranteed freedom of "religion~ 
doctrine 9 M.tikat 9 " and philosophical beliefo
271 This 
' 
change in wording can only be due to an error in the 
earlier version as the Tarikats (Dervish Orde~s) were 
abolished by a decree issued by the Cabinet on 20th 
September 9 1925o In view of this move, which shall be 
discussed in more detail later, it was clearly anomalous 
for the Constitution to guarantee freedom of tarikat 
until 1937.o 
Article 88, in the Draft Constitution, read as 
follows: "The people of Turkey, regardless of religion 
and racep are Turks". 272 But the Article 9 in this form 0 
was objected to by Hamdullah Suphi 9 Deputy for Istanbulo 273 
Talking about Armenian and Jewish minorities he called 
on them to: 
Accept Turkish culture. Then we shall call 
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you Turks. But you maintain a fH~paratG 
.I ~tnp,ur~ge 9 nepnrs~.I.A nchoolA A.n<i aim A.t n 
s~JpA.x:Rto At~te~ and then you come to ue and 
tell UA that you ~ant to be conBidered a Turkooo 
The Articleoooif it passes stating thai they 
are Turks 0 they could use this agaimst lis 0 274 
Because of this objection the Article was amended so that 
the final version stated thatg 11Th<a people of Turkeyg 
regardless of religion and race 9 are Turks as regards 
citizenship" .. 275· 
Thus it can be seen that the Constitution of 1924 
guaranteed freedom of religion and stated that citizeHP 
ship ~aa not dependent upon holding to any particular 
re1igiowa traditiono Later Constitutions 9 of 1961 and 
1982 9 found it necessary to say a good deal more on the 
subject of re1igiono But the freedom of religion 0 within 
certain 1imits 9 and the equality of citizens regardless 
of religion were to reappear consistant1y in the 
Conatitutiona of the Turkish Republico 
1926 Civil Code~ 
The Civil Code of 1926 represents a most important 
breakthrough., It was conside~ed and passed by the 
Grand National Aasemblyo 276 Although some questions concernimg 
pious foundations were still governed by Islamic law 9
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the new Civil Code was based on the Swiss Civil Code 9
278 
which was framed in 1912 from the existing Germanic 
Civil Codeo 279 This Germanic Civil Code was codified 
in 1874-96 9 and also formed the basis for the Chinese 
and Japanese Civil Codeav 280 
It would be difficult to exaggerate the significance 
of this developmento As we have seen 9 CommeFcial Codes 
had been introduced into 'furkey from the West prior to 
this 9 and measures had also been taken to remove certain 
areas of administrative law from the jurisdiction of the 
religious law of Islam. But 9 as Lewis explains~ "this 
was the first time that a reformer had dared to invade 
the intimacies of family and religious life 9 the inviolate 
f H 1 L II 281 preserve o ••• o y aw. With the introduction by 
the Grand National Assembly of the new Civil Code the 
Holy Law was repealed and declared null and void. 282 
Polygamy and the traditional Islamic restrictions on the 
fre~dom and status of women were abolished., 283 The 
marriage of a Muslim woman to a n.on-Muslim man now became 
legally possible 0 284 Marriage was valid only when registe~ed 
with the relevant civil authorities and all adults were 
regarded as having the right to change their religion 
whenever they wishedo 285 
The application of the new Code was not uniform. 
In major towns and cities the new regulations governing 
marriage~ divorce W!d inheritance were largely enforcado 286 
In smaller and remoter aettlements 9 on the other 
hand 0 the picture was quite differento To ensure the 
legitimacy of children 9 it is true 9 marriages were 
almost uniformly registered with the Civil authoritieso 287 
After one marriage had been registered~ howevers 
The ulegalG wife was then credited with the 
offspring of other wives 0 bound to their 
husbanda; by the bonds of religion and custom 11 
though witho~t the consecration uf the secular 
state0 2BS 
The fact that the naw Civil Code was not instantly applied 
uniformly from Istanbul to the smallest village in the 
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Eastern pr@vincosp neod not cause us to doubt the 
importance of the Codeo Such a major set of changes ~ould 
be bound to take time to ~ork their ~ay down to the 
villageso As Le~is puts itv the introduction of the 
Civil Code did not 10 transform Turkey ovennight into a 
Middle Eastern S~;;~itzerland"o 289 
DGapite this 0 the Code was an extnemely important 
development in Turkeyo In fact 9 it has been claimed 
that this "Code signified the unmitigated secularization 
of civil life"o 29° It is most important in assessing 
the significance of the te:ode to realise that it was 
instituted from above in Turkey 9 rather than gro~ing 
up from belo~ .. ThG aim of those promoting the Code ~as 
to shape the relations of the people rather than to 
regulate the behaviour of the nation according to existing 
customs and religious normso 291 Development from 
abova~ not below., 
The Code must be seen against the background of 
secularizatio~ in an Islamic context., Law hasp 
throughout history 9 been central to Islam and the main 
Islamic discipline has been jurisprudence rather than 
theology., As Berkes points out& 
If the crux of Western secularism lay in the 
relations between state and church 9 the pivot 
of eecula.:dzation in Muslim societies lay in 
the secularization of law 9 particularly the 
civil law .. 29'2 
Seen against this backgnound the truly great significance 
of the new Civil Code may be properly appreciatedo 
1926 Pel'lal Code: 
In addition to the Civil Code 9 1926 also saw the 
introd~tion of a new Penal Code 0 293 It would be 
appropriate here to mention those ~t!clee which weRe 
concerned with religious matterso Article 16·3' 9 for 
by misuse of religion 9 religious sentiments 
or things that are religiously considered as 
holy 9 in any way incite the people to action 
prejudicial to the security of the state 0 or 
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form associations for this purpose9ooPolitical 
associations on the basis of religion or religious 
sentiments may not be formedo 294 
The legislative attempt to exclude religion from the 
political process was continued in two later Articles 
of the Penal Code (241 and 242)o These Articles gave 
punishments for any religious leaders whop whilst preaching 
or teaching their followe~sv brought the administrative 
acts and laws of the government into diarepute or incited 
their followerR to disobey the government or ita regul-
ationso295 The attempt to freP. politics and government 
from religious interferance has been a consistent feature 
of legislation throughout the history of the Republico 
Yet such legislation has not prevented political parties 
from using religious sentiments in order to win votes 9 as 
we shall see latero Nor has it meant that in return for 
religion leaving the government alone that the government 
would not interfere in religious affairso As Halide 
Ed.ib has put itg "The Turks have at last rendered up 
the things that were Caesar's or the State 9s; but Caesar 0 
or the State still ltecap$ things which belong to God"o 2% 
As another element in the limiting and segregation 
of religion in public life the spatial limits of 
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religious worship were also laid down .. Article 529 
of the Penal Code stated punishments for religious leaders 
and functionarieA 1<1ho condur: t religious celebratimtB 
or proceAsions outside recognised placc3 of worshipo 297 
Thus religion was to be thoroughly restricted.. N@t 
only was itFJ operation limited to personal mattersv 
rather than the wider field of social lif~ 9 but. it was 
also to be limited to fllnlctioning in certain buildings:., 
Thus it can be seen how far 9 at least in legislative 
terms 9 the secularization, of the Turkish Republic had 
progressed by 1926 .. 
The relationship between the Sultan-Caliph in 
Istanbul and the emerging nationalist movement in Ankara 
did not get off to a good statto During the national 
struggle 9 or War of Independenceg 
Fetvas were issued to the effect that partisans 
of the government at Ankara ·..rere to be considered 
religious heretics ••• and death sentences were 
passed on the leaders of the National Struggle .. 298 
The Sultan may have acted under pressure from the 
victorious Allies who had effective control of Istanbul 9 
and Ataturk's mind regarding the future of the Sultanate-
Jaliphate may have been made up by this time .. But the 
issuing of such Fetvas certainly could not have helped 
the two parties to establish a satisfactory working 
relationship .. 
Thus 9 in NovembeF 1922 the Sultanate and the Caliphate 
were separated 9 299 and the Sultru1ate was abolished by 
a decision of the Grand National Assemblyo 300 
Sovereignty was thus transferred from the Sultan to the 
the country and hifl coUR.in Abdulmecid wA.fll el ecterl Caliph, 
by the Grand National Aasemblyo3°2 
Galiph 9 was the title given to the supreme head of 
the community of Muslims in his capacity as 10~mccessor 
and vicegerent of the Prophet"}03 Such was })is authority 
that Sunni hadith (traditions) taught that anyone who 
rebelled against the Caliph rebelled against God 0 }04 
The duties of the Caliph were generally held to be the 
defence of Islamu adjudication of legal disputea 9 the 
defence or the territorial integrity of Islamic rule 9 
providing troops to guard the frontiers 9 collecting taxes 9 
punishing wrongdoers 9 waging Holy War 9 and to take an 
active and personal interest in the details of government 
and adminiatrationo)05 
Abdulaziz (reigned 1861-1876) was keen to assert that 
the Sultan was not only the head of the Ottoman Empire but 
also the Caliph of all Muslims 9 no matteF who their 
temporal ruler might beo 306· Due to the fact that at 
thiR time Mufllim lMdA in North Africa and Asia were 
coming under increasing pressurA or domination from 
E.'urope 9 this new idea rapidly won wide support 0 307 
The total effect of this move was that~ "the Ottoman 
Caliphate provided a rallying point for the forces 
opposed to Westernization and the West"o3°8 This being 
the case 9 it is hardly surprising that the Caliphate was 
to come uradeF attack from the reformers of the ea.rly 
Republic., 
However 9 the position of the Caliphate had been 
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weakened by evrmts which took place prior to the 
establishment of the Republico The separatist tendencies 
of Muslim groups within the Ottoman Empire had sh~wn 
that Islamic Inte~natioDalism was on the declinev to be 
replaced by nationalism among the M~slim groups 0 309 In 
1915 the Caliph in Istanbul proclaimed a Holy Warv which 
was generally disregarded by the Arab Muslims within the 
Empire who tended to side with the Allies and against the 
310 Ottoman SUltan=Calipho In fact there is a considerable 
amount of truth in the assessment that the Atab choice 
to side with the Allies during the World War "weakened 
the value of the Caliphate" P 311 and that had this not 
happened "it would have proved an almost impossible task 
to abolish the Caliphate in Turkey" } 12 
When he became Caliph, Abdulmecid took his duties 
. 1 313 ser1ous Yo But he also failed to adapt to the new 
situation: "he failed to make his office purely 
spiritual" o 3l4 In addition to which the Ankara government 
became concerned that Abdulmecid's. office could become 
a "rallying point for discontented r~ligious conservat= 
Besides which the separation of the two 
offices represented a distinction between religious and 
secular power which most of the people of Turkey had 
no.t learned to makeo 3lb So it became necessary to abolish 
the Caliphate as well 0 3l7 
The decision to abolish the Caliphate was taken 
by Ataturk while attending military manoeuvres in 
January and l''ebruary of 1924: in this matter Ataturk 
acted oruy when he felt sure the army were behind him)18 
Traditionalists helped to prepare the way for the 
!'.\boll tion of l.lu·' ~HL.phate by insisting that the 
Caliphate and the Sultanate were inaeparable 0 ~l9 
Doubtless they saw this as an argument for installing 
Abdulmccid as Sultanv but the new government in Amkara 
choso 9 rather 9 to see it as an argument for abolishing 
the Caliphate also 9 Thus 9 on 3rd Marchv 1924 the 
Grand National Assembly voted for the abolition of the 
Caliphate o 320 In addition 9 all members of the Ottoman 
dynasty were exiledo321 This banishment order remained 
in force until it was rescinded in June 1952o322 To 
complete the day the Ministries of Religious Affairs 
and Pious Foundations were auppressed 9 and all Muslim 
religious schools were abolished creating a unifiedv and 
secularv school aystemo323 
'rhase measures opened the way for the abolition of 
Islamic law which 9 as we have seen 9 took place in 1926o 
For 9 as Berkes puts it: 
The abolition of the Caliphate implied the 
abolition of the sheriat as a law of the state 
because once the t:Jrad.i tional temporal and 
political power had been rejected 9 its legal 
basis and structure was bound to fall too 0 324 
In addition it may be remarked that this move also 
effectively removed from the scene the moat likely 
figure-head of opposition to the new government in 
Ankara. 
Calendar. Time And Measurement: 
Prior to the Republican period in Turkey 9 in 1915v 
a law was debated in the House of Deputies proposing 
a change to the Gregorian Calendar. 325 The proposal 
326 was rejected but was passed in the following yearo 
The Muslim year of 354 days is purely lunar and thus 
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tended to be unsuitable for government and administrative 
p\U'poneso 327 Thus 0 financial and adminifltrati ve calendars 
wars developed in the Munlim world based on WRntPrn mndnlR 
but taking theJ.r starting po.int as the Hijrao Orw r-mch 
was the Ottoman financial year which us<d@ a Julian year 
combined with a~ eraP and was introduced into 
Ottoman administnatio~ in 1789o328 So the decision of 
1916 was not a totally innovative one; but it was 
significant that~ the new calendar was to be applied to 
all areas of life .. 
On January the first 9 1926 9 this earlier change 
was altered still ~~rther .. At this point the Christian 
era was intnoduced for calendars to replace the former 
practice of dating events from the Hijra,.329 This was 
a most significant step; the prophet Muhammed was no 
longer officially recognised as the starting point fon 
a new era in world history,. 
In orde~ to demonstrate the need for reform in the 
dating system to the unified system now reached 9 it will 
be valuable to look at a page from an Ottoman office 
calendar (reproduced on. the next page) .. 330 The section 
on the right hand side, in FrenchP tells us that this is 
the page of the calendar for Thursday 9 the 20th Aprilo33l 
It also indicates to us the date of the last quarter of 
the moon .. 332 
This section also informs us that noon is at eleven 
minutes past fiveo}33 Below thisp in addition to 
information concerning the rising and setting of the sunp 
we are told that 12 O'Clock (midnight) is 9 for the Turks 
~0 Aiiip~ 51 ~ 1 1 'qe'l'llfl>JPnn ~@ 
£ll1IJPTIA~(O)~ 1 AVJRl~IL 
: 1:~ 
lL 
•tJ 
1 E 
..!; ' ? 
t- I ·~ 
. ,o 
~ i ,...: 
1-< I -
t::' I; l.:;l 
II Jeudln 
·1 Sninte Agncg 
.,... 
-
'l1'.1r;,l :wl Mtr.i.Jr1 
Till i WJ·~ 'l: In 
~~A&QSJioo l:!ci.pro~oq 
---
Ufilr'H - .:.1•\/ .. WJ'~~ Lever diA Solei!: 5. ii 
'Y' lhwq tn. lllfiV. 8/lz. lloliwo Coucber o 6. ~2 
aQo..wJf.fi: lllho. U. llbbli~. 12 h. a Ia Tu'i"qu,e: 6. ~9 
n~~ ~9~~m 22 1P':> 567 a 
110 O=l C> DOI!oM<IO CIU.O. o CJOOVI>Otl~ c:::::;:;:::j D@!!J 
79 
80 
forty nine minutes past six.3~4 This information is 
necessary as the Turksv in the Ottoman period, reckoned 
aach day from Aunset to sunAet. Thus it was that on this 
particular dey noon was at eleven minutes past five.335 
Howeverp the hours of sunset differ throughout the year. 
ThusP Istanbul had a sunset at 7.36 p.m. on the 30th of 
June 9 with midnight and noon the following day both at 
4o24 according to Turkish time.336 However 9 on the 
lOth DecemberD sunset was at 4.31 with midnight and noon 
both at 7 .29:o 337 Those making use of a steamer time= 
table in Istanbul 9 thus needed to remember that if a 
ship left at 4.30 p.m. 9 the time=table would call this 
8.54 in June and 12 0°Clock in Decembero33B Things 
were further complicated for those on a journey with 
the fact that the railway 9 unlike the steamer 9 kept to 
European and not Turkish time.339 
To the left of the French portion of the calendar 
is a section in Greek which also tells us that it is 
Thursday, but here it is the 7th of April and not the 
20th.340 1fhis discrepancy is simply due to the difference 
between the Orthodox calendar and that generally used in 
western Europe at this time. 341 In the horizontal 
section above the Greek and the Brench, the Bulgarizn is 
informed that it :i.s Thursday the 7th of April, as it is 
for the Greek and also for the Armeniana342 
In the small section below the Greek section, the 
Armenian is informed that it is a fast~day~ Great 
Thursday. 343 In addition it is a double festival 
co~nemorating the Anunciation of the Holy Mother of Jeaus,344 
along with the washing of the disciples' feat.345 To 
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the Greek 9 who does not keep the Armenian faai=dayv it 
is a fGetival commemorating the martyr Kalliopiou 9 while 
in iho F'r.onch F:JQ<:tion tho Gnt.h(llic .iA told Lhat It il"l the 
fGii.Bt of Saint 1\gTIGB., 3M) 
So far 9 in the French 9 Greek. 9 Bulgarian and Armenian 
sectionav th@ year has been 19·llo ::S47 However 0 on reading 
the upper portion of the calendar the Turk would discover 
that it is 1329 in reckoning by the Hijra (to the right 
of the crescent)p but it is 1327 if he reckons by the 
financial year (to the left of the crescent)e348 Also 
to the left of the crescent is printed the word Nisan 9 
the na.'lle of' the month 0 beneath which the large figure 
tellR us that it is the 7thQ349 To the right of the 
cKeRcent the name of the month is given as Rebi-ul-Akhir 9 
with the date as the 2lsto350 In addition we are told 
that Nisan has 30 daya 9 while Rebi-ul-Akhir contains 
only 29e 35l Both aides are agreed 9 however 9 that it 
is Thursday )52 
In dealing with the Turkish peasant 9 on the other 
hand, one would need to know that it was the 164th day 
of Kasim (the small figures under the 2l)o 35o3 This 
is because the peasant reckons the year by dividing it 
into two seasons and then counting the days of eacho354 
~ begins on the 8th of November 9 and is followed by 
Hidrelliz which begins on May 6thQ 355 Thus we aee that 
it is Kasim the 164th to the peasantP 21st day of 
Rebi-ul-Akhir 1329 to the ordinary town dwellerp and 
the 7th of Niaan to the Government official who is living 
in l327o 356 
At the bottom of the calendar the JO\·Jish user is 
informed that it is Thursday the 22nd of Nisan 9 in the 
year 56,71, 357 
This~ surely 9 adequately demonstFates the need for 
reforming and standardising the method of reckoning the 
It must be considered too complicated to have 9 
for this one Thursday 0 four dates for the yea:r 0 four 
names for the month and five numberings for the day.,35B 
•rwo other measures are noted here for the sake of 
completeness a Their importance lies in the fact that 
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they symboliae Turkey 0 s turn towards the West in a way which 
affected the whole society., Firstly 9 the international 
method of measuring time by reference to Greenwich mean 
Time was adopted .. 359 Secondly 9 the Metric system of 
360 
measurements was adopted; as symbolic of TurkeyVs 
turn towards the West 9 as Britain°s half-hearted 
metrication was symbolic of Britain's fual~-hearted turn 
towards Europe., 
Day 6f Rest: 
The important day in the Islamic week is Friday., 
On this day the most important weekly prayers take place 
in the musque., But 9 unlike the Christian Sunday 9 this 
day does not att~act the civil restrictions to trading 
and work., There is no insistence in Islam that Friday 
should be a day of rest., In this Islam differs not 
only from the Christian Sunday 9 but also from the Jewish 
Sabbath., 
Thus 9 in the Ottoman Empire 9 Friday was a day of 
prayer 9 not of rest., However it must not be assumed 
that ULtornsu1 off'i(~i.:,J.ln wm·kl'<lrl a fHWPII day Wf'OK 0 From 
1829 Sultan Mahmud II introduced a religiously neutral 
day of rest for government employees on Thursdayo)60 
This was changed on the fifth of Januaryv 1924o On 
this day a law was enacted declaring Friday to be an 
official and compulsory day of rest for all Turkish 
b · d . t · 36l Th · th d us~nesses an c~ ~zenso ~s gave e ~y a m®re 
than religious significanceo This wa8 a departure 
from tradition but was not a whole-hearted shift to the 
Sunday holiday common in Europeo In this way the 
government added the economic holiday to the already 
existing day of prayer and so created an Islamic model 
for the six-day working week which could stand against 
the European-Christian modele 
The situation was again modified on the twenty-
seventh of 362 May 9 19)5. The new situation declared 
in law no. 2739 9 363 transferred the weekly commercial 
holiday from l''riday to Sundayo The time delay between 
the two meat=mres is no doubt significant;: the move to 
the Sunday holiday being madA only when the state 
felt sufficiently secureo 
Thus a secular holiday was created in contrast 
with the aeekly holy day on Fridayo This secular 
holiday 9 being on a SUnday 9 fitted the European 
modelo Symbolically 0 at least 9 therefore 0 this event 
has considerable significanceo 
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Women~ 
HaHde I<:dib tells u:> tnilt .it was Sultan Selim III 
w110 r·Lr.nt mcpre:::1r·rt t.tl!:! opi.nicm that ttnlr~rw the womrm 
or Tu.rkey W•·'l"O NI.U,;~h l.c•n!'d :l,llout nat. i OTlA.l ideals and 
g:i.vr-m equr:tJity with mon Lfw r;mpire c:ould not be oaved 0 3bll 
Concern for the statuo of women grew until moat "Turkish 
men of the progressive type ••• esper.ially from 1908 onp 
have been in favour of the progress of women"g365 
Gokalp argued that the extent to which women were 
valued as mothers and wives meant that it was wrong for 
them to be discriminated against by the law 9 366 For 
him it was impossible to builct a strong and united nation 
without women having equal Rtatus with menQ As he put 
it in une or his puP.ms: 
If .i.n inhelli tance our women are worth only 
half a man 
And in marriage only a quarter 9_ 
Neither family nor nation can be uplifted 9 3o7. 
Ataturk 9 too 9 was convinced of the necessity of 
passing legislation to bring equality between the sexes 
in both family and public matters.368 In Izmir in 
1923p during a public speach 0 he stressed that he believed 
that Islam did not require women to be inferior to men.,369 
Ataturk was keenly aware of the important part that the 
women of Anatolia harl played in the war effort.. As 
he expresoed it at a meeting- in Konya in 1923: 
Our women have always lived ~Jide by side with 
men., Not just todayP but for c;enerations 
our women shared equal responsibilityP in war 
as in peacep in agriculture and in everyday 
life., Our men have fought bravely in defence 
of the country against invadersp but they had 
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to be fed and supplied in the army. In this 
task they counted on the women. As our 
existence depends on women 9 so we seek their 
co-operation" Xn this warv as in previous 
oneav our high morale and driving fox-ce resulted 
from the work being shared by women. They 
plowed and sowed the fieldsv cut the wood 9 
marketed their produce 9 kept the home fires 
burning 0 and 0 in every kind of weather 9 carried 
the ammunition needed by our troops in their 
carts or with their babies on their backs.370 
As a reward for all this effort 9 he argued 9 men ought 
to be prepared 9 in the future: 
to have Turkish women as partners in every= 
thing 9 to share our lives with them 9 and to 
value them as friends 9 helpers 9 and colleagues 
in our scientific 9 spiritual 9 social 9 and 
economic life 0 37l 
After the Republic was founded such speeches were 
translated into actiono A number of measures were 
taken which have greatly altered the position of women 
in Turkish societyo The actual effect of these measures 
on women has varied according to their individual 
circumstances. There have always been differences 
in the treatment of women in different areas of the 
counby, different strata of society and in different 1 
religious groups. Although the seclusion of women was a 
fact in the palace and among the upper classes it was not 
so widely practised elsewhere before the eighteenth 
centuryo372 Alevi women 9 to give an example of a 
religious difference 9 have traditionally enjoyed greater 
freedom that Sunni women in Turkeyu 
Much of the impetus for the changes was provided, 
as we have seen from Ataturk's speech above 9 by the First 
World War arid the Turkish War of Independence or revol~ 
11 t.i onar y fl tru ggl eo 'rhefle warn gave new opportunities 
for women Lo ma.k~' a •: ()YJ t.r i ll11 !.Inn in wha. t Ul'lerl to be 
ty-pically 111alP. arettll of' nmploymon t. and n.c ti vi ty. To 
this extent the position in Turkey is s.imilftr to that in 
much of Europe follovJing the First and Second World 
Wars. 
Thoughp as stated elsewhere, the wearing of the 
veil was never prohibited in Turkey 0 373 nevertheless 
Feyzioglu feels he c~. make a very grand claim for the 
advan<~ement of the position of women in Turkeyo He 
states: 
'Purkish women were granted the largest 
opportunities, at lea::~t as far as their 
legally granted rights were concernedp not 
only among women of all lslamic countries, 
but in the world in genera1.374 
One of the most important measures to effect the 
status of women was the introduction of the Civil Code 
in 1926., The important provisions ot this Code, such 
as the prohibition of polygamy and the institution of 
the civil marriage have alrc-~ady been mentioned. 
Wring the debate in the l;rand 1~ational Assembly on the 
Civil Code, on 17th February 1926, ~ukru Kaya a speaker 
for the justice commission,375 made explicit the 
importance attached to sucr1 measures. He said: 
The new law incorporates such principles as 
monogamy and the right to divorce = principles 
which are required for a civilized nation.,"576 
In 1930 a significant step was taken in the 
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field of women's rights. In that year women were allowed 
both to vote inP and to stand for municipal electionso 377 
87 
In 1934 women gained full political rights and dutieso37S 
The argument behind this latter change was set out in 
the introduction, to the bill when it was presented to the 
Grand National AsBemblyg 
~'or centuries 9 Turkish women have 1:;10rk6id in 
every field with men~ they have suffered every 
kind of privation and oppression and they have 
shared in the prosperity as well as the 
disasters which have beftallen this nationo 
They must therefore be given the right to take 
part in the legislative processes in the same 
way as they have the right to participate in 
matters affecting the family and their own 
Our Repuhlic has been established 
as a result of their patriotic endeavorso 
There is no place in our Republic and in our 
revolution for reactionary ideas stemming from 
the period of oppression and ignorance in our 
historyo 1~is motion is designed to give 
women the right to vote and the right to be 
elected to parliament so that we may benefit 
from the contribution they will make in the 
development of our countryo379 
The following year» 1935 0 in elections to the @rand 
National Assembly seventeed women gained placeso380 
Yet with regard to the enhanced status of women 
it must be remembered that there remains a great 
difference between the urban? cosmopolitan centres and 
the villageso When Landau, in 1938, said how impressed 
he was by Turkish women for "the thoroughness of their 
recent emancipationoooit was astonishing how unself-
conaciouse and sure of themselves they were" 0 38l he \1&8 
almost certainly talking about the urban womeno In 
many cases changes in the position in the urban aFeas 
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havG fai.J.t~d to filter d<lwn to t.h~ viJlngesu In fac tv 
even in the urban setting 9 though the legal and official 
attitude to women may have changed there has been little 
if any shift in the outlook and opinions of many of the 
individual male members of societyo 
such individual still described Turkey to me as a "very 
masculine society"o 
The ~,amillf_g 
The leaders of the new Republic rightly recognised 
that if reform was to be successful it had to penetrate 
into the world of the familyo Moat of the reforms touchsd 
upon the family in some way; but the following are 
mamsures aimed specifically at the familyo 
In 1923 9 and again in 1924 9 the Grand National 
Assembly discussed a draft Family Code 0 382 This Code 
was baaed on the Meriat and was eventually 9 for this 
It was felt that having a family 
Gode based on the §eriat was inappropriate for the new 
Republico384 This reasoning iA highly significant as 
the c·onsti tution of 1924 did not claim that Turkey was a. 
secular stateo The 1924 Conati tution still stated that 
the religion of Turkey was Islamo This would tend to 
suggest that the collective thinking of the Grand 
National Assembly was more advanced tham the thoughts 
they chose to express in the 1924 Constitutiono 
Another measure directly affecting the family was 
the policy 9 expressed in the 1926 Civil Code 9 that only 
those marriages contracted by an authorized representative 
of the state were recognised as valido3S5 This was 
not a shift in the nature of marriage from a sacrament 
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to a contract in civil lawo In Islam marriage is not 
a sacrament but a legal contract. The change here is 
from a leg-al contract valirlated hy the religious 
In tll.i:1 mea:n.tre i L j :J the l:.cw wnidl iu' bc.iTlf\' secu.Larizcd v 
not marriage. 
Finally 9 on the 21st of June 9 1934 9 a law was 
t d · · th of' i' ·1 386 All enac e requ1r1ng e use ~n1 y names. 
families had to choose and to regiater a joint na.me 9 
the equivalent of the surname in Europe and America. 
Kemal Statues: 
The government of the Republic signalled their 
intf~n tlon t;,l (lepart from Ir-~larnic tradition in another 
way. On OctohP.r 3nl, 192(, a fltat.uc~ or Mustafa Kemal 
was (·~roc: ted in IstanbuL 387 Thi.D wa:.1 an important 
an Islam strictly forbids the erection of human or 
imageH., 388 'l'his prohibition is based on Qur 1 anic 
injunctions against idolatry with the following two 
verses of the Qur'an being cited:389 
And when Abrahrun said 9 'My Lord 9 
make this land secure, and turn me 
and my sons away from serving idols; 
event 
animal 
my Lora 9 they have led astray many men ••• '(l4:38) 
and, 
0 believers 9 wine and arro•.-~-shuffline 9 
idols and divining-arrows are an abominat.ionv 
some of Satan's work; so avoid it; haply 
so you will prosper.(5:9~)390 
vlhile it is true that there was a well established 
tradition of miniature painting in Ottoman Turkey 9 the 
miniatures were not on public display~ They were very 
much the property of the elite and wP.re for private display 
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'l'hin point about .l.i.rn.i.ted aceesu was also ~rueP 
thottgh to a lesser extent 9 of the portraits of the Sultan 
which Mahmud II ordered to be hung in government offices 
from 1829 o 39l The statue 9 however 9 was on public viewo 
A year laterv on .!llovember the 4th 9 1927 another statue of 
Mustafa Kemal was erected 9 this time in Ankara.,39
2 These 
statues were 9 tnusv a very public statement of the break 
with Islamic traditiono 
Educationg 
On 3rd March 1924 the law on the unification of 
education was passedo393 This law placed all education 
under the c;mtrol of the Ministry of Education)94 
Giving the .Ministry control of all educational establishments 
paved the way for the later move to e~ose the medreseso395 
The need to close the medreses can be illustrated by 
the fact that as late as 1921 they taught "almost 
exclusively by rote memorization of the Qur 1 ru1 and Arabic 
texts learnea by reading aloud before the teacher"o396 
This method of euucation haa proved satisfactory for 
the moL·e t1:auitional religious needs of Ottoma.u societyo 
Clearly however they well'e unsuited for the development 
of a Wes~ern nation envisaged by Ataturko Under the 
rule of the Ottoman tneocracy "religious schools and 
religious euucation iu schools were unquestioued" 9 397 
certainly for the population at largeo Ataturk 9 on 
the other hand 9 saw Islamic education as an integral 
pa... t of tne old order and as a stumbliug block to 
d . t• 3~8 mo ern1.za l.OHo 
This attitude ou the part of the group urgiug 
moderuizatio•• of the Turkisn state anu the following 
of a path to Westernization involved the teaching of 
religion in all state schools being prgscribedo399 
'['hiA bl"Jgan in 1927 with lhf! fi.rr~t EltagP. of' a two-part 
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move againc-jt religiouA educ:ationo In thin year r8ligious 
classes in ordinary state schools became voluntaryo400 
The second stage in the removal of religious educatiom 
began in primary schools where religious classes were 
dropped in 1930 in urban schoolso 401 This measure did 
not apply to village schools until 1933o 402 This 
difference in the year of implementation of the measure 
points to the urban-ru~al cont~ast which must always be 
kept in mind when looking at Turkey 9 particularly when 
looking at matters of developmento Following this~ in 
September 1931 reli~ious clasnes were also abolished 
in middle schoolsa 403 This abolition of religious 
education was seen as necessaxy 9 but not necessarily 
as irreversobleu As one leading figure in Turkish 
national education told Rom Landau in the late 1930sg 
In twenty years or more there may be a religious 
education in Turkey once againo But we cannot 
possibly have it todayo Within one or 
two generations we must try to absorb ~hat 
spirit of the new age which most of the 
Western nations have evolved slowly through 
many generationso The word 'religion' must 
not even be mentionedo It would only c~eate 
confusion in the minds of the people and open 
doors to the reactionarieso 404 
An additional measure may be noted here for the 
sake of completenesso On 7th February 1924 a law was 
passed banning religious symbols from the inside of 
foreign schoolso 405 These foreign schools were of 
two types. Firstly those providing a Westexn education 
to those wishing to acquire oneo 
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Secondly denominatiom®l 
schools providing an education to members of ap®cific 
religious groups .. In April of the same year the 
government closed down all French and Italian 8Choo~ 
in Turkey as those responsible for these schools refused 
to remove Roman Catholic symbols from their classrooms .. 4°6 
Gen~rally speaking Christian missionaries were allowed 
to continue their educational work though the government 
repeatedly made it clear to them that it would not 
tolerate any direct pli'Oselytizingo 407 'This may be 
illustrated by the incident at the American Girls Lycee 
in Bursa during 1928o In that year the school was closed 
down following changes being brought against it which 
alleged that three of its pupils had been converted to 
Christia.nity., 408 Three teache~s from the school were 
charged under legislation forbidding proselytizing and 
were convided on 30th April 1928., 409 Following an 
appeal the verdict was upheld by the Court of Cassation 
on 5th March 9 1929.
410 The school was later allowed to 
reopen without the offending teachers .. 411 
Another measure which directly concerned the foreign 
schools in Turkey was an order issued by the Ministry 
of Education in August 1931. 412 This order directed 
that history, geography and civics should be taught in 
the Turkish language by Turkish teachers .. 413 Apart 
from these measuresp however 9 foreign schools in Turkey 
were allowed to continue their work without undue 
interferance. 
Following these early measures religious education 
between 1933 and 1949 went through a period of "benign 
neglect". 414 •.rowards tne tmd of tni:3 period nowever 
the situation was beginniug to change. Though they 
belong chronologically to the per·iod up to 1950 11 these 
developments in fact foreshadow the changes which were 
to take place iu the period after 1950. But they may 
be stated here. On 24th December 1946 a debate was 
opened in the Turkish parliament.4l5 The debate was 
concerned with \>lOrries that a complete lack of religious 
educatio&~ would le<td to a lack of ethical and moral 
qualit i.es among the youth. 416 ThiB debate did lead 
to concrete developments. In 1949 two hours per week 
of Muslim religious education Here made available on 
a voluntary basis in the 4th and 5th grades of public 
elementary schools.4°7 
One anomaly, noted by Reed 9 is wortn repeating. 
tie tells us tnat: 
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From 1934 to 19-18 the only indigenous, legal 
Islamic religious training available to Turkish 
Muslims was eitner as a routine part of basic 
armed forces training for recruits, or in the 
very elementary cournes for memorizers of the 
Qru: 1 an and on the Qur 1 anu 4lS 
~is is remarkably strange as it is the army which is 
regarded as the guardian or Kemalism, and thus of 
secularism. So to have a situation in wnich these 
tS'Uardians of secularism are the only peopl.e providing 
a religious educatiou is something of a surpriseo 
Feyzioglu points to a dual attitude towarus the 
subject of religious education from the point of vieH 
of secularism in Turkeya As secularism "does not imply 
an anti-religious attitude" he tells us~ 
the faith of children being educated at state 
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nc~lluolu ha:J l.o I If' rr~:l!JP.l; Ll"rl v 1:1hilu ~ or cnurae 0 
it is imperative that no erlucation in direct 
conflict w.i.th the scientific approach be given., 4l9 
!ie sees 9 thus 9 the need to attempt to strike a balance 
between respect for individual beliefs and respect for 
the scientific outlook. 
We are left in no doubt as to which element in the 
choice is to be given greater weight., H'eyzioglu tells 
us that :it is ''totally undesirable to have a religious 
1 establish111eut 0 " free from ::-1tate control and regulation 
"which conduets religious education completely outside 
of th8 sup8rvision of the Rta.te 11 0 420 In eRsence: you 
may take the religion out of the state 0 but you cannot 
remove the state from religion .. 
With regatd to higher education two items need to 
be notedo lt'irstly the increasing inability of the 
Jt,acul ty of Theology at Istanbul University to attract 
s tucten ts between 1921! fl.fld 1933u 421 'llhe dP.clining 
rJtudtmt pupulatic1n of thin establiGhment <:an be seen from 
422 tne follow.Lnt; statemP.nt of studeut numbers: 
1924-25 
1926-27 
l9~7-2B 
1929-30 
1932-33 
284 
167 
53 
35 
20. 
This probably simply reflects the fact that the profes-
sional and employment prospects whicn graduates of tnis 
institution could expect were declining in the new 
atmosphere of modernization and developmento For the 
sake of completeness it may be noted that in 1949 a new 
l~ l t f Th l d t Ank u . . t 423 •acu y o eo ogy was opene a ara ~vers1 Yo 
This will be discussed in more detail in the next ser:tion 
when we come to discuss the cha.uge in the situation 
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beginning about 1950o 
We can now turn to thP. schooilis for the education 
and training of religious functionarieso In 1924 there 
were over 29 of these imam=hatig schools.424 This number 
declined to only two in 1932425 and in 1932=33 imam-hatiR 
schools ceased operatingo426 Yet it came to be 
recognised that it wasg 
essential to train qualified men of religion 
capable of comprehending the fact that 
secularism doss not imply antagonism toward 
religiono 427 
The state was to try 9 in other_ words 0 to use religious 
functionaries as agents to promote the popular acceptance 
of secularismo This was turned into concrete action 
in 1948 with the opening of schools to train religious 
f t . . 428 unc 1.0nar1eso 
Finally two more items may be included heFeo In 1929 
school history books were rewritten to place more 
Qmphasi~ upon the ethnic hackgrounn of the Turks and 
with "exaggerated and dubious theorieA about their 
origins and influence in the world"o429 Included in 
such efforts was the work of Turkish scholars to establish 
links between recent Turkish history and Hittite and 
Sumenian civilizationso430 Considerable impetus was 
given to such work by Ataturk 0 s belief in the antiquity 
and importance of Turkey. As he put it: 
My whole work for Turkey 9 everything I have 
done 9 would be meaningless if I did not believe 
that this country is the cradle of civilizationo 
Ny faith in the antiquity and in the special 
role which Turkey must play in the history 
of the world has been my guiding principle 
th h ll t . •t• 431 roug a my ac ~v~ 2GSo 
At the same time 9 the rew~iting of school books was part 
of the procosap including the language reformp aimGd 
at fostering national identity and at distancing the 
'furks f:rwm theil? Islamic neighbours with an Arabic and 
Persian based cultureo This rewriting replaced the 
predominant Islamic emphasis in the G~liet text bookso 
W® can also note the effects of Western educatio~ 
upon the native supettatitionso Kazamias notes thatg 
as students acquire more formal educationv 
they also change their attitudes concerning 
the role of KiBJ1let in shaping their lives and 
their futureo432 
This would seem to justify the faith and emphasis which 
Ataturk placed on education as a means of fostering more 
Wester~ and scientific attitudes which would sssist the 
Westernization ~f Turkeyo 
Hat Reform: 
We now come to consider the so-call~d hat refoll'lllo 
This aeries of events started on August the 24th 9 l925o 
At that time in Kastamonu Ataturk and his fellow 
travellers discarded their fezes in favour of Eull'opean= 
style hatso 433 Fellowing thisp on September the 2ndp 
the wearing of European dress was introduced and the 
wearing of the foz was prohibited 0 434 This l18.6 
re-inforced in the Grand National Assembly on the 25th 
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of November 19'25 9 when the Assembly ou.tlawed the wearing 
of the fez and other fonms of head=gear without bnimso435 
For Ataturk to discard his fez was one thingv for 
it to be required of the entire population was quite 
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another .. The wearing of Europe&1-style nats was not 
completely wlkuown in Turkey for Armenian Christians~ 
amougst otnP.rs 9 haa worn tuP.m before the .ttepuulic came 
into beiHg~ ttowPver it v1a:J rnof-l t unusual for A'1UJsl im 
'l.'UJ:kn to v/el'l.r trlflHto 111 f;;u~t~ the d8ID8..11d tnat '1\u:ks 
snoulct wear orirnmea neau~gear crea'teu. a logistical 
problem for the society as a wlwle anu for tne particular 
inctiviuuaL To llegin with tuere was a proolem of supply 
anu de111aJAd.; taere were simply not ei10Ugh caps or hats 
with DL'ims in 'l'urkey to fulfil the new demancte Hence 
tne clal!H by rtaliae Edio that the maJor effect of the 
nat reform was to "enrich Europea.a hat factories at the 
f th ' l r d • • d Tu· k II 4 36 }i' expe se o P. <t. red. y unpovertshP r s o or 
the inc1ivi.rlun.l Ltwre Wi'.LA Lhe probLem or how to make tn<a 
ri~lal proAtrution during prayer wnilst weaxing a hat 
with a hrimQ Ofte •• tniR pt·oblPlu was solved by tur .. ing 
a peaked cap back to front during prayers., 
The change from one form of head~covering to another 
may 9 at first» seem trhial. Indeed rialide_ ~dib saw it 
a.s the most "futile and 3uperflcial" of the reforms .. 4i7 
lu fact 9 sh8 werJt furtner: 
'l'ne \1eHtr~rniz::tt.i.cju of Turkey is not and s.,oulrl 
not be a question or rnere extr~rna.l imitation 
and gestllrP.oooTo tell the Turk to don a ~erta.iu 
headdre:::.:s and 1get ~ivilized' or he hanged or 
43t! impri8oned, is ahsurd 9 to say the leaot. 
But the effects of tuis refurm were more profound than 
Halide Bdib allows., We have noted the diffieulty tne 
new head-wear ere a ted for the Muslim clur ing 1,prayer. 
But the symholic natu.L:e of thP. change went mu<.:h deeper. 
As Berkes explains: "the cuaue;ing of heP..dGovering did 
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indeod ::;~'IT.:JOlize an importaut change in m~-:ntali 1-y" o 439 
This may be better understood by tully appreciating the 
reaso11 for 9 and depth of the attachment of the '.Purk to 
the fe? .• Gokalp has outljnefl this attachment as follows~ 
When the people prel'P.r the fez or fur cap to 
the hat~ they rio i 1. not het::awJe they think 
one in more nyp.;ienic or eheapcr thRn the other 9 
hut becaw=w theue (JJ,jP.(~to symholi.:;;e a meaninev 
1 I . h ,., . ·th t. l . 440 a va. Uf:! c wr.1:3 cu Ln , c na tonct cousraousness. 
Indeed the n t-r.ength of th.in a.L l;achment is 3t.ill more 
surprising ivhen it is recalled that the fe7. was oniy 
introduced into Turkey in l1J213 on the instructions of 
Mahmufl II" 44l At that time strone measures were needed 
to fore:Jtall andp if need bep suppress oppositiou to 
thE: fez., 442 Indeed 9 doubts were expressed as to vmetner 
the fez could be properly regarclerl as an Islamic head-
. 443 cover1.neo 
J:i'or Ataturk tniu pre-exi.::1ting national sentiment 
or consr:iuusness ha.rl to he resha.pcrl and redefined in 
particular terms" The rejer:tiou of the fe?. in favour 
of the cap or brimmed hat servedp yet again, to redefine 
national consciousness in terms of equality and identity 
with l!.'u.ropean nationso As Ataturk himself explained the 
move when speaking during 19271 
It was uecessary to abolish the fez 9 which sat 
on the heads of our natio•• as an emblem of 
ignorance, negligence, fanaticism, a.nd hatred 
ot' prot,rresrcJ ana c:i.vlli?.ation 9 to accept in 
its plar: e the hat 9 U1P. head gear used by thA 
.,,hole civilizer! worlcl ~ and in this way to 
uemonstrate that thr~ Turkisn natiou 9 iu its 
mentality as in other respects, in no way 
diverges from c:i.vili?.P.rl ::wcial life a 444 
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It iA irnportantp howeverP to note here that the 
veil has nevl':r he en outlawed in Turkey .. 445 Yet we need 
IH:~ ld't i.n no douht 1lfl to Ataturk 0 s feeli$16'S on the mat.tero 
In Kastamouu on 30th August~ l925D Ataturk expressed his 
feelings towards the veil thus~ 
In some places I have seen women who put a 
piece of cloth or a towel or something line it 
over their heads to hide their facesP and who 
turn their backs or huddle themselves ou the 
grom~d Wf4en a man passes by 0 What are the 
meaning and sense of this behaviour? Gentlemenv 
can the mothers and daughters of a civilized 
na tiou aaopt this strange manner u tnis barbarous 
posture? It is a spectacle that makes th~ 
nation an object of ridicule., It must be 
d. d t 446 reme 1e a onceu 
Despite such words the veil was never outlawed as mentioned 
aboveP but today it is not at all common in the urban 
centL'es., 
Religious Clothing: 
In December 1934 a law was passed which prohibited 
the wearing of ecclesiastical garments outside mosques 
and churcneso 447 This measure came into force on the 
15th of JuneP 1935.448 In earlier periods clotning 
worn had. given precise indications o1 the religious 
allegiances of the individualo Not only were there 
distinctive features of dress fo.J.. individual tarika.ts 11 
but clothing also distinguished the various grades within 
one ta.rikat from one another. This had often proved a 
source of conflict with religious rivalries erupting 
on the streetu In additiou thJs was an important move 
as it limited the ability of strangers to pay respect 
to religious men in the streetP as religious function~ 
aries were no longer recognisable to the public outside 
of their place of worsttipo 
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'!'h<a la .. f,llA.g® r.eform i:'l onn o C Utf: mooi widely kuOtrM 
reforms oJ the early Republtc::u1 period, The beginnings 
of the la.uguage reform are 9 nowever v to be fouHd before 
the .ttepublic. came into being., i5y 1908 many Turkish 
novelists anct journalists were trying to bring the written 
form of the la.. .. guage closer to the spokeu form0 449 
A little later~ during 1911~ a group of writers im 
Salonicap grou.ped around the journal Geuc;; Kalemler ( 0Yonng 
Peus 1 ) 0 staxtect to demand. the suppression of Araoic and 
PerAiau words unct theiL· replacement with native 'l'urkisu 
worrln wuere such exinted.,450 They also wisi!ed to 
abandon tuofle rules of Arabic rutrl Persian grammar whiic.ta 
nad fou.ud their way iuto '!'Urkis•l over the ceuturieso 451 
Once the Repuolic was establiS11ed language reform 
could get underway iu ea.ruest .. In 1928 the Latiu script 
was adopted to replace the Arabic script in wnich Turkish 
ha.u beeH written up to tnat time., 452 After it was 
ctecid.ed to adopt the Latin script an intensive campaign 
of iw3truc:tion waA initiated with tne aim of teaching 
the new f!cript to tnose wno hau uned the Arabic one.,453 
Ataturk himself toured the natioH w.ith the new alpnabet 
and oeca.me "the t!hief ifwtructor of the School of the 
:Nation"., 4~4 He pusned the alpnabet reform througt1 in 
a matter of mo11tns against bitter opposition from 
couservative a.ud L'eligious quar~ers,.455 .Uespi"te tne 
opposi tiou the refo.1:m weut turougu a .. d dema...ds for the 
rHnl.oratiuu of l.tH~ ol.rl :wri.pt have 9 evor 1.1ineev tended 
to he equa"lr;<i w.i i.u relig.Lon:-'1 :·md pol.i tical reaction .. 4~6 
m :November 1928 0 a law was ena(·ted banning the Ut;e of 
the Arabic script iu all puulic a.ff'airs after the first 
of Decembero 451 I1~eeuP Article 526 of the Penal Code 
prohibits tne pri!.ting of '1\u'kisn books in the Arabic 
scripto 4.5S So by 1929 Turkisi• books and newspapers 
bagan to appear in tne new Lal-ii! scripto 459 
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With spec.ifie regard to the change in alphabet there 
can be serm one particular hope and two specific 
reservationso 'L'he hope wB.s that the adoption of the 
Latin script would facilitate a rapid increase in the 
rate of literacyu4bO The Latin alphabet was felt to 
be easier to lear:ap a. poiut Hnicn has been so Hell 
l~ommu,.icated by the hierarcuy in Turkey tu::tt most younger 
Turks today are couviuced that Ottoma..u Turlas~, wri ttta:u 
in the old scriptP is virtually irnpossiole to learn., 
Tne two specific worri~s were both to fu1 extent 
co.ucerned wi tu tne perdep"tion .. 9 of tnose outside Turkeyo 
In tne firat place 9 tne Latin alpnabet hau been adopted 
by the Al banirul Muslims wuo were cou.siaerea to have ·· 
"certeu from the Ottomau Empire an ..... from Islam 11 g 461 
More couservative elr-~meat:: w.i tni.u tne ne·w Kepublic 
coula not nelp hut worry .iu cu.:1A the ne"' a.lp.llel.bG~i snould 
meru. that they too were f'el t to have ceue<i from Islam 0 
Seconrtly 9 F1 sirnil:=tr movr;ment towards tne auopti.on 
of the Lati.. script was UdJerway amoug the 'l'urkim.~ 
speakiug peopleu of' the Sov.i.ct Unionu462 would tne 
aa.option of tne new alpuabet leA.a. some to HOuder if the 
siwilari ty of tue ~ove with that of the peoples wi ·~niu tne 
102 
Soviet Union was not eignisicanto 
On the whole~ however 9 the adoption of the Latin 
script was a poaitiwe move as it did have a beneficial 
effect on rates of literacy~ as well as the more super-
ficial effect of making the TurkiRh books and newspapers 
look more Westerna 
Ji'ollowing a familiar pat tel!'n moves wGre then made 
to eliminate the alternatives in an effort to re~inforce 
the new measureso we have seen that laws were passed 
prohibiting the use of the Arabic script with the Turkish 
language., The next step was one to eliminate Arabic 
and Persian languages from the Turkish system of schoolingo463 
This occurred on the twenty~ninth of August 1929v when 
instruction in Arabic and Prarsian languages was banned 
from the curriculum of Turkish schoolso 464 
'rhe energy devoted to language reform is well 
justified by the importance of language which can be 
"such an important uniting element that it often dlraws 
ethnically diverse peoples together under a common 
nationalistic ideology" o 465 Yet in this regard language 
is something of a double edged sword as ethnic 
minorities, such as those in the Southeast of Turkey 9 
tend to cling to their own language tenacioualy.,466 
Language neform was notv of course~ confined to 
matters of education and script., Indeedp the strongly 
nationalistic and Westernizing nature of the early 
Republican regime very much favoured the more radical 
linguistic reformers who wished to remove many of the 
foreign elements from Turkish., 467 The new regime 
certainly could not tolerate the cleavage between the 
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'Pu.r.kiah Of' lhe Pdueatod c:1aB8AFJ and l.hal. OJ" the mf),GfJ(lQ 0 46fJ 
As Ataturk put itg 
The Turkish nationp which knew how to defend 
its country and noble independencev must also 
liberate its language frohthe yoke of for~ign 
langu.ages., 469 
In this connection the Turk Dil Kurumuv Turkish 
Language Societyv was founded in l9}2o 47° The Society 
was to work consistently over the years for the 
purification of the Turkish language by removing words 
of fo-reign origin and replacing them with "pure Turkish" 
wordso Huwever 9 the Society 0s attitude towards words 
borrowed from European languages was more tolerant than 
their attitude towaxds words borrowed from Arabic and 
Persiano 471 This is understandable in the secularizing 
atmosphere as so much of the prestige given to Ar~bic 
and Persian is tied up with their status as Islamic 
langu.ageso 472 Though many French words have been borrowed 
over the last 150 yearsp these seem to have been thought 
less of a threat to the individuality of Turkish than 
were the Arabic and Persian borrowingso473 
Linguistic reform came to a temporary halt after 
the death of Ataturk i~ 1938 9 but was re=activated under 
Inonu in 194lo474 Ever since that time there have been 
periodic purges of old words and attempts to introduce 
and to populariae new oneso 
Liturgical Languages~ 
The leaders of the Republic also set about reforming 
the languages used in worahipa The use of the Turkish 
laneuage in worship was passionately supported by Ziya 
Geka.lpo 475 He insisted that "Turkism in religion aimplyr 
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me<ws naving religious scriptures u sermons 9 and preaching 
all in Tt1rkish11 9 41b A good argument was made out for 
tnis move on the grounds tnat conducting religioU8 
services in tne la::.guage o1 the commou people 1;10uld help 
to increase tneir understanding of the teachings of 
It was presented as a move wnich would help 
rather than hinder Islam iu Turkey Q 
In 1933 the Arabic ~all to Prayer was prohibited.477 
This cannot be portrayed as a move to strengthen Islam 
by makiu.g it more uudersta.udable to native Turkish 
epeakerso The Gall to Prayer is always the same and 
its mea.niug is well u.uderstood by Turkisn M.ulslims. 
Tnis .L·eform was simply a piece of zealous language 
purification. Y®t this prohibition was giveu the backing 
of Article 5~b of tne Penal Code w.tU.cn o.eclared that 
every Muezzin who did not give the Call to Prayer m 
·l'Urkish was liaole to irnpriso.weuto 478 
Sucn attempts to chauge the use of Arabic as a 
liturgical l~Uogu.age met wi tu opposi tiouo The pious 
maintained 9 as tney always nad doue 9 that it was not 
permissible to offer the ritual prayer in a la.uguage 
otuer tuan Arabic.479 
Today in Turkey the Call to Prayer and the ritual 
prayers are offered in Arabic, but the sermon on Friday 
is ge.uerally given in 'l'urkislle In furtherance of tue 
aim of rna.Y..ing the teachings of Islam more available to 
the Turkisn speaker many trausla ti OHS of tue Qur van bave 
appea.rea in Turkish siuce 1923.480 'l!hougn tnese are 
used for private etuay of tne mea.uing of textsp not for 
liturgical purposaso48l 
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Dervish Ordersg 
Tha J.)orv.Lsn OrdPrri had a f,'J'('i:l.t dna] of' influrmce 
OVBJ' lhe mann of' thrJ peop.l1· and tuua W!'l'r' ttle tarr:P.t 
for reform a.t an early stage in tho ni:~tory of the 
Republico As .tlrockelmaun puts itg "the religious 
life of the people was affected more by the dervish orderso•o 
tnan by tne official clergy" o 482 DuL· ine; tne Ot taman 
periodp w1ule tne ulema were becoming a wealthy nereaitary 
group somewuat removed from the ordinary people the 
leaders of the dervir-w orders L·emained as part of the 
people? w.i tu immeuse influeuce and prestige amoug tnem., 483 
At times tneir influcuce was mo:1t welcome aB wne .. they 
took r)art in thP. expansion of !Rlam and were most 
prominent in work at the froutiers of the expanding 
Islamic world., This is noted by .orockelmann wno commeAJ.ts: 
"it cannot De aenied tnat to a great exteut the orders 
exercised a civilising effect under conditions of 
oarbarism.,"484 However? in the moaern period tue very 
couservative 9 and often autocratic influence ol tne 
leaderR of dervi:m orders had been a great obstacle to 
reform .. As !,ewis poiuLs OUtp the influence or tne 
dervisu orders was such that tney were described as "a 
religion wl.ti,iu a religioa9 and a state witnh! a state",.L1S5 
.uuri..g tne periou of reform in the l~ineteentu Centuryp. 
nowever, after a limited amount of iuitial resistance~ 
the leaaers of the dervisu o.;:.ders seemed to have been 
largely indifferent to the reforms aud discussious of the 
timeo486 
The influeA.~oc:e of the heads of the orders ou their 
followers canuot be over-estimatedo 'l'he head of an 
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order. was tho spiritual director of the rnembell's of the 
order. This was the basis of their influence as a 
novice owed "blind obedience" to his spiritual dirG!ctoro487 
The relationship 9 thus 9 took the form of charismatic 
dominatiom;. Charismatic domination is characterized by 
obedience not to rules or traditions but to a person of 
imputed holiness 9 heroism or some extraordinary quality.488 
ThiA type of obedience .is not open to being challenged 
successfully at the rational level 9 a.s the dominatiom 
is not rationally based in the first placeo The very 
act of recognizing an authority based on holiness implies 
a total submission to that authority. It is against 
this background of total obedience to the deFVish leaders 
that we must see the measures taken by Ataturk to counter 
their influence., This effort to countell'· their influence 
took place 9 in fact~ despite the fact that there was no 
uniform response from the dervish orders to the early 
nationaU.at movement under Ataturk. While the leaderR 
of some dervish orders gave active and effective support to 
the Army of the Caliphate~ mobilised oy the Sultan;..caliph 
against the nationalists~ ten other dervish leaders were 
members of the first Grand National Assembly in Ankarao4S9 
During the early reform period it became apparent 
that it was from the dervishes rather than from the~ 
that the main opposition to secularism would come 0 490 
Because of this it was realised that something must be done to 
bread the dervish leade~s 6 conservative influence 
if the attempt to reform Turkey into a modeFm Republic 
were to be a auccesso On September }Othp 19~5 Ataturk 
spoke thus of the dervish orders: 
107 
I cannot accept the existence 9 in the civilizGd 
Turkish community 9 of people so primitive as to 
seok their material and Apiritual wGllbaing 
through the guidance of any old she.Um~ ioday 0 
when they stand in the radiant presenco of 
loarning and acience 0 of civilization and all 
that it meansooothe Republic of Turkey can 
never be the land of eheikhs 9 dervisheac and 
lay= brothers., The straightest 0 truest Way 
(}arika~ is the way of civilizationoooThe 
heads of th® orders will grasp this tnuthooo 
and ~ill at once close their tekkes 0 of their 
oun. accord., They will acknowledge that their 
disciples have at last attained right guidance 0 49l 
Thus it was that dervish orders wene outlawed 9492 and 
all tekkes (Turkish order-centr@s) 493 were closed 0 494 
ThaAe decrees were published by the Cabinet on the 2nd 
of SeptembeF 0 1925 9 and covered by a law enacted on the 
30th of Novembez·., 495 This: law 9 noo 677 also banned the 
use of honorific terms. associated with the dervish orders~ 
such as sheikh 9 baba and so on; and pFactises of fortune 
telling 9 faith healing and such were also banned.,496 
Generally speaking these measures against folk=religion 
aroused far more opposition than did the abolition of 
the Caliphate 9 or the replacement of Islamic law with 
the Civil Code in 1926.,497 
These measures achieved varying degrees of success· 
with many dervish orders continuing to function 
clandestinely a Undoubtedly they were bold reforms to 
attempt eo early in the life of the Republic., But it 
was recognised that unless this step was taken quickly 
all other reforms would be more difficultp or even 
impossible to carry auto 
Secularism Un®er Ino~: 
Ismet Inonu who became President of tne Republic 
after the deatn of Ataturkp wan horn in Izmir in l364o498 
Al thm.tgh hin view of seculariflm allowed more room for 
religious freedom~ 499 Aldermau tells us thatg 
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officially at leafltp there were no maJOL' c:il8.ltges 
in the application of Kemalds secularizatioKll 
principles from nis death to the commencement 
of tne multi-part.y system~500 
'l'he reforms were certainly >.i.Ot di~a...tled 9 but equally 
tnere were no maJor new reforms introauced a.ud existing 
measures were executed with less vigouro The new 
situation was well stated by Fo H. Akay 0 the spokesman for 
a uelegatiou from tne Tu.rkisu prAof:l viAiting Inuia in 
1943o 
We are Turks first and then Muslims. We have 
no .interest in a..q ki.ud of project for Islamic 
unity ••• Jt'or us religion is a very honourable 
personal trung 9 but i "L nas no place in Turkish 
1 . . 501 po ~t1CS., 
Despite the lack of new reforms one measure deserves 
a mention here. On 11th November 1942 law no. 4305 was 
passed by the Gr<wd i.~ational Assembly. 5°2 This introduced 
a new eleweht of taxatiou called tne Varlik Vergisi or 
Tne stated aim of tnis tax was to soak 
up part of the windfall profits being made by speculative 
businessmen in the inflationary period during World War II. 504 
It was imposed on businessmen 9 factory owners and real 
estate ageuts and was assessed by a special committee 
made up of businessmen and goven.ment officials. 505 
It is mentior1ed here because the firms of the non=Muslim 
minorities werep according to KarpatP "subjected to the 
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tax in an arbitrary and unrealistic way'0 o 506 Non=:Muslims 
seem to have paid 9 in fact 9 up to ten times as much in 
this tax as did the Muslimso507 In an address to the 
People 0s Party in June 1943 9 the then Prime Minister 
Saracoglu claimed that this disc:dmil'I.B.tio:n had been purely 
accidental 9 the minority community had 9 he claimed~ 
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simply been the most wealthyo But it is more believable 
to see the tax as a.n expression of a policy of oconomic 
nationalism.,509 In March 1944 the law was repealedo5~0 
But 9 as Hale concludesg 
By this timeoeoserious damage had been done 
to the R0public 1 s reputation for fair t~eatment 
of the minorities 9 besides much suffering to 
those affected.,5ll 
This measure demonstrates that despite the even=handed 
and secular principles which find expressio~ in the 
Turkish Constitution o£ 1924 9 discriminatioru on the grounds 
of religion was still possible this far in·to the 
Republic., 
This completes our review of the reforms- in Turkey 
up to 1950., In the following section we will turn to 
the period following 1950 to examine the contemporary 
situation and the changes brought about since the start 
of the multi-party system .. The desire underlying the 
reforms so far mentioned was well expressed by "one of 
Ataturkoe oldest coleagues" who told Landau: 
We want to return to the Orient as Orientalists 9 
but not as Orientalso As students anrl critics 
of the Orientp not as a part of it .. 512 
§_~'riON F'OUR 
'!ttrldiliY A.l'"flili 
Islalll to ua d.oomea. as a vi tal force in t£.e cultural a.nJ. 
strong m. Republic au Tur:key al thoug1-. its posi tiou a..:A 
role i•A SOuia.l life &1.'9 S0ffi6What a.moiguOUS 0 a 
tHoug.iJ. tra.a.i tion a.ud. foL·ce of 1J.B.Di t certainly count for 
accou. .. ~.a for tue attachmeut to Islruu to 00 fo~ in ih® 
Fol.' 0 as ldR&!ye poiutl':9 o~tp tuere 
u.as oeen °0a.l!! ~.roesive rel:ilUJ.·grutce of L"SligioY!s t'eolir:J& 
auo. interrast 11 iu ~.Le la'test. pua!:!e of Tin'kie.u uililtoryo-4 
Though Millar argues t!Ml.t 1$AAat someil e.r~ calli:ug tns 
resurgence of !slam !!1 Turkey is simply tne em.erge.uce 
of 01a balance of reepect10 bettJeen religious groups 9.00. 
tna rar(set&o5 As Lewis re.!Unds us i 1. is ll'lOt accurate to 
speak ol a reliesioWJ re-lii\lal iu Turksyp as 11 UM!.t- tJTh!tem 
-~s u:e v er 1 os 't i te 11 i tali ty ca..1 sc arc.sl-y be, revived'~ o 6 
Loold..u« a.t t.i!e si·l;uatio21& iXA- Turkey aft.er 1950 0 Heyd. 
In t!te Ot toma.n 
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Empire the state was to a cm~i@,g:~;able eJLtli!lAt subject. to 
religiou) In tne .l::tepuolic 0_ on tue otner na.ud. 0 religion 
is suuject to the state witi1 religious functionaries 
appea:dng to be 11but miuo:..: civil serva.uts 11 o 8 This is 
~y \fhat O.i..!.S woulU. ~B-~ by tus term secula.:dsmo 
What. has ol~ Hey-d. expla.i.M L!Jg 
uot tu~ iutegratiou of religious aMd. sooular 
insti tu·~;ions out tJ..e measure ot· ~,e political 
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influ.e.uce or tneir respective fw.nctiotAaXieso 9 
The Xslaudc poli l.y uas oeeu d.eatroyeu a.uu. tne state has 
estaulia.leu tne aumi.uiAtrative apparatus Atecessary for 
it to insp~ct ru!..dp if ueeu be 9 contz:ol 't.11~ relig.iolllS spnerao 
Yet 9 as Feyzioglu points ou.tP in adopting t.ne 
principles of secul~rism Turkey nas Hot divorceu itself 
from the esseuce of tue Islamic traJ.itiouo10 Islamic 
aT.ti tu.ues a.uu t.radi t.iom:1 e.x.er1. an important iufluence 
ou the li~tes or ~ks a.ud 9 hG! saysp will contiuue to do 
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SOo 
1~ Islam is slirong iu pJ:emmt uay '.l.'urkey 0 JJet::~pitC:l 
beiu.g elimiua l.eu. from poli t..ical lifiJ n Islam is fh·mly 
roo'lieu iJt t.lie n ... aJ.:t.s &Ml minus 0.1. tne peopleo lj The 
secu18.J: l~u.ers u.a..e .:.wt at-ce ... pt.eu. atJ.y maJOr reforms of 
relig·iou since l950o Moweverp tnough freeuom of 
coUBCieuct:: 8.42d oelio1· are u«UC•1 praiseu as products of 
tne secula.d.ziug moveweut yet Htraui tioualista 9 moder.uis~ 
or Alevis 0 to say aAO't.uug or· M~Mus11m J.:Gl'lligioua 
mi.uori liies IJWliW ftt~:~l T.ual. w .. eir points of 11iew recei'iOO 
i.ua.d..,qu.a.te at "entrou"o 14 '!'hey !rlf.\Y also at t..i.mrt~a 1'et4l 
t.hftflilSG'Jlllee "o ue ~o.ue 11ict1m~:~ or &uotle OJ: eve.cA mnre opeu 
i . . t• 15 u scrJ.nu.ua. ~Ollo Op.udou .:i.tj free P uu t perua.p~ a oms 
opiuioilS ru:·t: mo1:e free T.h.a.n others. 
ST.alillll1l secularists~ seeiAJ.g tuis re1.fival of religious 
fet:!ling, fslt T.ua.T. iT. was fa.nueu oy survivo1:s fJ:om 10ne 
OT.toma.u pe.o:iou. wi tu a sentimental attacume! ..... to traui tioEA.,16 
Tuey uavo oeeu appJ:~.uSI<I::Ii"c.~ ~case gran'&!Alg full autouowy 
to Islamil: iAI.sti l.u't.ious mig-ut lt1ad. to t .. ,eir being controlled. 
L>y 1:eae tJ.ou1.u:y Olll)IIM-'.Utllilo l'{ After 1950 e;ctrQIIIJ.Bt t.:Oh.~!OUtll 
pJ.:opagwtuu. hat~ f t
. l{Jb 
O®e/2 iu e viuo&!.C o rtiil!ll time t.n l.llltl. 
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Th<D group most resJJonsibl® for this has been tho Nurcuso l9 
The Nurcusg 
The Nurcus are one of the most prominent religious 
groups to be outspoken in opposition to secularismo 
It will be useful to look at some of their opinions in 
a ceFtain amount of detailp to see the nature of some of 
the views which oppose the official ideology in the modern 
Said Nuraig founder of the Nurcuep recoived only a 
traditionalp Islamic educationo 20 Hl3 seems to have had a 
fixed a.tti tude to modernism and W12sternization in hia 
early years as it iQ reported that he took part in a 
conservative counter-revolution against the Young Turks 
in 1909·o 21 However 9 in the Republic he kept 
cautiously out of the limelight until the multi-party 
periodo 22 
According to the Nurcu inter.pretation of the War of 
Independenceg or Liberation 9 Ataturk was supported by the 
p'eople in order that the Caliphate and Sultanate could 
be saved by expel1j._!!g_the enemy (the European powers) 
- 23 -from Turkeyo Thus the nation which·backed Ataturk 
during the war was "full of faith and ready to die for 
the sake of God"o 24 They were not at the time. fighting 
for the Ataturk reformso There is no historical reason 
for finding fault with this interpretationo 
The Ataturk period 9 however 9 is seen by the Nurcus 
as a period of irrsl.igiom <llld declineo 25 It was this 
irrelltsion which cveat1:1d the opportunity for communists 
26 to infiltrate in to •rurkeyo 'Phe main thrust of the 
Ataturk reforms is not understood as 'being an attGmpt to 
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separate the affairs of state from religious matterso 
Rather it is seen as the state using atheism to oppose 
both religion itselfp and religious peopleo 27 They consider 
that the reforms went so far as to make the perfor111ance 
f 1 0 0 d to 0 0 bl 28 o re 1g1ous u 1es 1mposs1 e. The Nurcus insist 
that Nationalism must not replace Islam. 29 Religion 
and nation cannot be separated out in the way envisaged 
by the reformersg the Nurcus claim that "our nationality 
is Islam"o 30 In fact 9 the Nurcua will not accept apostate 
Muslims as Turks but regard them rather as Europeans 
31 
"disguised" as Turkso 
Under Ataturk 9 the Nurcus stateP strenuous campaigns 
were launched to make people forget the soeial valu®s 
which would have united them as a nationo 32 Further 
they insist that none of the reforms was accepted willingly 
by the people but all were imposed upon them forcibly.33 
Following from thia 9 they interpret the election oi' the 
Democrat Party to replace the Republican People 0 s Party in 
government in the elections o.f 1950p as the nation taking 
the first opportunity to reject the reforms "by making 
a white revolution and ••• practising Islam even more 
exuberantly as a reaction to the previous authoritarian. 
regime". 34 The way in which secularization was implemented 9 
they argue 9 merely resulted in the Muslim population being 
alienated from the stateo35 Ths ambib~ity of the concept 
of secularism, in addition, meant that the innocent 
exercise of the individual 0s religious freedom was assumed 
to be an offence.36 This reaul ted in people being- unjustly 
put behind burtjv for theito religious 1.U1d tnoJ:oal eonvJetiunAo 37 
'l'he Nurcuu also argue that any greatnesH which Ute 
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li~qd.wiih their b@ing Mualimao ~n the Turk@ follouod 
religion. clos~ly 0 ihoy oxp1ai~ they have b~cn hold in 
high regsrd by other nationeQ3S ~uGWGrp ~hon the ~ks 
dmrio.tod frOID. thoir r0ligion 0. they eJ.so foll from this 
high ostoGmo39 ~ith rs~ to thi~ poeition tuo ihing9 
§ay b® notoda Firstly 0 this reminds us very ~h of tho 
ninotoonth c®ntury argumont ~hich saw tho doclino of tho 
deui&tions f&Om Islamic lo.~o 
in Section ~o) Socondly 0 it iG ~orth r~ing that 
"'hen the Nt!rcUG~ refer to tho Tw:kGI b®ing kwld a high 
oste®m by other natio:rus it is surely only to other 
Islamic nQtiona that they rofeEo 
that & l!lation11 tho Ottoman Empir® incll!dod.11 tm.e held in 
high regard b~ the Europoen po~ero for its ~renco to 
lal!i!mo Tni9 surGly provides an indicatio~ &a to thG 
foyeign policy orientatio~ ~ch ~ould mo~t plaaao the 
Nurcu.s 11 e.s it ~ould bs in the lfl.iddlo Eaat and tho Islamic 
world oDly where a peopio 0 tn~ ~0. woUld find fsvou.r-
for their loyalty to !alamo 
The R&'Urcu.a state that the Cal.ipbau i&J both a rW.igious 
and an administrative institution which r0presents the 
tmi ty of th~ Muslim worldo 40 They go on to argtAe that 
had the Caliphate lllot be®B!l o.'bolished by the G»and N&tio!!WJ. 
Asa~bly that th0 ~ko ~ou.ld havo "rocoiwod rnoro bonofit 
than ~ from. ! t 00 o 41 Somewhat eU&'ioU&lJ0 thio aaae11J$Ulen'\G 
iB back0d "P by mgk!ng rofer~G to ihG ~on of Gveat 
Bri~ and her position wit~- th® con3titutionml 
frB!Il.Owork of tho Bri tiah govemmon~ 42 The axgument 
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tho gcod=tl!ll and th® roap~ct of fo~oignoroo 
this c~ntury the Calipb&tG ~t bo rep~oaontod not by a 
m@E! 0 but by a council., 43 Thoy clW! ihat moot Th!t.;Jl.iLo 
ac~olera vould eccGpt this pogitio~o44 This posiiicn 
d~ansi~at0s that the llurcua do not sioply ~ish to ro~ 
to tho position prio~ to tho Ata~ ~ofo~Q., 
ro=aatabliBhi~ tha old institution in itg ~nditio~ 
tlith rogazd to thQ qmoation. of rsligioua oduc&tio~ 
tho poW. tion adopted by th® Nurcug could e.loo bo aJh~ed 
coooidG>r t.l'w.t 00:E:"aligious train.ing99 ahou:td bo iliilOlooed iRA 
. - 45 
ell la~ala of educatioliio Thomgh this ~ con~ory 
to tho A.taturk rofornm vo hnvG 100 doubt toot othG~rliil in 
Turkey have coma to tha same no9itio~ in r®apoDSo to 
of lMg~ABgG rafomo Thay considar that it ia ns a direct 
rosult of tho lenguege raforo that Turkey is ~al!an~iod~ 
from lalam and f~om the Islamic ~orldo46 
Seid ~ur6Ji himeolf arguod tMt polygooy tJhould oo 
ro=introducado 47 NMrcus do ar~o 0 hova~arD that under 
normal conditions monogamy is the most desirable form of 
marriageo 48 In Islam polygamy is neither encouraged 
116 
nor required 9 they statea 49 Polygamy is merely permitted 
in Islam as 10a precaution taken against falling into a 
worse position". 50 The Nurcus maintain that the actual 
consequenc~ of the prohibition of polygamy was that the 
reformers "had to officially-accept the existence of many 
brothels")l If polygamy were allowed~ they argue 9 subject 
to the conditions stated in Islamic lawp this would 
provide •~an outlet which sui ted the true nature of 
mankind".,5 2 Thus the repeal of the law outlawing 
polygamy is seen as a weapon in the battle against promis= 
It need not be spelled out that this represents 
a typically masculine 9 one might even say sexist 9 point 
of viewo Neverthelesa 9 the Nurcus 0 dislike for the reform 
prohibiting polygamy is clear enougho 
With regare to the Department of Religious Affaira 
the Nurcua have one specific complainto This is that 
the Department has never worked to awaken the religious 
consciousness of the peopleo53 This is an important 
complaint as it reveals a great difference in the way in 
which the Department is viewed by the Nurcus and by those 
in government circleso The official government view 
would not be at all shocked or displeased with the failure 
of the Department to perform this consciousness raising 
tasko This is simply because the official view does not 
see this as being in any way the function of the Departmento 
Indeed 9 one can reasonably ~uspect that if the Department 
was ever perceived to be taking an openly evangelistic 
Htanee, Lhut. .i L would be 1i!morjt iuuuediat.ely dit~bu.nded or 
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Snid Nursi demanded that ~1 BooteT.O innow~tion~ 
should be abol!sh®d& 54 Clo~y thio attii~do ~ould magi 
pro~bly !oM to thG rojoction of ell of tho b.it:'l.iw;>k 
n io cloax' th&t thQ sintGE!.Gn'to of ihoeo '!:Jho 
N:wrcua Wlgue todnyg ''to bog for ciw!l.:!.zatJ.om f'Eom Ew:cpo 
1:m9 oo ixwult to Ielrnn"o£)% lEA o.ddiiio~ to this rojoctiom> 
of the notion that civilizatio~ 1m ~Y t~ aonso cannot 
lovol th0ro is no contradictio~ bot~oGn Islam end ~oot0r.B 
science and techlllology o.56 ~0. tha ~cu&J worud seo liDO 
Tho NurouGJ &19 strongly opposed to Koow.l.:!.sllil and long 
to seo Ial~c rule in Turkoyo 57 Murs! himself cl&!mod 
that the constitution of Turkey should bo ths Qur 0an and 
that the only law should be the law of Islemo5S Tho 
stat@ should be controllsd 0 he ~od0 by a council of 
uleDW.o 59 Yet oodern Wurcua rejoct the. uao of force as 
a means of transforming the statoo~O ThQy believe tha~ 
it is not for them to inforce Islamic lawo61 WhQn 
society is rraad.'Y to embrace Islamic law0 they &rgiW 0 God 
62 
will create a moans to onforoo ito 
The Nt.Woug consider ttw.t it is not thoir ta.sk to 
get !n~olvod illl. politico "for thG sake of ii10 0• but ~~thoR 
to h~lp thoae politicians who seem to auJ9port x-oliaioDo63 
It. is for this reason that they do not seem to hBvo ®Qi 
up a tightly=knit political organization along thG 11D2o 
of a political partyo 64 
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The Nurcu support for political 
parties is not indiscriminate. It is reported that the 
Nurcus did not support the National Salvation Party because 
they consider its allegiance to religion to be inaincere~ 65 
'!'he Nurcus 9 despite their lack of sympathy with the 
Ataturk reformsp are not wholly opposed to the Hepublico 
They state that in a Republic the law must be supreme. 66 
One of the most forceful reasoms for the Nurcus albeit 
grudging acceptance of the Republic is their fear of the 
al terna ti ve. They consider that the only alternative 
to a democratic Republic at the present time would be a 
totalitaxian communist regime. 67 A shift to communism 
would have disastrous consequences as the Nurcus see itg 
"if we lose the Republic in Turkey 9 we will lose Islam 
too"o 6S It is by no means clear that a totalitarian regime 
of the left is the only alternative to democratic government 
in Turkey at present. A regime of the far right is no 
lesa plausible. Neverthel0ss it is interesting to note 
that the fear of communism is a prominent factor in the 
Nurcu approach to the current political situation. 
Though the Nurcus were a divisive force in the country 
they do not appear to have been a threat to the existence 
of the state. 6~ Yet official circles appear to have 
perceived the Nurcus as a major threat to the continuance 
of secularism in Turkey. ~Tom time to time many Nurcus 
have been arrested and tried for breaches 9 nr alleged 
braachea 9 of the secularist legiala.tiono Yet the effect 
of thes0 tri~lf:l has been som"'what counter-productive., 
As Mevmer concludes: 
The much-publicised trials of Nurcua can be 
undeEstood as vigorous attempts to implement 
the Kemalist reforms and pr~vent a return to 
obscurantisma' But they •.• misfiredo They 
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served chiefly to give the impression •• othat 
Nurcus were valiant upholders of the faith against 
authorities that were in league with the dev!la10 
Here we must conclude our brief look at the Nurcuso 
We have attempted to show that while the Nurcua are 
certainly opposed to the Ataturk reforms 9 the extent to 
which they pose a serious threat to the existence of the 
state has gene~ally been over=estimatedo However 9 it is 
an indication of the dislike for the reforms in certain 
sectors of the aooiety.that the Nurcus 9 as a group, have 
coatinued to exist to this dayo Yet it must also be 
remembe~ed that the views which find expression among the 
Nurcus have never seemed to be those of a majority of the 
populationo 
The reforms had been adopted by the upper-claaAGS 
but had not percolated down to the villageso 7·1 Marked 
bifurcations continue to exist between urban and rural 
dwellers with this being particularly noticeable between 
an educated urban elite and an illiterate village 
populationo72 In the countryside there are still 
innurnenable superstitions and people still "live with 
their demons and angels".73 Ialam as a force in regulating 
the life of villagers is still stromg.74 Early in the 
mul ti=party period thu eli ts rediscovered j,ust how deep 
was the attacrunent of the masa of pe:.tsa.nts ·to traditio!OO.l 
Islamic beliefs and ritualso75 In ordeF to secure their 
votes a modification of official attitudes became necessaryo 
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Att~mpts were made to prove the revolution to have been 
anti=clerical rather than anti~religiouso76 Nevertheless 9 
the upper-class 9 regardless of political affiliation g. 
is unwilling to turn back the clock and abandon the major 
achievements of trw revolut.iono 77 However TL!rkish 
com.vensationa 9 even conceL·ning the most mundane matters~ 
are often still a fabric of religious expressionso 78 
The secularist ideology has taken firm root among the 
educated urban classesp particularly in the cosmopolitan 
centreso7~ As Feyzioglu states, it is an "Obvious fact" 
that Turkey cannot return to being a theocratic state 
8.0 
ruled by fetvao This would be the majority view in 
modern Turkeyo 
Among the general signs or tho religious revival 
areg a renewed interest in mosque tmildil'lg 9 thriving 
religious ,iournals 9 widespread lnLerest in Muslim festivals 
d . . l t• f' i t 81 FUl lllCl.'easJ.nt!; y open venera 1on u aa n so The latest 
available figures for Islamic publications in Turkey tell 
us that in 19a4 505 Islamic books well'e published in Turkey 
out of a total number of books published of 7 9 224o
82 
This figure does not include novels or poetry with Islamic 
themes,.83 It is, in addition9 likely that this figure 
is an under-estimate as books of Islamic economic ideas 9 
for axampl"" 9 could be regarded as economic, rather than 
religious books 9 thus making the figure quoted above most 
probably a. conservaU.vo esLimateo In the villagsa 9 
marriages are still o !.'ten arranged by the parents and 
celebrated according to Islamic traditiono84 But 
marriages are increasingly being registered officially 
with the civil authorities. A fairly large part of the 
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still observe the fast during the month of Ramadano 85 
Yet again 9 the proportion is greater in the rural than 
. 86 1n the Westeru urban areas. Attendance at the mosque 
ia still widespreadoO? Fey~ioglu goes so far as to claim 
that Mllelrums l.n Turkey continue "to worship God with a 
piety of devotion and faith"' second to that in no other 
Islamic countryo 88 
In 1950 the Call to PrayeJl' was once again permit ted 
in Arabica 89 This took place on June 16th following 
an anouncement by the newly elected Democrat Party 
governmento90 To this extent the reforms w!!re put into 
reverse 9 and 9 though a small measure 9 this was much 
appreciated by the general populationo In addition 9 
the new government also sanctioned the broadcasting of 
readings of the Qur 1 an on state radioo9l Today in Turkey 
the position, with regard to liturgical lanh~ages is that 
the Friday sermon is now delivered in Turkish after 
recitation of some verses from the Qur 1 an in Arabica92 
Thus the desires of both Gokalp and Ataturk are fulfilled 
while the -people retain the Call to Prayer in Arabico 
With regard to the dervish orders 0 the substantial 
mystical tradition of 'furkey with its spiritual valul'§ls 
was preserved after the outward aboli tioTh! of the orders}3 
In 1950 visiting the tombs of saints was again legalisedo94 
This waA a notable concession to popular worship. Today 
tombs of various saints corLtinue to be the sites of 
various superstitious customs aimed at securing the saint«s 
aid or intercesaiono }t'rom what we saw in the last section 
we oan be sure that this development would not have met 
with Atatu1·k 0 s ttpprovul. By 1960 8J1 aeeornodation was 
~~!~ plBCo bot~eo~ modo~~ ~E!Qh lifo amd popular 
Xslffi!!l.o 9~ ')!]roo omett::mcG of tho dc:!liV'ish ordo~s oo 
o~g&.Thi~od groupg oo~nt!Rmed' to bo ~inEJt the lo.'\:Jo~~ 
ng long &a tho groups x:ofraimod f~om diro©t politicsl 
imwol~ooont and f~om attacking tho momory of Ataiurko91 
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~D in prooticO E!&n;w of tho !OOOiminW have 'h30Eil l:l.fiod 
f;);Oi8! the dervish OX:dOI:'Bosa a thi!J X'Ggt;U"d the At&twdt 
~o mentiom0d above the M~cu aitiiudo to the ne~ 
situation of the Ropublico Amother roligiou~ groupg 
m 1~51 thio 
group smmshed sieiuos of Aiaturk in various p&ris of the 
coW!try0 99 This omtbroak of ico!Jil)ClC1Glm ~as in sw.ppori 
of the Islamic prohibitio~ of ~avoiD ~ao100 
The alp~b~t,reform has last0d to ihe present day 
md ~6!.±!lllod gon~ral accoptenooo. Yot iDll tho 1960o 0 , 
Soh!m3ol roportg 0 many villagorn still ~agnrdod tho Latin 
alphabet ao 00infidol lottaro10 o 1011..;1 
~ith re~d. to the secrua.rl:zation of ·aaucatiom GG'Weral 
factors arCil ~orth notingo 
im. lsl8Dl to bo introducoGI. in tha fourth 8Jld fifth gradeo 
102 
of ~alementary schoclso Ai firra~ par0ntg had to opt 
into thoso claeaoB fo:xr thGir childrGng lnlt la.tor p&\rGmtiOJ 
hnd to opt out if thoy ~.:!.shod thoir children not to 
Bitondo l03 !rl!. feci& "lily 19SO tho Gj,TOI!l.t D&jori ty of 
primary GOhool ch!ldron took tho oo\A~aG in rolig!o~~ 
edtAoetiol0'0 o104 'fhg msJ.n ar~ont for tho ro=introductioli! 
of roligioue oducation ~as the dang$r of allo~ing Turkish 
clnQDOO hBvo bo~~ !n~odu©od i~to tho o~~ic8la @f 
105 ao~o~y gcho@loo School history boo~ aro being 
o.ntoineivoly EO=Uri tteK! io c@~ll:O©i. P1fe.12.J. ty infomatiom.uu 
a bon '6 IolaB ood Ot t4l>EJ8E.1. h,lLg:toz-y .. :wtS Thio. ie boc~W-mo 0. 
roihe government prof~s to givo tho nsu go~or&~®O n 
~ficont history(), rethe:!f thti.Yl a Qhe.m.Qf\ll ooo..'P<>:unr: 
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corrocia sooo of tho imbalancoLi! in oarliGr history h@olm 0 
but ih~ roo~lta of the ro=~ting muot bo eua.itod uith 
inio~oat to QOO the oxtsnt to uhieh X~lem end tho !sl~ic 
pGriod of Turkish h!otory ooa bG®Ii1 :&:O=or:rphB.o·ieodo. lbfoll:'o 
ini~resting foatur@ of tho dovoloping eitu&tio~ ~t bo 
!mi. tho o~ly 196oo ~ott obtained SO!.OO 
ho't!!!Boholdo if children o~ht to ~OC(dvo religi~ odueation 
in gcmoolo Qruy abomt 2~ \:Jero in fawo~D 't!ith mora 
·than. ~ ~not~100 ·ThG l!!Oaaon fmli' this porheyo· 
rdigious .UWtruotion should t&ltG pla.co in thGJ oogquo :.~ 
and b® given by tho ~Gligioue loadsJI.> of tho village0 not 
tho school toBChOEol09 In odditiom to tho dovelopmGnta 
noted a.bovo there a.r<a also plMs to iniirnduco tuition 
in Arabic aa a. SGloctivo aubjoct in. high ~hoolo and 
110 u.n.iv~~SJitiOGio 
opport~t!Qs and inatitutio~s fo~ !olamic raligioua 
Gduc~tio~111 SGco~y oohools for ~iming roligio~ 
112 functionaries re-opened offering six-year courseso 
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Seven of these imam-hatip schools were 0stablished between 
1949 and 195loll) By 1981-82 however this number had 
grown conside!i'ably with 336. imam=hatiQ schools operating· 
in that yearoll4 !t is a measure of hm.J cautiously 
Komalists viewed these denllopments that M0nderes 7 the 
Democrat Party Prime Ministerp felt the need to make a 
declaration d£rsupport for secularism in order to 
reassure themo In 1950 he said his party was devoted 
to secularism and to the development of higher religious 
educa.tionol15 
This assertion was especially necessary with reference 
to a new institutio~P the Faculty of Divinity at Ankara 
Univeraityo Menderes and his government were not 
responsible for setting it upP but ita establishment 9 
taken with the developments noted above 9 created a certain 
fear amongst strict Kemalists that the revolution was 
about to be diamantlodo 
On June 4th~ 1949P law 5424 waa adopted to aet up a 
Faculty of Divin~ty at Ankara Universityo116 The Faculty 
opened on the 31st Octoberp 1949oll1 Government scholar-
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· ships were available to the studentso A booklet 
published by the Faculty in 1959 provides details of the 
curriculumo119 In that year the number of hours per 
week devoted to 0ach subject was as followmg 
1st YEAR; 
Arabic 8 
P~rsian 4 
A Wom.tern Language 9 
(English 9 German or l<'ronch) 3 
H.tdigious 'l'0xta In Clasoioal 
~rkieh 3 
~ur 1 an And The Essentials Of 
Islam 2 
2nd YElill.B 
~~@!c 6 
Porei~ 2 
Yoo~o~ ~o 3 
Rolig!o~e ToE~S rn ~loaeioBl 
'1\lx' lli!.clh 2 
Qtm 0~ And ThG E0~a~ontials Of 
~1m 2 
lti!'!iltory Qf !sl@l! 2 
Psychol@gy Of Religion. 1 
sociology @f RGli~©~ 3 
JPllll!l@BJO];)hy And 1o~!@ 1 
3rd m.&.Ru 
Arabic 
r!O~EJ'i;Qli'lrl\1~ 
E!Gr~~EY Of Iolam 
~ato!re (~ 0 eni@ oxogoo!G) 
&d! iliA (X8lamic 'rEM! tiooo) 
HiBto:E:'y Of Iolemic C:R'o®d And 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
!tg Soetg ~ 
!fraJi.eY!l (Xalam!c T.hocloaY) 2 
!al~!c Philoeo~ 2 
P~l®oo~ And L©gic 2 
Eiotory 0£ ~io~t Ph!l@G®~ 1 
Hiet®:ry Of Roligiooo 2 
Peychol®~ Of Reli~io~ 2 
!slQ.rn!C kJ.tJ ~ 
.W.Ji!it@ry Of Xslmdc AE~ 2 
W.e'is@ey Qf !slrndo Doc or& t!.vo 
Arto And PMeoopnp~ l 
4th mARp 
uaM© 6 
rJo~~orm ~ 2 
W.a'OOry Of X&E!!ii ~ 
i'efoir 4 
~!~ 4 
W.atox-y Of Tho :Wl~c 
Roli~io~ And I~o Soc~ 4 
alam!c PhllC»EJ®p~· 2 
W.s.t@ry Of Rol!giono 2 
B!eroory Of !Gllamic AE.t&l 2 
Po~g!co0 Tho SG!EIJOOG Qf 
Edmcatio~ And Its ~tico 2 
W.e:~x-y Of Smfioo 2 
'l"M'k!oo And Islas!e Docor&tivo 
Arw 1 12Go History Of Tho Rovol~tioD 2o 
1t c&n be sean that in addition to thG Ks~c Qcio~og 
of la'!1~ oxog0oi9 Md so on 0. tho inclmoio~n of oubjocts 
such e.l!l the . pr;oyohology and aociolo'~y of' roligiorn f5t1VO o. 
9ianifioanily no~iraditio~l look i® tho tlork of tho 
125 
126 
J?o,cn"IJ. tyo Xt is ffiloo noticonblo th&~ tuition i§ ~p~ 
oot&blishmsnt of the Facul iy ruay be G®Gm. oo & aoculGJ;izi~ 
the motives b~ tho dsvoloprnont of the ~culty ~d 
the irnrnm=hatiR achool~.~~ io produco a no~ group of 
religious fumctionaEiog who wo~o both better oducatGd 
~ moro wsll=diopesod to the RQpublican rogimo~ Tho 
dovGlopmc;mt rand to some extent ClliD bo saran to signal thG 
situation in Turkoy following 1~0~ 
As montionod above 0. much of the reviv&l of inter®a~ 
in re~ligious education was due to foaxs that tho youth 
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wGm.lil bGing b~ought up in a "100ral vacu'Wl!l" ~ 
g~mwrelly agii'Ged that.g "sol.Wd sUmda.rd.s of porgonaJ. end 
&loo!lill moral! ty have to bs imparted to chil~ooto ~122 
~ fol~ -thmt modern sGoui~ socioty ~-lost some of th~ 
Gpiritual moorings so nocossary foF. ita enrvival 0 123 
~ nit!tud0s woro not limited to villagers ~d tho 
~ducatodG Hoyd tolls oo theta 
Turkish nationalism and Boa.tern civilizationooo 
h&vo provod incapebl~ of filling0. oven for many 
~duc~tod ~ko0 tho Gpiritual vacuuo erGated 
by th® oliminatio!.! of Islam}24 
XW.am t-re.s MVGr oliminatGd in Turktay oocawao 0 a.t the p<dli'eolllBl 
l~vol L\1 GiJOOulariB!II could not ropl&co Islam &nd Islam. coKliinuoo 
to bo atro~ thGro do~pito the roformmo 
1961 Conati tutiom.g 
Following the military t~e-over of 1960 a n0w 
comstitution was prepared which became operative in the 
following yearo In preparing the new con~titution no 
single foreign constitution was t~(en as a model by the 
Constitutio:naJ. CommiasioiD~., 125 However~ substantial 
attention was paid to the constitutions established in 
West Germany and Italy following the World War IIo 126 
In view of developments under the Democrat Party govern-
ment in the late 1950s the reason given for the attention 
paid to these two foreign constitutions is inteFesting., 
These two were of importance because they were introduced 
into countries which had "thrown off dictatorial regimes 
and established successfully an order based on Western 
127 concepts of Demccracy"., Although it is misleading 
to state that Germany had "thrown off" th0 Nazi regime 0 
it is interesting to note that those involved in preparing 
the new constitution saw the Turkish position as being 
comparable with that in post-war Germanyo 
When explaining t}1e_ '~fllpdame_n};~ p_~i~~~p_!~_E!" _ ~opt_e_d_ 
by the Conati tutional Commission Enve:~r Ziya Kara1 9 chairman 
of the Commission, stated that they had agreed that "it 
shall be indicated that the Turkish state is a secular 
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and democrat!ilc Republic"o Consequently 0 Article 2 
of the constitution declares the state to be secularo129 
Tarik Zafer Tunaya 9 rapporteur of the Commission 
and Constituent Assembly representative for Iatanbul 0 
reported that the Conunission conaidered secularism to be 
indispensible for the protection of the reforms and of 
demo&racy.,l30 Another rapporteur of the Commission0 
Muamer Aksoy 9 pointed out that it was necessary to give 
secularism constitutional protectioB in view of the 
occasional eruption of reaction in the country. 131 
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Some criticisms of this article were also expressedo 
Sadsttin TnkboyP an Assembly representative of the 
Republican Peasant National Party (RPNP) 9 thought that 
the principle was not clearly and adequately expressed. 132 
Mehmet Altinaon 9 also of the HPNP 9 thought that the lack 
of a definition of the concept of secularism was a great 
deficiency.l33 Yet another RPNP representative 9 Ahmet 
Oguz, suggested that secularism was composed of four elementsg 
freedom o£ b0lief 9 freedom to ~oEship 9 freodom to 
organise, and freedom to inspire and instruct., 134 He 
suggastad that in view of "recent 'furkish history and 
the conditiona of the eountry" that the latter two freedoms 
should be under the control of the state, and he wished 
to see this clearly indicated in the constitutionol35 
General Gernal Gursel, the leader of the 1960 intervention9 
pointed out that national consciousness was not yet 
formed throughout Turkey.,1 36 He explained that if one 
were to go aud ask an Anatolian villager who he was: 
"his answer would be 9 8 Thank God 9 I am a Moslem'. He 
does not say 0I am Turkish8 ".,l37 He then argued that 
the major factor which irJ.hi bi ted the growth of national 
identity was Islarno 138 FOL' thie reason he was convineed 
of the need to state the secular nature of the nation 
ira, the consti tutiono l)9 
Article 12 of the constitution declared equality 
before the law for all individuals regardless of "language 9 
race 9 sex 9 political opinion~ philosophical view 9 or 
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religion or religious sect"ol40 'l'his Article t·ms 
approved without any major discussiono 
In contrast 9 Article 19 provoked one of the longest 
discussions in the Representative Assembly.l4l 'rhis 
Article ran a® follow8~ 
~very individual is entitled to follow freely 
the dictates of his conscience 9 to choose his 
own religious faith and to have his own opinions. 
Forms of worship 9 and religious ceremonies 
and rites are free provided they are not in 
opposition to public order 9 or morals or to the 
laws enacted to uphold them. 
No person shall be compelled to worship 9 
or participatf:l in religious ceremonies and ritec.: 9 
or to reveal his religious faith and beliefso 
No person shall be :t'eproached for his religious 
faith and belief. 
Religious education and teaching shall be 
subject to the individualns own will and volition 9 
and in the case of minors 9 to their legally 
appointed guardians. 
No person shall be allowed to exploit and 
abuse religion or religious feelings or things 
considered sacred by religio~ in any manner 
whatsoev@r for the:purpose of political or 
personal benefit 9 or for gaining power 9 or for 
even partially basing the fundamental social 9 
economic 9 political and legal order of the stat0 
on religious dogmas. Those who violate this 
prohibition 9 or those who induce others to do so 
shall be punishable under the pertinent lawse 
In the case of associations and political parties 
the formen shall be permanently closed down by 
order of authorized courts and the latteF by 
order of the Constitutional Courtao 142 
The importance given to secularism can be seen from 
the statement made by Fehmi Alpaalan 9 representative for 
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the Province of AtrvinD who said that it was by adopting 
secularism that 'l'urkey "lt,ound its place" in the civilized 
worldo 143 Rauf Gokcon 9 representative for the National 
Unity Cornrnitt0e 9 remarked that he thought secularism was 
still misunderstood as being a rejection of religioli1;; 
an interpretatio~ he rejectedol44 
Cevdet Aydin9 representative of the Province of 
SiirtD maintained that Turkey still did not conform to a. 
strict definition of secularismol45 As he pointed out 9 
in Turkey the Presidency of Religious Affairs 9 "schools 
for training Muslim clergy ••• the Theological Faculty •• o 
were placed under state control"ol46 Sadettin Tokbey 9 
representative of the H.PNP 9 !Misted that in a secular 
state religion and the state do no.t interfere with one 
another. 147 He went on to express concern that Article 
19 would enable the state to interfere with religious 
. t' 148 conv~c ~onao Kadircan Kabli 9 representative of the 
RPNP 9 added his name to those who thought that neither 
religion nor state should be allowed to interfere in one 
another's affairs. 149 But Orner Sami Cosar 9 representative 
of the press 9 said that the state should be able to control 
religion as no other force existed to control "the 
superstitioma and the backward situation in religious 
matters" in, Turkey.l50 The Chairman of the Commisaion9 
Enver Ziya Karal 9 justified the fact that the state could 
intervene in religious affairs by pointing out that Islam 
was not only a system of beliefs 9 but also "an order of' 
life 9 an order of society 9 an educational system 9 a 
political ideology and a form of atato"ol5l This seems 
to be little short of a recognition that Islam cannot be 
secularized; it can only be dismantled, however partially. 
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Additionally Rauf Gokcen~ ropresentative of the 
National Unity Committec 9 pointed out that the second 
paragraph of the Article could be interpreted as allo~ing 
the re=opening of the dervish lodgeso 152 He thought 
this paragraph should be ro=writtcn in order to clearly 
prevent such an interpretationo 153 This insistence that 
it should not be possible to i~terpFet the constitution 
as sanctio~ng the dervish orders is interesting in view 
of the faut that not long after these discussioms were taking 
place some of the dervish orders were functioning more or 
less openly in any caseo Dsspite all the above discussiona 9 
however 9 the Article was approviDd in the form quoted aboveo 
Another of the general principles outlined by Enver 
~iya Karal was that political parties which did not conform 
to socular principles should not be allowed to existol54 
Thua 9 AFticlo 57 stated that: 
The statutes 9 programs and activities of 
poll tical parti~s shall conform to ttJe principles 
of a democratic and secular Republic~l55 
This proved to be an area of consensuso156 Consequently 
Article 57 was accepted witho~t ~y lengthy debateol57 
Finally we come to Articles 153 and 154~ Article 
153 proved to be another area of consensus. 158 It reads 
as follows: 
No provision of this constitution shall be 
construed or inter.prG?ted aa rendering unconsti t-
utional the following reforlll laws which aim at 
raiBing the 'l'urkiah society to the level of 
contemporary civilization and at safeguarding 
the secular character of the Hepublic which 
were in effect on the date this constitution was 
adopted by popular vote: 
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l) Tl'w Law on the Unification of Education 
of March 39 1340 (1924) no. 430. 
2) Th0 Hat Law 9 of November 25 9 ;1,341 (19?.5.) 7 
noo 67lo 
3) Th0 law on the closing down of deiEVish 
convents and mausoleums~ and the abolition of the 
office of keeper of tombs 9 and the law on the 
abolition and prohibition of certain titles~ 
of November 30 9 1341 (1925) .. 
4) 'fue conduct of the act of marriage according 
to Article 110 of the Civil Codo of February 17 9 
l925o noo 743o 
5) The law concerning the adoption of inter-
national numerals of May 20 9 1928~ no., 1288. 
6) The law concerning the adoption and application 
of the Turkish alphabet 9 of November 1 9 1928 9 
no .. 135 3o 
7) The law on the abolition of titlea and 
applications such as efendi 9 bey 0 pasha 9 of 
November 26P 1934 9 no .. 2590 .. 
8) The law concerning the prohibition of wearing 
certain garments.9 of December ) 9 1934 0 no. 2596o 159 
These laws were considered to be those which had 
"initiated the beneficial reforms introduced in Turkey 
oetween 1924 and 1934".HiO This Article reflects the 
fact that one of the "fundamental principles" outlined by 
Karal as a guide to the new Constitution was that the 
At t k f t b 'd d . . 1 bl 161 a ur re orms were o e cons1 ere 1nv1o a e .. 
'rhe moat useful feature of this Article is that it 
outlines those reforms which the rulers of Turkey themselves 
coMidered to be of the most importance. These individual 
reforms were discussed in Section Three of the present 
work .. 
Article 154 was concerned with the administration 
of religious matters .. It reads: 
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The Office of Religious Affairs 9 which is 
incorporated in the general admi~stratio~ 9 
discharges the functions prescribed by a spacial 
l Hi2 awo 
This institution-9 variously referred to as the Department 
of Religious Affairs 9 or the Presidency of Religious Affairsv 
appoints and pays religious functionaries with money which 
comes to it out of the general budgeto163 
'bJD.:th this Article we have concluded our consideration 
of the relevant Articles of the 1961 Constitutiono 
Now we may look at the relation of politics and 
religio~ since 1950a No completely satisfactory picture 
can be givena The religious element ir1 Turkish politics 
is notoriousely difficult to assesao A brief outline may 
be provided howevero 
With th0 transition from a one-party to a multi-party 
system in Turkey 9 religion emerged as a political and 
social issue once againo 164 As religion was still strong 
among the mass of the people liberalization of controls 
ori religion became a vote=catching slogan. 165 -All parties 
tried to some extent to exploit the religiotls factor to 
their advantage though this does not mean that any of 
the major parties would be prepared to app~ase reactionary 
elements to the extent of threatening the existing ordera166 
Nor should the importance of the religious factor in 
determining voting behaviou~ be over-estimatedo During 
the 1950s economic factors remained one of the most 
important influences on rural voting patternsol67 
During the 1960s Islam became of great ideological 
importance in the political climate ae a counter-weight 
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Tije.ni order for their iconoclastic attacks on statues 
of Ataturk which were noted aboveo 177 Throughout the 
1950s the Democrat government prosecuted members of the 
outlawed dervish orders and of extreme religious groups 
whenever they became too prominent .. 178 One individual 
who was prosecuted, in 1956 11 was Fevzi Bayerp a preacher 
(ha.ti:Q.)p who said during one of his sermonsg "all the 
devout should attend the Democrat Party meeting.oothose 
who do not attelnd may be classed as infidels 11 ., 179 
Though Democrat Party leade~s doubtless agreed with 
the sentiments expressed, a prosecution was initiated 
because it was felt that the preachen had gone too far., 
The party leadership also resisted demands from some of 
its own membens for the abolition of secularism and a 
180 full return to Ialamo 
In general, ~·~enderes believed that A ta turk had gone 
t f t f t 1 t . ad f 1 . 181 oo ar oo as a ong ne ro o aecu ar~sm. lJUring 
nis early years in office, however, r1enderes us policy 
~awards religion was not marked by any extravagant 
18~ 
concessions to Islamo 'l'he re=opening to the public of 
tombs of the saints was officially justified on the grounds 
that they were buildings of architectural importance and 
were to be considered historical monurnmentso 183 
.ttowever, towards the end of the 1950s .·.enderes had 
begun to use religion as a political t 1 184 00 0 In a speech 
in K.oeya, in December 1955, Menderes stated: "we ao not 
believe that a society without religion can become a a table 
nation" J85 1vineteen JJemocrat .!:'arty JJeputies 1n the 
Grand National Assembly took such exception to this 
remark that they resigned from the Partyo186 The later 
years of tne party 9 up to 1960 9 were increasingly charac~ 
te-cized by a dependence on the political use of Islam to 
offer symbolic inducements to voters as a means of propping 
up the ell~C toral popularity of lhe party whieh had begun 
to doclineo l07 In 1957 this att~mpt io regain popular 
affection. caused Menderes to begin encouraging religious 
reactionaries. 188 However 9 it would be a great mistake 
to regard Menderes as being responsible, single-handedly 9 
for the religious revival of the late 1950s., lS9 Alderman 
explains that Menderes 9 as an astute politician: "was 
guilty 9 rather oi exploiting this reaction"ol90 
The Turkish armed forces strongly diaapp·r:oved of the 
Democrat government's attitude of "ambivalence" towards 
secularismol9l 'fhis influsnced the deciaion taken by 
senior army officers to intervene in TuFkish political 
life in 1960.,192 The position taken by the National 
Unity G0mmt~temtwhich held poweF after the military 
intervention is summarised by Ozbudun as follows: 
Although many of the Committee membel!'s are f.laid 
to be practising Muslims 9 and some have expressed 
a strong interest in encouraging an enlightened 
Islam 9 they all unequivocally condemned tho 
exploitation of religion for political ends 
and the retrogHlssion of Kemalist secularism 
in the multi-party period.l9} 
Prior to the multi-party system the Republican 
Peoples' Party had enjoy,ed a monopoly of political powero 
During that time Islam was largely ignored by the 
government except 9 of course 9 when the government passed 
reforming measures discussed in the previous section to 
curb the influence and power of Islam in the countryo194 
By thus ignoring IsL.1m both the pa:aty and the government 
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gave the party the balance of power as any of the other 
parties who wished to form a coalition government would 
need the oupport of the National Salvation PartyD 204 The 
Nationul Salvation Party carne to power as part of a 
coalition government wi t11 the Republican Peoples Party 
after receiving a vote of confidence from the Grand 
National Assembly in February 1974., 205 This government 
206 only lasted 9 howaver 9 until 18th September 1974o 
In the national elections of 1977 the votes cast for the 
National Salvation Party represented only 8 9 56% of the 
total votes cast'g for which they received 24 Assembly 
"0'7 seats.,<- 1 
Officially the National Salvation Party was in favour 
of secularism 9 but 9 unofficially P it was ita "die=hard 
208 
enemy"., In the first Article of the party programme 
"Moral Development"~ that is religious revival 9 preceded 
209 
"material development"., Article 18 of the programme 
supported secularism as long as it guaranteed freedom of 
thought and beliefg but stated that secularism should not 
be allowed to become the means of oppressing those people 
who did think and believeo 210 In the field of foreign 
policy the programme advocated closer relations with the 
( ) 211 Islamic world Art., 42 ., With regard to edueatiow 
it advocated emphasising religious education. (Arto 82) 
and developing an educational system based on "modesty 9 
( ) 212 morals 9 and virtue" Art. 6.6 • 
I~ 1973 the leader of the National Salvation Party 9 
Erbe.kan~ declared that: "the only source of truth is 
213 in !elam"o 
as Alkan concludes: 
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A m&jor r~ason for the difficulty in assessing the r~lig!oue 
dimen8iom of the political partiGs ie ths inability of 
It seem5 reasonablG-to expect that-
national politicians~ moving that they vould be ~uot!SMi 
in the press would iaeue relativQly moderate atatement5o 
Eut it ie known that they found other ways te indicate 
their religious commitmento 
speech to go &nd pray BJld enooUFe.ging th~ aud.ianc@ to 
grasa=roota politicians would ~more free with th&ir 
uae of religion in the political competition for votemo 
On. Septemoor l2th 11 1980 the military intervened in 
political life in Turkey and took eontrol of the oouniryQ 
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Public order in Turkey had become so uncontrollagle that 
the military would certainly have intervened anywayD but 
the timing of the coup may have been affected by events 
at a fundamentalist rally in Konya0 218 The rally saw 
oanners written in the old script oeing paraded before 
the crowdso 219 'l'he new military regime was most critical 
of past tendencies for politicians to use religion in 
d t . t 220 or er 0 WlO VO eso Such criticisms of past actiona 
have been accompanied by warnings concerning the present 
and the futureo In 1984 it was stated that "religious 
fanatics are again active 9 but moving very cautiously 
and avoiding exposure"o 221 
1982 Constitutiong 
The new constitution of 196\2 9 prepared after the 
coup 0 oxplici tly outlaws radical poli ticf.i.l parties advocatin~~ 
a theocratic system of governmento 222 Article 2 9 following 
the pattern of previous constitutions declares the state 
to be both secular 9 and loyal to the "nationalism of Ataturk11 o 223 
Further 9 in Article 4 it is stated that Article 2 shall 
224 nei~her be amendedp nor shall its amendment be proposedo 
Article 10 states that all individuals are equal 
irrespective of "language 9 race 9 colour, si!!X 9 political 
opinion 9 philosophical belief, religion and sect 9 or any 
such conalderation"o 225 In addition to this 9 Article 14 
declares that none of' the rights <:ind froedoms t,'"Uaranteed 
in the constitution·shall bo exercised with the intention 
of creating discrimination om any of the above baseso 226 
When basic rights and freedoms are suspended 9 partially 
or entirely: "no one may be compelled to reveal his 
religion9 conscienco 9 thought or opinion 9 nor be accused 
227 on f'1.Ccou.nt of thorn" (Art" 15). Thus it can bP. neon 
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that the constitutional proviRion of freedom of conscience 
is maintained in the 1982 version of the constitution of 
the Republica 
Article 24 deals specifically with religious freedomo 
It is broadly the same as the corresponding Article (Ari. 
19) in the 1961 constitutiolll dealt with above 0 One change 
is noticeable howevero For the first time in the history 
of the R~public the Constitutio~ of 1982 embodies the 
requirement that education in "religious culture and. moral 
education" should be a compulsory element in both 
primary and secondary schools (Art. 24 9 paragraph 4). 228 
The injunction in Article 24 regarding the 
unaoceptability of using religion for political ends is 
strengthened by Article 6B. This specifies that "the 
statutes and programmes of political parties shall not 
be in conflict with ••• the principles of the ••• secular 
Republic". 229 This corresponds to Article 57 of the 
1961 Constitution. How effective this provision will 
be remains to be seen. From the above discussion of 
political parties it will be s.een that the 1961 
Constitution was not terribly successful at eliminating 
the political mani.pulation of religious sentiments. 
The Depattment of Religious Affairs is dealt with 
in Article 136o This states that the Department is 
part of the general administration and that its duties 
ib d . . 1 1 230 are prescr e ~n a spec1a awo This much was stated 
in the Constitution of 1961 (Arto 154)o However, the 
1982 Constitution also states the manner in which the 
Departmentis duties shall be exercisedo They are to be 
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carried out 10in accordance with the principles of 
secularism 9 removal from all political views and ideas 9 and 
aiming at national solidarity and integrity" .. 231 Here 9 
thenp it is made explicit that. the Department must conduct 
itself in a secular manner .. Al~o it is interesting to 
note that it is seen as an inntitution aiming at the 
. nolidari ty and integrity of the nation a ThiR function 
is not made any more explicito However 9 it seems 
reasonable to Ruggest that one way in. which it is to promote 
national integrity is by closely observing those religious 
groups which may threaten the stateP of any part of it. 
Finally we come to Article 174 .. This corresponds 
to Article 153 of the Constitution. of 1961. It provides 
a Constitutional guarantee for those of the Ataturk reform 
laws listed)~~ But it also indicates by the fact that 
these are to be considered unchangeablep that these reforms 
have come to b0 cunoideredv by one section; of Turkish 
societyv to be in effect sacred things. 
Thus the regime in power after September 12th 9 1980 9 
has sought in the new constitution to reaffirm the prin-
ciple of secularism established by the Kemalist reformso 
But at the same time 9 the regime has been unwilling to 
make.too outspoken a statement on matters of secularism 
and religion. as they are currently drawing closer to other 
Islamic countries for economic and foreign policy reasonso 
With regard to the position of women it is lower= 
middle class women. who are the most secluded of Turkish 
women 2.33 
... They are also the least likely group of Turkish 
women to seek employment ou,tside the borneo 234 Yet this 
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represents a choice which economic circumstances within 
the family allows. this group to makeo Women in low-
income families are often forced to seek employment beyond 
the home and will often regard such employment as they 
take as a "temporary 9 sometimes shamefu1 9 expedient" to 
see the family finances through hard times 9 ~35 \'/omen 
of the elite group 9 however 9 are encouraged to qu~lify 
for professional employment a 22 ~6 They arf! enahJ.ed to 
do this because of the existence of many .illiteFate or 
semi~l:iterate women "who can be hired at low wages to 
take over the domestic tasks a working professional woman" 
has no time foro~}7 Among this group of highly-educated 
professionals sexual differentiation in matters of employment 
is virtually non-existento 238 In almost all non-profes= 
sional employment 0 however 9 male and female tasks are quite 
distinct with the sexes usually being separated spatiallyo 239 
Generally apeaking 9 most women in contemporary Turkey 
240 Atill tend to lead lesA public lives than meno 
In most social strata girls are expected to show 
modeAty and to practise avoidance of boyso 241 They may 
"flirt from a distance" with looks and gestures but to 
engage in direct conversation would generally not be 
"d d 242 cona1 e~e propero Even the aparently Westernized 
childrem of elite groups tend to operate socially more as 
membeEs of a tightly-knit uni-sexual group than as individuals 
seeking social relationships with individuals of the 
opposite sexo 243 Girls are very unlikely "to develop 
an intimate relationship with a boy who is a potential 
huaband" .. 244 Th~ most likely exception to this rule ia 
the intimate relationship which sometimes develops between 
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a girl and her broth~?r 0 especially i.f he is close to her 
own ageo 245 Ev®n well edur:atP.d professionals 0 of both 
sexea 0 are most likely to move in a uni-sex social worldo
246 
Within the family the most intimate relationships tend 
to be between members of the same sexo 247 Howeverp in 
almoat all familiea 0 unlesA there are strangers presentv 
males and females will eat togethero 248 But sexual 
divisions of labour within the family are quite marked~ 
to the extent that "a single man is greatly pitied because 
it is assumed that he will be unable to take care of his 
own dom®stic ne®ds"o 249 
\vi th regard to the preference for a male child there 
is a variatio~ which is clearly economic in natureo 
It has been discoveren in extensive surveys that: "where 
economic VOC Value Of Children assumes great importancep 
there is also widespread sex preference". 25° The preference 
is~ of course 9 for a male childo 
Having noted these various developments we may now 
look at one specific controverayo In 1981 a circular 
-was issued by the Ministry-of Education s.tat-i-ng tha-t girls 
of school aee were forbidden to wear head-scarves while 
attending classes 0 251 This was answered by a statement 
by the Department of Religious Affairs who said that it 
was God 1 s will that women should keep their hair coveredo 252 
The Department went on to say that it was no more sensibla 
for the state to order that people should not wear head-
scarves than it would be for it to order that they must 
Encouraged by the attitude of the Department 
of Religious Affairs sevaral hundred girls at an imam~hatip 
school in Ankara refused to attend classeso 254 Commenting 
on these events in the Consultative Assembly Mr 9 Mehmet 
Pamruc argued that "while the state should be secularp 
it should not expect religion to be so 11 0 255 The 
cor.IJtl:'ovarsy over head~scarves has continued from time to 
time Bince this affairo In 1985 it was Atated that the 
growing number of young women wearing head-scarves was 
causing· concenn among educated c:ircles in Turkey., 256 
On being asked why she wore a head~scarf a young girl 
told President hvren that she wore it for religious 
reasonso 257 It was pointed out 9 howeverp that these 
wearing head-scarves went out and met boy friends as did 
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t . T .. h 2')8 o ner young . urKl.s womeno - Tnis topic has been noted 
at Home length in order to show how secularism is still 
a live issue in Turkeyo 
Uve though the issue isP the changes which have 
taken place sinee the beginning of the multi-party period 
should not be over-estimatedo The state as such is 
still in Turkey basically secular 0 259 It was just that 
political parties tried using religious affiliation and 
f 1 . b . f . . t 260 ee 1.ng as a asl.s or w1nn1ng vo eso 
As Kazamias stated in 1966: 
To what extent Ataturk had succeeded completely 
in secularizinrs the new na tiono o o and the minds 
of the peoplep is today not so clear as it may 
r1ave seemed during the heyday of religious 
reformo 261 
Indeedp the visitor to modern 'furkey can be left in little 
doubt that it is a Muslim country9 This remains true 
even if the law of Turkey is not based on Islamic lawo 
This concludes our review of recent developmentso 
All that remains now is to make sense of these develop-
~o~ig &nd to Eavio~v ©Eiorly 0 thG quostiom ffi~ ~o ~~GihoE 
o~ ~t oodG~ ~~key !e ~ eGcular siaiQ0 
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.Ropublico It w&e 'I:Jith the Ropub!ie 0 h®'I:Jover 0 that tho 
pace of the rGform mowemGnt quick~ned afid tho rofo~ 
m.easllli'es became mora d&ring& Some mGMUEGa 11 likG thG 
&doption of a no'I:J Civil Code~ '!:Jere ~jor rof~a i~ thGir 
0\:'Jlll :dgh~0 QikW&!Qp &ru.Ch 8.8 tho !Ji3iE00.UCtiO& of th0 l!Y.if.iE.iC 
ayet0m of JBG~eiDOilliGl 'I:J<llrG mora Gl;yBOOlico .Rut if oJ.l 
the refomer e.re i.&ken iogether 11 o.s they shol!lcil. be 11 the 
combined 'I:JGight of the meagures is. coneidGrnbleo Yot ~OGO 
reforms 0 it muat bo rornembGred 0 '!:Jere imposed on tho po@plo 
from ebovo and o~y pmrt!&lly fil~red doun to romoto areOB 
After the doath of Aiaturk the roform movGmant appoarod 
to 1M@ ita v!gol!X' 0 leavi~ the ai tua.tion much thfJ SBIDG 
until 1))50o Ho\:Jl &X'G t10 to understMd t~ha.t bapp0l!Wd ~t? 
~ t1ta h&v~a aeoo the poli ticia.ns reruiaoo that the p1001.santo 
a.rui lo\:JGX' clM!lllOo 0 'I:Jho had boem least. al terod idool®gicallly 
by the ~ef@rma~ 'I:JGre atill very attached to !alamo Thoao 
~ou~a ~eo co~ted for a majority of the Gloctoratoo 
TO t&ko ~ leaG r!~@rou9ly secularist nttitudo to roligi~ 
'I:JR.r<! em obvioma 'I:J0.Y to. eppea.l to this mm.jo:dtyo Oil ihG 
other hand the prilmciple of aocula.ril@!il 'I:JOO m:i tten into thG 
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'l'horc wa.A Lhun a limi L to what could bo 
conA about the rHligiouR oi turd Lono 
One Aolution was to rnako small 9 but symbolic concessions 
to religious and traditionalist opinio~ The restoratiollll 
of the Arabic Call to Prayer is an example of this typo of 
move. Another solution was to ignore the law without 
altering it., The re~emergence of the de~vish orders was 
largely made possible by such a policye Another solution 
has been simply to flout the law. The laws forbidding 
the exploitation of religious sentiments for political ends 
were systematically flouted in this way~ particularly by 
right wing pA.rtieap until the military take=over in 1980. 
Heyd 9 nurelyP was correct in describing what has happened 
in the multi-party phase of the Republicvs history as a 
"retreat from extreme secularism". 1 It was not secularism 
itself~ but only its more extreme manifestations which were 
abandoned. The movement was a tactical retreat: it was 
neither a wholesale evacuation nor a surrender of the 
principle of secularism. The more extreme reactionariesv 
whether religious t,Toupa (the Nurcus) or -political parties 
(the National Salvation Party) failed to win majority backingo 
It seems that what the Turks desired 9 and to a large measure 
have achieved 9 was not a pendulum swing reaction to 
seculariam 9 but rather a compromise between an Islamic society 
and a secularist polity. Turkish society remains Islamic 
though the political and legal systems are built upon secular 
foundationBo 
A consensus on a reasonable compromise between Islamic 
society and secular state is not easy to find. Since the 
military intervention of 1980 there has been a sometimes 
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lively debate as the two sides begin a fresh search for 
~hiB mutually tolerable compromiAeo \-Jhere the final 
balance will be struck on thiA OCCFLAion it iA impcssi ble 
to aay., 'l'hG;) on=going controvPrsy ovAr the wer.Lring of 
hoad-sca:cvP.sp for exampleP showA that in Turkey today 
secularimn is still very much a live issueo 
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